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Abstract 
 
This dissertation offers the first comprehensive historical examination of the political 
economy of US public debt ownership. Specifically, the study addresses the following 
questions: Who owns the US public debt? Is the distribution of federal government bonds 
concentrated in the hands of a specific group or is it widely held? And what if the 
identities of those who receive interest payments on government bonds are distinct from 
those who pay the taxes that finance the interest payments on the public debt? Does this 
mean that the public debt redistributes income from taxpayers to public creditors? Who 
ultimately bears the burden of financing the public debt?  
Despite centuries of debate, political economists have failed to come to any consensus 
on even the most basic facts concerning ownership of the US public debt and its potential 
redistributive effects. Some claim that the public debt is heavily concentrated and that 
interest payments on government bonds redistribute income regressively from poor to 
rich. Others insist that the public debt has become very widely held and instead 
redistributes income progressively. The lack of consensus, I argue, boils down to both the 
empirical and theoretical problems that plague existing studies. 
Empirically, only a handful of studies have attempted to map the ownership pattern of 
US federal government bonds, and even fewer have made efforts to measure the 
redistributive effects associated with a given ownership pattern. And to make matters 
worse, those few studies that do attempt to map the pattern of US public debt ownership 
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make little effort to theorize in any systematic way the distributive and redistributive 
dimensions of the public debt. 
Anchored within a ‘capital as power’ theoretical framework, my purpose in this is to 
shed some much-needed light on the dynamics of distribution and redistribution that lie at 
the heart of the public debt. I show for the household and corporate sectors how over the 
past three decades, and especially in the context of the current crisis, the ownership of 
federal bonds and federal interest has become rapidly concentrated in the hands of 
dominant owners, the top 1% of households and the 2,500 largest corporations. Over the 
same period the federal income tax system has done little to progressively redistribute the 
federal interest income received by dominant owners. In this way, this dissertation argues 
that, since the early 1980s, the public debt has come to reinforce and augment the power 
of those at the very top of the hierarchy of social power.  
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1   Introduction 
 
 
 
 The public finances are one of the best starting points for an investigation of 
society, especially though not exclusively of its political life 
 —Joseph Schumpeter1 
 
The Questions 
 
Who owns the US public debt? Is the distribution of federal government bonds 
concentrated in the hands of a specific group or is it widely held? If ownership of 
government bonds is concentrated, the flow of interest payments on those government 
bonds is also concentrated. And what if the identities of those who receive interest 
payments on government bonds are distinct from those who pay the taxes that finance the 
interest payments on the public debt? Does this mean that the public debt redistributes 
income from taxpayers to public creditors? Who ultimately bears the burden of financing 
the public debt?  
As simple as these questions might sound, I argue in this study that political 
economists, despite centuries of debate, have given them unsatisfactory answers. Only a 
handful of studies have attempted to empirically map the ownership pattern of US federal 
government bonds, and even fewer have tried to measure the redistributive effects 
associated with a given ownership pattern.2 To make matters worse, the handful of 
                                                
1 Schumpeter, J.A. 1918 [1991]. ‘The Crisis of the Tax State’ in R. Swedberg (ed), The Economics and 
Sociology of Capitalism, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, p. 101.  
2 As we will see later this study, the poor empirical track record of existing studies may have to do in part 
with the paucity of disaggregate data on the ownership of the public debt.  	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empirical studies that do exist make little effort to theorize what I refer to throughout this 
study as the distributive and redistributive dynamics of the public indebtedness. 
To clarify, I use the terms distribution and redistribution to refer to the public debt and 
tax system, respectively. Distribution in this study refers to the pattern of ownership of 
government bonds and the interest payments that flow from those ownership claims. 
Redistribution has to do specifically with the role of the tax system in modifying the 
pattern of public debt ownership. This is a narrow definition of redistribution, which is 
distinguished from the broader definition of redistribution as a change in distribution (if 
the top 1% of the population receives 20 percent of income in year t and that 30 percent 
in year t+1, it is common to say there has been a 10 percent upward redistribution of 
income from years t to t+1). 
The empirical and theoretical shortcomings in the existing literature have led to 
ambiguities, such that political economists, whether ‘mainstream’ or ‘critical’, cannot 
agree on even the most basic facts, let alone their interpretation. Some claim that the 
public debt is heavily concentrated and that interest payments on government bonds 
redistribute income regressively from poor taxpayers to rich public creditors. Others 
insist that the public debt has become very widely held and instead redistributes income 
progressively. But given that existing studies lack any solid theoretical-empirical 
foundation, how are we to adjudicate between these competing claims? 
My purpose in this study is to shed some much-needed light on the dynamics of 
distribution and redistribution that lie at the heart of the public debt. I suggest that the 
empirical and theoretical shortcomings in the existing literature can be traced to an 
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insufficient conceptualization of power. Few would deny that issues of distribution and 
redistribution – in asking ‘who gets what?’ and also ‘who gets what at whose expense?’ – 
are rooted in concerns over power. Yet these power dimensions are conspicuously absent 
in existing studies of US public debt ownership. And it is not at all certain that 
conventional approaches to political economy, which tend to sidestep the power relations 
of debt and credit in capitalist societies by treating them as a distortion or as a fiction, 
offer much theoretical guidance (Nitzan and Bichler 2009).  
 
The Alternative 
 
Theoretically, my approach builds upon a burgeoning body of literature that places power 
at the heart of the analysis and conceptualizes capitalism not as a mode of 
production/consumption, but as a mode of power (Nitzan and Bichler 2009; Di Muzio 
2013; Hager 2012). According to this alternative ‘capital as power’ approach, capital is 
defined as capitalization: the discounting of future earning capacity into present value.  
This earning capacity, as we will see, is exclusively a matter of institutionalized power. 
Like any other asset, the value of a government bond is generated through discounting its 
risk-adjusted future earnings into present value. Following this logic, the public debt is 
not a ‘fiction’ as existing theories of capitalism would have us believe, but capital like 
any other capitalized asset. And like any other capital, the public debt, too, capitalizes 
power.  
The interest payments and principle that flow to owners of government bonds are 
‘backed by’ the government’s powers of taxation and this backing means that 
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government bondholders own a share ‘in the organized violence of society’ (Nitzan and 
Bichler 2009: 294). Framed as a guiding hypothesis, the capital as power approach 
developed in this study proposes that the accumulation of ownership claims on the public 
debt by a particular group of bondholders represents the growing power of that group 
over society.  
Crucially, the social power conferred by ownership is top-down, relative and dynamic. 
As a top-down process, the focus here is not on capital in general but on the dominant 
capitalists: the largest corporations and wealthy individuals at the center of the process of 
accumulation. As dominant capitalists augment and increase the market value of their 
ownership claims, they achieve differential accumulation and augment their power 
relative to other social groups. And as an inherently dynamic process, the way to gauge 
the trajectory of capitalist power is to map the relative changes in ownership over time.  
These alternative theoretical propositions provide a conceptual basis for the 
development of alternative empirical methods and accounting techniques. A focus on 
relative or differential accumulation leads to the use of cut-off points that separate 
dominant capital from the wider population. A focus on the dynamic aspects of power 
leads, where possible, to the replacement of ‘snapshots’ of ownership data with long-term 
historical time-series.  
Examining the US household and corporate sectors, my alternative theoretical-
empirical analysis offers the first systematic effort to map the long-term and shorter-term 
historical dynamics of distribution and redistribution that lie at the heart of the public 
debt. I show for both sectors how over the past three decades, and especially in the 
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context of the current crisis, the ownership of federal bonds and federal interest has 
become rapidly concentrated in the hands of dominant owners, the top 1% of households 
and the 2,500 largest corporations. Over the same period the federal income tax system 
has done little to progressively redistribute the federal interest income received by 
dominant owners. In this way, this study argues that, since the early 1980s, the public 
debt has come to reinforce and augment the power of those at the very top of the social 
hierarchy.  
 Anchored within this alternative theory of capital as power, the exploratory research 
conducted in this study produces some of the key quantitative building blocks for 
mapping the power relations of US public indebtedness. Yet this anchoring of the 
research with the theoretical framework remains partial. To develop a more complete 
theory of ‘public debt as power’, more work must be done to outline the qualitative and 
other quantitative dimensions of power and how these relate to the quantitative map 
produced in this study. In the concluding chapter of this study I suggest several avenues 
for future research that will flesh out the theory.  
 
The Synopsis 
 
The analysis in this study builds up gradually chapter-by-chapter; to properly 
comprehend it the reader is asked to tackle the document in its entirety. In the remainder 
of this introductory chapter, I provide a synopsis of the argument as it unfolds through the 
remaining seven chapters.  
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 Chapter Two sets the stage for the analysis by comprehensively surveying the existing 
literature on the distributive and redistributive dynamics of the US public debt. The 
chapter takes its point of departure in the work of the late nineteenth-century political 
economist Henry Carter Adams, who offered the first serious attempt to theorize and 
empirically map the pattern of US public debt ownership. In his empirical work, Adams 
(1887: 44) found the ‘spectacle of a highly centralized public debt’. The ownership of 
which was dominated by a powerful ‘bondholding class’ that, in Adams’s estimation, 
controlled the government much like dominant shareholders control a corporation. For 
Adams, the public debt reinforced class inequality between the majority of taxpayers who 
financed the interest payments on the public debt on the one hand, and the bondholding 
class that received the bulk of those interest payments on the other.  
The chapter then goes on to survey the literature as it has evolved since Adams 
published his pioneering study. As we will see, the twists and turns in the debates about 
the distributive and redistributive dynamics of the public debt have been bound up with 
deeper transformations in the US political economy. But one thing remains constant: over 
the past century political economists have come to no consensus regarding these 
dynamics. There has been no agreement on the most rudimentary facts. Some insist that 
the public debt has become widely held in the twentieth century and redistributes income 
progressively, while others emphasize continuities with Adams’s era and claim that 
ownership of the public debt is still heavily concentrated and redistributes income 
regressively. In short, political economists have failed to give any convincing portrayal, 
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let alone an explanation, of what has happened to the bondholding class that Adams 
theorized and mapped over a century ago.  
 The purpose of Chapter Three is to explain why political economists have failed to 
come to any consensus on even the most basic facts regarding the ownership of the public 
debt and its redistributive effects. The lack of consensus, I argue, is due to both empirical 
and theoretical problems that plague the existing literature. Empirically, the track record 
of the existing literature in mapping the disaggregate ownership of the public debt is, to 
put it mildly, patchy. And those few studies that do engage in empirical research offer 
little in the way of theoretical reflection on the subject matter. One crucial exception in 
this regard is the aforementioned work of Adams, whose theoretical-empirical framework 
drew inspiration from Marx and made implicit linkages between the ownership of the 
public debt and the exercise of power by the ‘bondholding class’. Yet Adams makes no 
effort to systematically theorize these power dimensions and their relationship to 
concepts such as value, capital and state, which are foundational to political economy.   
The linkages between distribution/redistribution and power have obvious intuitive 
appeal. But it is not at all clear whether conventional theories of political economy, both 
liberal and Marxist, can help us to integrate power into their frameworks in a way that 
would allow empirical research on the distributive and redistributive dynamics of the 
public debt to flourish. The remainder of Chapter Three outlines the difficulties that 
conventional frameworks have in explaining the power underpinnings of public 
indebtedness.  
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Chapter Four develops an alternative theoretical framework anchored within the 
notion of capital as power. This framework develops more explicitly and systematically 
the conceptual linkages between ownership and power in arguing that the institution of 
private ownership derives its very meaning from the principle of exclusion, which is itself 
a matter of organized power (Nitzan and Bichler 2009: 228). In contrast to the liberal and 
Marxist dual quantity theories of value, the power theory of value argues that the 
capitalist order has both quantitative and qualitative aspects. The quantitative architecture 
of capitalist power is denominated in universal units of price and governed by the process 
of capitalization: the discounting of risk-adjusted future earnings into present value. In 
terms of methodology, the linkages drawn between this quantitative architecture and the 
qualitative manifestations of power are inherently speculative and depend on our abilities 
to link the two together in a compelling, rigorous story.3 Crucially, as a process of power, 
the accumulation of ownership titles is both dynamic and differential: the guiding 
objective of capitalists is to augment the capitalized value of their ownership titles over 
time and relative to some average benchmark. As a top-down approach, the power theory 
of capital as power is focused not on ‘capital in general’ but on the dominant capitalist 
owners at the center of the process of accumulation.  
This alternative framework offers new theoretical-empirical insights into the 
distributive and redistributive dynamics of the public debt. The remainder of Chapter 
Four fleshes out the power-centered research methods that will be employed to explore 
                                                
3 Conventional dual quantity theories of value, like any other theory, are also speculative. Yet the main 
difference is that these value theories tend to deny or gloss over this speculative dimension, whereas capital 
as power makes it explicit. 
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the distributive and redistributive dynamics of the public debt. As we will see, a focus on 
the top-down nature of power leads us to examine the differential ownership share of 
dominant owners. A focus on the dynamic aspects of power leads, where possible, to a  
replacement of narrow ‘snapshots’ of ownership data with long-term historical time-
series that map the ownership of the public debt over time. And taking into consideration 
some of the empirical limits on what we can know about the redistributive dynamics of 
the public debt leads us to focus on the role of the federal income tax system in 
redistributing the federal interest income received by dominant owners.  
Before proceeding to map the distributive and redistributive dynamics of the public 
debt, Chapter Five provides a primer on the nature of government borrowing. Using Post 
Keynesian macro accounting techniques, the chapter examines the role of government 
borrowing in contemporary capitalist societies and systematically decomposes the 
sectoral ownership of the public debt. The purpose of this chapter is to provide a much-
needed de-mystification of the public debt, which, since the birth of political economy in 
the eighteenth century, has been treated almost religiously. Overall, this primer provides 
the groundwork for the disaggregate analysis of public debt ownership and redistribution 
that follows in the remainder of the study.  
 Chapter Six offers the first systematic effort to historically map the distributive and 
redistributive dynamics of the public debt for the US household sector. Using the top 1% 
of households as an ‘indirect proxy’ for dominant capital (Bichler et al 2012: 5), my 
argument in this chapter unfolds in three-steps. First, I show how concentration in the 
ownership of the US public debt follows the general U-shaped pattern of wealth and 
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income inequality in the US over the past century. Second, I demonstrate how the federal 
income tax system has done little to progressively redistribute the federal interest income 
received by the top 1%. Third, I assess the claim made by orthodox Keynesians that the 
intra-governmental portion of the public debt serves the interests of ordinary Americans 
by analyzing the distribution of federal transfer payments. Recent data collected by the 
Congressional Budget Office indicate that the top 1% of households has received a paltry 
share of these transfer payments. But this small share, I argue, is no reason to celebrate 
intra-governmental debt as a progressive force. Once we dig deeper and examine the 
distribution of transfer payments within the bottom 99%, it becomes clear that over the 
past three decades intra-governmental debt has, if anything, intensified social inequality 
and polarization.  
 Overall, the research in Chapter Six leads me to conclude that over the past three 
decades the public debt has served as an institution of power working in the interests of 
the top 1%. Though much has changed since Adams’s time, the research suggests that the 
powerful ‘bondholding class’ is alive and well in contemporary US capitalism.  
 Chapter Seven provides the first examination since Adams of the distributive and 
redistributive dynamics of the public debt for the corporate sector. Throughout history 
heterodox political economists have argued that ownership of the public debt has 
bolstered the power of dominant business groups (see Gottlieb 1956). Most famous in 
this regard was the work of Marx, who in various writings, made references to a powerful 
‘aristocracy of finance’ in Western Europe and the United States that exercised power 
over state and society through the ownership and trading of government bonds. 
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Concentrated ownership of the public debt was combined with regressive taxation on ‘the 
most necessary means of subsistence’ (Marx 1867: 920). And this meant that the public 
debt redistributed income from the laboring masses to the financial aristocracy. Yet there 
has been almost no research into the linkages between the public debt and business 
power.  
My research indicates that corporate sector holdings of the public debt have become 
rapidly concentrated in favor of the top 2,500 corporations over the past three decades 
and especially in the context of the current crisis. Though the federal income tax system 
is marginally progressive in the household context, my research Chapter Seven shows 
that it has been practically neutral for the corporate sector. In other words, federal income 
taxes have done nothing to stem the rapid concentration in the distribution of federal 
interest income. A sectoral analysis of the distribution of the public debt indicates that 
corporations classified within Finance, Insurance and Real Estate (FIRE), own a 
dominant and increasing share of the public debt. And digging deeper, an analysis of the 
sub-sectoral distribution of the public debt within FIRE reveals that institutional investors 
have replaced ‘traditional’ bank intermediaries as the dominant owners of the public debt.  
Taken as a whole, the research in Chapter Seven suggests that Marx’s notion of a 
powerful ‘aristocracy of finance’ at the heart of the public debt is not a relic confined to 
an earlier phase of capitalist development, but a very real feature of the contemporary US 
political economy.  
Chapter Eight concludes the study by suggesting avenues for future research and by 
fleshing out some of the implications of the research findings. The bulk of the chapter 
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taps into recent debates that have emerged in light of the explosive rise in the US public 
debt. Underpinning these heated debates is an assumption that the US faces a ‘debt 
dilemma’ over whether it should bring its fiscal house in order through tax hikes on the 
rich or cuts to entitlement programs. At the heart of this debate is the question of which 
groups should bear the burden of debt repayment and fiscal adjustment. 
As we will see, it is primarily thanks to the efforts of anti-austerity groups that issues 
of power and inequality have been forced into the current debate over the ‘debt dilemma’. 
With stubbornly high unemployment and increasing income and wealth inequality, these 
groups advocate gradual debt reduction through tax hikes on the ‘super-rich’ that have 
gained the most from the political economic regime in place since the early 1980s. But in 
the end the anti-austerity groups do not go far enough.  
As the research findings in this study suggest, power is not only central to the issue of 
public debt repayment, but also to the very existence of the public debt in the first place. 
And the public debt is not simply related to the issue of inequality. Instead, the public 
debt, through the power dynamics of ownership distribution and redistribution, directly 
contributes to income and wealth inequality in America. And once these power relations 
underpinning public indebtedness are brought to the fore, we gain a totally different 
understanding of America’s ‘debt dilemma’. Increases to the public debt without 
progressive redistributive policies are likely to aggravate an already explosive situation 
characterized by inequality, while decreases to the privately held portion of the public 
debt are likely to encounter resistance from dominant owners of the public debt.  
This, I conclude, is America’s real debt dilemma.   
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2   What Happened to the Bondholding Class? 
A Survey 
 
 The capitalists are in a very small minority, and any legislation repudiating in 
whole or in part the obligations of the bonds of the government would fall most 
severely upon widows, orphans and people of small capital…Out of the three 
million subscribers to our various public loans, over nine-tenths are of the class 
called the people. 
 —Jay Cooke4 
 
 
Introduction 
 
Debates about the ownership of the public debt have raged in the US since the country 
gained independence from British rule. The original system of public debt, established in 
1790 and based on Treasury Secretary Alexander Hamilton’s Report on Public Credit, 
drew the ire of critics who argued that it created a ‘new monied [sic] interest’ that 
produced nothing and wished only for ‘oppressive taxes’ (Wright 2008: 153). Robert 
Livingston (1790: 4), an early opponent of the US system of public debt, claimed that 
only 0.025 percent of the US population owned government bonds. The inequalities in 
the ownership of the public debt, Livingston suggested, were a source of great social 
instability, as the taxes of the many would go to enrich the few public creditors (cf. 
Wright 2008: 162). 
 During the American Civil War (1861-1864) President Abraham Lincoln claimed that 
large increases in the public debt would create political and social unrest unless efforts 
                                                4	  Quoted in Macdonald (2003: 398; original emphasis).	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were made to ensure that government bonds were widely distributed amongst the US 
population.5 In 1865 Lincoln’s successor, Andrew Johnson, suggested that the country 
had failed to widely distribute government bonds. In Johnson’s view the Northern States 
had merely replaced their slave oligarchy with an aristocracy based on the ownership of 
the public debt (ibid: 393). Jay Cooke, a banker and government loan contractor during 
the Civil War, vehemently denied such claims.6 According to Cooke, his campaigns to 
market government bonds to the masses had made large capitalists minority investors in 
the public debt. Attempts to repudiate the public debt would, Cooke proclaimed, bring 
great harm to all the widows, orphans and small-time savers across the US who had 
invested their meager savings in the public debt.  
 But it was only in the late nineteenth century that any concerted effort was made to 
theorize and empirically map the pattern of US public debt ownership. In 1887, Henry 
Carter Adams published a pioneering study that examined the ‘concentration of 
bondholding interests’ in the US. Focusing specifically on household and corporate sector 
holdings of federal government bonds, Adams (1887: 44) uncovered the ‘spectacle of a 
highly centralized public debt’. The public creditors, according to Adams's assessment, 
formed a powerful ‘bondholding class’ that controlled the government much like 
dominant shareholders control a corporation. Adams (ibid: 41) went on to suggest that the 
public debt reinforced a strict class division between the majority whose burdensome 
                                                
5 The account in this paragraph relies on Macdonald (2003: 392-399).  
6 Cooke’s role in financing the Civil War is told in Matthew Josephson’s masterful history of US capitalism 
(53-58). It may have been that Cooke had Marx (1867: 940) in mind when he proclaimed that the Civil War 
had led to ‘the creation of a finance aristocracy of the vilest type’.   
 
 
 
 15 
taxes financed government debt servicing, and the bondholding class that received the 
tax-financed interest payments.    
 Over a century has passed since Adams produced his analysis. In that time, there has 
been plenty of heated debate about the pattern of US public debt ownership. Some 
emphasize continuities with Adams’s era and claim that the public debt is still heavily 
concentrated and that interest payments on government bonds still redistribute income 
regressively from poor to rich. Others stress change and insist that the public debt has 
become widely held and that interest payments on government bonds now redistribute 
income progressively. The debate has become so polarized that contemporary political 
economists, whether ‘mainstream’ or ‘critical’, cannot agree on even the most basic facts 
concerning ownership of the US public debt and its redistributive effects. As a result, 
political economists have failed to give any convincing explanation of what has happened 
to the bondholding class that Adams theorized and mapped over a century ago.  
 In this chapter I survey the existing political economic literature on the distributive 
and redistributive dynamics of the US public debt. Focusing on some of the key 
contributions, I develop an historical account of the debate over the past century. The 
twists and turns in the debate, I suggest, are bound up with deeper transformations in the 
US political economy, which have brought in their wake changes in the thinking about, 
and also in the overall level of, public indebtedness. The purpose of this survey is not to 
exhaust everything written on the subject matter, but rather to highlight the lack of 
consensus regarding the actual pattern of public debt ownership and its redistributive 
effects. This survey sets the stage for Chapter Three, in which I dig deeper and attempt to 
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explain why political economists have faced such difficulties reaching a consensus on 
these issues.  
 The rest of the chapter will be organized as follows. First, I offer a detailed overview 
of Adams’s theoretical and empirical analysis of the late nineteenth-century bondholding 
class. Second, I discuss the debates about the distributive and redistributive dynamics of 
the public debt that accompanied the rise of Keynesianism in the 1930s. Third, I examine 
changes in the nature of the debate in the postwar period. I argue that this period is 
noteworthy less for what was said about the distributive and redistributive dynamics of 
the public debt, and more for what was not said. Instead of debating whether the public 
debt redistributed wealth and income between classes or social groups, postwar liberals 
instead became embroiled in a debate about whether the public debt redistributed wealth 
and income between generations. Even postwar Marxists treated the distributive and 
redistributive effects of the public debt as little more than a historical curiosity. Fourth, I 
review the resurgence of debate about the distributive and redistributive dynamics of the 
public debt since the early 1980s. In conclusion, I set up the task for the next chapter, 
which will be to explain why political economists have such difficulties coming to 
consensus on even the most basic facts concerning the distributive and redistributive 
dynamics of the public debt.  
 
H.C. Adams and the ‘Science of Finance’ 
 
Since the founding of the American Republic, politicians, political economists, the media 
and ordinary citizens have fiercely debated the distributive and redistributive 
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consequences associated with public indebtedness. In the early years of the republic these 
sentiments were often based on political expediency rather than any systematic theory. 
Furthermore, there were no attempts to subject these claims about the distributive and 
redistributive dimensions of the public debt to any rigorous empirical scrutiny. With little 
data available on the distribution of the public debt, the arguments were backed up by 
little more than rumour and conjecture.  
By the late-nineteenth century, however, the debate started to change. In his Public 
Debts: An Essay in the Science of Finance, Henry Carter Adams (1887) developed a 
coherent theoretical framework that analyzed the effects of public indebtedness on the 
class structure of capitalist societies. What is more, Adams sought to substantiate his 
theoretical claims with a careful empirical examination of US Census data from 1880. 
For the first time, the distributive and redistributive consequences of the US public debt 
were to be subjected to serious theoretical-empirical research.  
 
Public Debt and Class Politics 
 
Adams’s contribution to the study of public indebtedness was shaped by developments 
that were unfolding in the latter half of the nineteenth century. In that period, the act of 
public borrowing had become a nearly universal feature of the global political economy. 
What had started as the exclusive practice of the commercial powers, such as Holland 
and England, had become an ‘established fact’ that was being adopted by advanced 
Western powers and imitated by societies in all corners of the world. The guiding 
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purpose of Adams’s study was to provide an explanation for this unprecedented spread of 
the practice of public borrowing.  
 For Adams (1887: 7), successful systems of public borrowing, such as the one that 
developed in England in the seventeenth century, depended on two things. First, 
successful systems of public borrowing grew out of established money markets, which in 
turn depended on ‘a somewhat advanced state of industrial development’ and the 
emergence of a new propertied class, the capitalists, with surplus capital that could be 
loaned to the government (ibid: 7-8). Second, successful systems of public borrowing 
required that the government make an explicit guarantee against repudiation, and this 
guarantee was best secured by republics or ‘by peoples possessing some form of 
constitutional government’ (ibid: 8).  
 Adams (1887: 7-11) suggested that these two factors were inherently intertwined. 
Constitutional governments emerged out of the principle that people should be able to 
govern themselves (ibid: 9). But according to Adams (ibid: 9), ‘…the historical fact is 
that, in the attempt to realize this theory, the actual control of public affairs has fallen into 
the hands of those who possess property’. Public creditors that lent to government, 
Adams (ibid: 9) argued, therefore ‘…lend to a corporation controlled by themselves’. On 
the one hand, the new class of capitalists possessed surplus funds, and on the other, the 
government was in need of these funds to carry out wars. And the principles of 
constitutionalism had, according to Adams’s assessment, emerged out of this historical 
symbiosis. The capitalists’ decision to lend to the government was not based on 
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patriotism or any other sentiment; it was merely a sign ‘…that in some way the moneyed 
interest has captured the machinery of government’ (ibid: 9).   
 Adams (1887: Chapter Three) went on to analyze the ‘social tendencies’ of public 
indebtedness, which he defined as the influence of public debt on class relations. In 
general, social tendencies could have two effects on class relations: they could change the 
existing class structure or they could serve to ‘…render permanent such classes as are 
already established’ (ibid: 39). The social tendency of the public debt was, in Adams’s 
view, only of the second variety (ibid: 39).  
Large fortunes had indeed been amassed from trading in government bonds. But 
Adams (1887: 40) held that these fortunes were the result of poor financial management 
by the government and not the existence public debt per se. ‘Men’, Adams (ibid: 41) 
states unequivocally, ‘hold bonds because they are rich, they do not become rich by 
holding bonds’. After all, Adams (ibid: 41) had argued that a strict class division, under 
which private property was sufficiently concentrated in the hands of the capitalist class, 
was one of the main prerequisites to the development of successful systems of public 
borrowing. All the emergence of the public debt does is render existing class relations 
permanent by dividing society into ‘…those who pay taxes for the support of the debt, 
and those who receive interest payments out of the proceeds of the taxes’ (ibid: 41). In 
this way, the division between public creditors and taxpayers would mirror the class 
division in capitalism between propertied and property-less (see Ferguson 2001: 191). 
Adams never spells out who, in class terms, the taxpayers are that support the public debt, 
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though by definition Adams implies that the class identity of taxpayers is somehow 
distinct from the capitalist class of public creditors.   
According to Adams (1887: 41), the bondholding class refers more to a particular set 
of interests that the capitalist class holds in relation to the public debt than to a specific 
group or ‘fraction’ of capitalists. Most importantly, the bondholding class of rich 
individuals and large corporations advocates the permanency of public borrowing, 
claiming that this permanency is essential to the economic wellbeing, or ‘commercial 
interests’, of the nation and to the stability of the national banking system (ibid: 42). In 
this way, Adams (ibid: 42-3) argues, the bondholding class tries to convince people that 
‘what proves to be of personal advantage must of necessity benefit the community at 
large’.  
 
Mapping the US Bondholding Class 
 
Ultimately, the social tendencies of the public debt would hinge on how the public debt 
was distributed. A highly concentrated public debt would confirm the existence of a 
powerful bondholding class. Adams set out to measure the ‘concentration of bondholding 
interests’ in the US. Luckily for Adams’s purposes, data on the disaggregate pattern of 
public debt ownership had recently surfaced. In 1880, the U.S. Census published for the 
first time data on the ownership of the public debt, disaggregated by gender, by amounts 
held and by region.7 Adams (1887: 44) analyzed extensively these census data and 
                                                
7 The 1880 US Census was an anomaly in this respect. Not only was the 1880 census the first to publish 
disaggregate data on the ownership of the US public debt, it was also the last to do so. These data are 
conspicuously absent from next decennial census in 1890. And the US Census Bureau has not bothered to 
collect these data ever since. The census data on the disaggregate ownership of the public debt captured not 
 
 
 
 21 
uncovered the ‘spectacle of a highly centralized public debt’ for both the US household 
and corporate sectors.  
The main 1880 census data cited by Adams (1887: 46) are reproduced in Table 2.1. 
The first column in the table divides the public creditors into investment classes based on 
the total amount they invested in the public debt. These classes range from class I, which 
includes investments of $50-$500, to class VIII, which includes investments exceeding 
$50,000. The next four columns provide data on the percentage of investors in each 
investment class and on the percentage held by the respective investment classes for both 
US individuals and US corporations.  
Let’s begin with the data on individual holdings of the public debt in columns 2 and 3. 
Though it represented only 1.4 percent of the total population of individual public 
creditors in 1880, the top investment class with investments exceeding $50,000 (class 
VIII), owned 48 percent of the individual holdings of the US public debt.8 The unequal 
distribution of the US public debt becomes even more apparent when we divide the 
investment classes in half. Public creditors in classes V through VIII, those with 
investments exceeding $5,000, made up only 15 percent of the population of individual 
public creditors, and yet they owned 82 percent of the individual share of the public debt. 
Given the fact that the average annual per capita income in the US in 1880 is estimated at 
around $176 (Klein 2009), it could be safely assumed that only the wealthiest individuals 
had any significant ownership stake in the US public debt.  
                                                                                                                                            
only the attention of Adams, but also of the New York Times, which ran an article discussing these data (see 
Anonymous 1881).  
8 The total public debt in 1880 was $1.2 billion (Adams 1887: 44).  
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Table 2.1: The US Bondholding Class in 1880 
 
1. Classes 
Designated by 
Amounts Held 
2. Number of 
Individual 
Holders 
(% of total 
number of 
individuals) 
3. Amounts Held 
by Individuals 
 (% of total held 
by individuals) 
4. Number of 
Corporate 
Holders 
(% of total number 
of corporations) 
5. Amounts Held 
by Corporations  
(% of total held by 
corporations) 
 
I. $50-$500 
 
36 
 
1.8 
 
4 
 
0.007 
 
II. $500-$1,000 
 
21 
 
3 
 
4 
 
0.03 
 
III. $1,000-$2,500 
 
17 
 
5 
 
4 
 
 
0.04 
 
IV. $2,500-$5,000  
 
12 
 
8 
 
10 
 
0.3 
 
V. $5,000-$10,000 
 
7 
 
9 
 
13 
 
0.8 
 
VI. $10,000-
$25,000 
 
5 
 
13 
 
17 
 
2 
 
VII. $25,000-
$50,000 
 
1.8 
 
12 
 
15 
 
4 
 
VIII. Over $50,000 
 
1.4 
 
48 
 
35 
 
93 
Note: Percentage values in columns may not total to 100 due to rounding.  
 
Source: Adapted from Adams (1887: 46).  
 
 
The data on corporate ownership of the US public debt in columns 4 and 5 of Table 
2.1 are less clear. When it comes to corporate holdings, we would expect individual 
corporations to hold more government bonds than individuals, given that the size of the 
average corporate balance sheet normally outstrips that of the average household. Yet 
even with this discrepancy, the same ‘classes’ are used to differentiate the amounts held 
by individuals and corporations. As a result, the census data on corporate holdings tell us 
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very little about the relative ownership shares of large versus small corporations. Given 
average corporate holdings of around $22,500, we would expect that even fairly 
insignificant players would be included within the top investment class (class VIII). And 
with such a low cut off point, 35 percent of corporations make it into the top investment 
class (holdings exceeding $50,000). Still there is nothing within the data in Table 2.1 to 
suggest that the pattern of ownership concentration for the corporate sector differs 
significantly from that of individuals. The top class of owners may be ‘diluted’ by this 
low cut off point. Yet the fact that top corporate owners held around 93 percent of 
government bonds indicates a staggering pattern of ownership concentration.9   
Overall, the census data cited by Adams appear to confirm his arguments about the 
public debt being concentrated in the hands of a ‘bondholding class’ of wealthy 
individuals and large corporations. In contrast to Jay Cooke, Adams (1887: 47) argued 
there was no reason to suggest that the public debt is ‘a good thing because it permits 
easy and safe investments for the funds of those who are weak and dependent’. Given the 
level of concentration in the hands of society’s most powerful elements, Adams (ibid: 48) 
held it ‘ludicrous’ to suggest that the public debt was maintained for the benefit of 
widows, orphans and other members of society in need.10   
 
                                                
9 If corporate shares are widely held, then a broader base of the population may have indirect investments 
in the public debt. But Adams (1887: 47) suggests that there is nothing to suggest that corporate shares are 
more equitably distributed than government bonds (see Chapter Seven).  
10 In a recent study, Robert E. Wright (2008: 162) accuses Adams of underestimating ‘…for political gain 
the dispersion of the national debt as it then stood’. The main reason for the underestimation, Wright (ibid: 
162; emphasis added) claims, is that Adams measured concentration only in ‘registered’ federal debt, 
‘which was probably more concentrated than ownership of the government's [unregistered] bearer bonds’. 
But alas, Wright does not make any attempt to estimate, even roughly, how unregistered bonds would alter 
the pattern of ownership concentration. Without even a rough estimate, one could just as easily accuse 
Wright of underestimating Adams's findings for his own ‘political gain’.  
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In many ways, the timing of Adams’s pioneering study was inopportune. In the late- 
nineteenth century, the level of US public debt had declined significantly. As Figure 2.1 
indicates, the level of US public debt as a percentage of GDP fell from around 32 percent 
in the immediate post-Civil War period to 12.6 percent in 1887, the year Adams's study 
was published.  
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Figure 2.1 US Gross Public Debt as a Percentage of GDP 
 
Note: Gross public debt includes intra-governmental debt (the debt held in 
government trust fund accounts) and 'debt held by the public'.  
 
Source: From 1792-2010, Global Financial Data (series codes: for GDP, GDPUSA, 
for public debt USFYGFDA); from 2010-2012, Office of Management and Budget 
(Table 7.1) 
percent percent 
sbhager.tumblr.com 
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With the public debt in decline, debates about its distributive and redistributive effects all 
but disappeared in the late nineteenth century (Hansen 1941: 113; Rowley 1987: 62). It 
was not until the first half of the twentieth century, which witnessed two world wars, the 
Great Depression and the largest expansion of public borrowing in US history, that the 
debates would resurface. 
 
The Keynesian Revolution  
 
The next wave of discussion would come with the rise of Keynesianism. With 
unemployment exceeding 20 percent in the US and Britain during the Great Depression, 
Keynes (1936: 27) and his followers were compelled to develop to a liberal alternative to 
the ‘classical’ theory of employment.11 In the General Theory, Keynes (1936: 6) explains 
how liberal political economy had previously assumed that all unemployment was either 
frictional or voluntary. In the former case, unemployment was a short-lived phenomenon 
due to temporary mismatches of demand and supply in isolated markets, while in the 
latter case it was due to workers demanding wages higher than their marginal 
productivity (ibid: 6). In the long run, however, there was simply no room for chronic 
involuntary unemployment within the classical framework. The classical liberal view 
elevated the market to a self-regulating mechanism governed by Say’s Law, which 
Keynes (ibid: 18) summarized as ‘supply creates its own demand’. This meant that in the 
long run, aggregate supply and aggregate demand would reach an equilibrium point at 
full employment. 
                                                
11 Keynes (1936: 3) used the blanket term ‘classical’ to refer to both classical and neoclassical thinkers.  
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The situation in the 1930s flew in the face of the classical explanation. Unemployment 
was proving to be stubbornly persistent rather than temporary and that persistence 
remained, at least in the US, even in the context of declining wages and unemployed 
workers willing but unable to find work at any wage (Blaug 1997: 643). For the most 
part, Keynes argued, the unemployment of the 1930s was not frictional or voluntary, but 
involuntary. And involuntary unemployment, it followed, was to be understood as a 
problem of ‘effective demand’. According to Keynes, the aggregate supply of goods and 
services willingly supplied by capitalists could, and often did, equal aggregate demand at 
an equilibrium point below full employment. As such, Keynes argued that active 
government intervention was needed in order to combat involuntary unemployment. 
Expansionary government spending would serve as a compensatory mechanism filling in 
for the lull in effective aggregate demand in the private sector. 
In providing the first systematic theoretical justification for active government 
intervention from within the liberal tradition, Keynes and his followers would need to 
provide a convincing alternative to the liberal faith in the doctrine of sound finance, 
which called for balanced budgets and minimal government borrowing.12 In other words, 
Keynesians would have to develop a framework that determined how the government 
would finance its expenditures in a way that would most powerfully boost aggregate 
demand while minimizing the negative side effects that the dogma of sound finance 
feared. This challenge involved demonstrating how the public debt, once used to fund 
                                                
12 Keynes (1925) himself was somewhat ambivalent in his allegiance to liberalism and this ambivalence is 
reflected in his theoretical framework. Throughout this study I argue that Keynes falls within the liberal 
tradition insofar as he tacitly accepted – or at best never provided a coherent alternative to – neoclassical 
thinking save for the crucial exception of Say’s Law.  
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war making – and in the latter half of the nineteenth century, also to fund public works 
projects – could be used as an effective tool of macroeconomic management (Gottlieb 
1956: 266; Hansen 1941: 138). Keynes left it to his followers to flesh out the mechanics 
of how government policy would be used to achieve stability (Burkhead 1954: 207). And 
in the 1940s, the most prominent early Keynesians, Alvin Hansen and Abba Lerner, took 
up the task of re-thinking the role of the public debt within capitalist societies.  
 
‘We Owe it to Ourselves’ 
 
The views of Keynesian theorists of the public debt are diverse (Burkhead 1954: 206-10; 
Lerner 1943: 43-4). Yet the kernel that unites the arguments of Hansen and Lerner and, in 
turn, provides the basis for a Keynesian critique of the sound finance doctrine, is that the 
public debt differs fundamentally from private debt (Hansen and Greer 1942: 491; Lerner 
1948: 255).  
For private individuals and businesses, success or failure is determined by the 
principles of private accounting and the primary benchmark for success is net wealth, 
which is calculated by subtracting debts from assets (Lerner 1948: 255). In the private 
sphere, Lerner (ibid: 255) proclaims, ‘Indebtedness is impoverishment’ and all of the 
traditional rules of sound finance, to minimize indebtedness, to keep debt within a 
sustainable ratio to net income and to balance the budget, formed ‘…an eminently well-
established rule of private prudence’. Private debt, Lerner (ibid: 255) maintains, is 
restricted by the principles of sound finance because it is external to the debtor. Any 
private individual or group who owes money to another private individual or group is 
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burdened by interest payments on their debt because they involve an external transfer of 
income from one entity (the debtor) to another entity (the creditor).  
In contrast, Keynesian theorists argued that the success or failure of the government 
should not be subjected to the same principles as private accounting (Dillard 1948: 105). 
According to Lerner (1943: 39), government policy actions ‘shall all be undertaken with 
an eye only to the results of these actions on the economy and not to any established 
traditional doctrine about what is sound or unsound’. The benchmark of success for the 
government was whether its policies were successful in creating non-inflationary full 
employment. So long as non-inflationary full employment was achieved and maintained, 
the outstanding level of public debt was inconsequential.  
The reason, Keynesians argued, was the public debt was internal. When viewed in 
aggregate macroeconomic terms, the income transferred from taxpayers to public 
creditors in the form of interest payments flows internally within the same entity – the 
national economy.13 In aggregate accounting terms, one person’s asset is another person’s 
liability and so in the aggregate macro-economy the two cancel each other out. As Lerner 
(ibid: 256) explains, an internally held public debt involves no external creditor: ‘we owe 
it to ourselves’.   
 
 
 
 
                                                
13 Keynesians point out that the public debt held by foreigners is an external form of debt (Hansen and 
Greer 1942: 492; Lerner 1948: 256). In this case the interest payments constitute a transfer of income from 
one entity (the borrowing government) to an external entity (a foreign citizen or nation). In the case of 
foreign held public debt, the rules of sound finance apply. 
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‘We’ ≠ ‘Ourselves’ 
 
In the aggregate, Keynesians argued that the public debt was not subject to any pre-
defined limits, but conceded that, in the disaggregate, there were potential threats that 
accompanied a rapidly growing public debt. One of the potential dark undersides of a 
rapidly growing public debt was the effect it had on the distribution of income and 
wealth. Lerner (1948: 260) admits that once we start to disaggregate the national macro-
economy, ‘“we” does not consist of the same people as “ourselves”’. If the identity of 
bondholders is distinct from the identity of taxpayers, then the public debt will 
redistribute income from the latter to the former.  
Both Hansen (1941: 174) and Lerner (1948: 260-1) were keenly aware of the negative 
effects that a rapidly growing public debt might have on distribution. Hansen (1941: 
179), for example, argued that lower and middle class investors could invest in the public 
debt in the event of small, gradual increases in the public debt and that this would not 
present any regressive effects on distribution. But he went on to suggest that the rich 
would disproportionately purchase government bonds in the event of large increases in 
the public debt, and that this process would only serve to intensify existing inequality. 
The negative effects of public debt on the distribution of wealth were in Hansen’s (ibid: 
179) view ‘…the most fundamental objection that can be raised against financing mainly 
by borrowing’.14 
                                                
14 Even dominant capitalists during this period were attuned to the distributive and redistributive dynamics 
of a large public debt. According to Winthrop Aldrich (1943: 122), Chairman of Chase National Bank: ‘If a 
public debt is widely distributed among all income groups in the community, a larger number of people 
will acquire conscious personal interest in government fiscal policy. This is as it should be in a democracy. 
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Early Keynesian theorists of the public debt were uncomfortable with the idea that 
government borrowing might have such adverse effects on the distribution of wealth and 
income. Although this point is never made explicit in the work of Hansen or Lerner, from 
a Keynesian perspective any regressive effects of a growing public debt on distribution 
would only aggravate the deficiency of ‘effective demand’. The so-called ‘marginal 
propensity to consume’ was, after all, much higher for those with lower incomes, and a 
pattern of distribution skewed towards top earners would, if unequal enough, eventually 
undermine, rather than enhance, the much vaunted ‘multiplier effect’ (Dillard 1948: 102-
3; Brown 2004). These dynamics, if pushed far enough, would eventually undermine the 
government's ability to engage in counter-cyclical deficit spending.  
Though they recognized the potential distributive and redistributive dynamics of the 
public debt, the early Keynesians did not believe that these dynamics were of much 
practical concern. Hansen and Greer (1942: 497) declared unequivocally that the 
distribution of government bonds in the 1940s was more equitable than at any other point 
in history, and that, as a result, it is ‘not true that the wealth represented by the [federal] 
bonds is mainly concentrated in the hands of a relatively few of the very rich’. Wide 
swaths of the population, Hansen (1941: 179) went on to argue, benefitted indirectly from 
the public debt through their stake in ‘institutional thrift institutions’ such as life 
insurance, savings banks and social security trust funds, which held government bonds. 
Furthermore, both Hansen (1941: 181) and Lerner (1948: 261) argued that the negative 
effects of the public debt on distribution would, within certain limits, be a reasonable 
                                                                                                                                            
Moreover, if the debt is widely distributed, political controversies between bondholders and non-
bondholders are not likely to arise’ (see also Lasdon 1942).  
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trade-off for the attainment of full employment. Finally, both Hansen (1941: 179) and 
Lerner (1948: 261) were confident that any lingering distributive inequality created by 
the public debt could be offset through progressive taxation.  
 
Enter the Critics 
 
Neither Hansen nor Lerner offered any compelling evidence to back up their assertions 
about the distributive and redistributive dynamics of the public debt. This void left the 
issue unsettled and opened the way for critics who questioned the feasibility of the 
Keynesian approaches to public borrowing. Most of the hostility came from more free 
market-oriented liberals.  
The University of Chicago’s Harold Moulton (1943: 59), for example, attacked 
Hansen for failing to provide convincing data to back up his claim that the public debt 
had become more widely held, though Moulton himself offered no disaggregated 
ownership data of his own. Instead, Moulton (ibid: 59-60) mentions how nearly 40 
percent of the public debt is held by commercial banks that, he claimed, serve the 
interests of big business and ‘individuals of substantial means’. Moulton’s evidence was 
just as fuzzy as Hansen’s, but with both sides failing to produce any detailed data on the 
disaggregate ownership pattern, his claim was enough to bring into doubt some of the 
Keynesian arguments about the public debt. Meanwhile the Austrian School economist 
Albert Hahn (1949: 18) accepted the Keynesian claim that the public debt had become 
more widely held and taxation more progressive. But Hahn (ibid: 18) argued that this 
dynamic of progressive redistribution would have devastating consequences for capitalist 
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societies because it would transfer wealth from ‘productive’ entrepreneurs to the 
‘unproductive’ state, stifling risk taking, innovation and entrepreneurship. 
 In the 1940s, the debate raged back and forth between those who claimed that the 
public debt was highly concentrated and those who claimed that it was widely held 
(Reinhardt 1945; Harris 1947). Yet as one commentator put it, when it came to the 
ownership of the public debt, there was ‘rarely […] any substantive evidence offered for 
conclusions reached’ (Cohen 1951: 267). In the first book-length study of Keynesian 
views on the public debt, Seymour Harris (1947: 180) was forced to concede that 
‘available information on distribution of holdings of government securities is scanty and 
scattered’.  
 
Keynesian Vindication 
 
Things started to change, if only modestly, very early in the postwar period. In the early 
1950s, a pair of empirical studies surfaced, both of which appeared to corroborate the 
arguments of Hansen and Lerner. In a study based on his PhD dissertation, Donald Miller 
(1950: 134-5) found that, for 1945, just over 5.3 percent of US households received 
almost 60 percent of the total household share of interest payments on federal bonds. Yet 
Miller (ibid: 134-5) also found that the share of federal taxes paid and the share of federal 
interest income received by the top income earners in the US was more or less equal at 
around 60 percent. This led Miller (ibid: 142) to claim that the US public debt was not an 
important ‘redistributive force’. In a short article, Jacob Cohen (1951: 267) used rough 
estimates to gauge the distribution of federal interest and federal income taxes; he 
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declared that, for 1946, the US public debt actually had a ‘…distributional effect in favor 
of lower-income groups’.  
Miller’s research suggested that ownership of the public debt was still highly 
concentrated, but that the tax structure was sufficiently progressive to ensure that what 
the rich received in federal interest payments was matched by what they gave in federal 
taxes. As a result, Miller’s research appeared to support the claims of Hansen and Lerner 
that any lingering inequalities in public debt ownership would be offset through a 
progressive tax system. Federal taxes had, it seemed, come to neutralize the regressive 
redistributive dynamics of the public debt. The class conflict that pitted rich public 
creditors against poor taxpayers no longer seemed clear-cut. And in the immediate 
postwar period, the bondholding class did seem to be a relic of the nineteenth century 
(Hansen and Greer 1942: 497).  
 
From Classes to Generations 
 
Later in the postwar period, the debates concerning distributive and redistributive effects 
once again faded into the background. This ebbing of the debates in the postwar period, 
much like in the late nineteenth century, proceeded alongside substantial decreases in the 
public debt (see Figure 2.1). Aside from various studies of wealth and income inequality 
in general, which contain only traces of data on the ownership of government bonds, 
there were no stand-alone studies of the distributive and redistributive dynamics of the 
public debt for the period from the 1950s through the 1970s (Lampman 1962; Smith 
1974).  
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Liberal political economists continued to debate whether the public debt had 
redistributive effects. But instead of arguing about whether the public debt redistributed 
income between classes and social groups in the here and now, liberals became embroiled 
in a protracted dispute over whether the public debt redistributed income between 
generations (see Ferguson 1964).  
 
Children and Grandchildren 
 
The rather esoteric debates centered on the temporality of public debt repayment and 
whether the ‘burden’ of repayment could be shifted to future generations. Keynesian 
theorists of the public debt more or less dismissed the entire thrust of these debates. They 
were adamant in suggesting that any burden or sacrifice associated with public borrowing 
must be borne by the current generation. According to the Keynesian argument, the ‘real’ 
burden of government expenditures, whether financed by taxation or borrowing, is 
created from the transfer of current purchasing power from the private to the public sector 
(Hansen and Greer 1942: 491; Lerner 1948; 256; Buchanan 1958: 6).  
According to the Keynesian argument, public borrowing does shift the repayment of 
government expenditures forward. But in aggregate terms, an internally held public debt 
does not create a future burden, as the tax bill of future taxpayers to service the debt is 
cancelled out by the interest income that is received by future bondholders (Lerner 1948: 
256). In other words, the drain of purchasing power from taxpayers is cancelled out by 
the increase in the purchasing power of bondholders. For Keynesians, the problem was 
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not that the public debt created an aggregate burden, but that it could, as we have already 
seen, potentially aggravate existing inequalities in the distribution of wealth and income.  
The Keynesian denial of any ‘future burden’ of public indebtedness came under close 
scrutiny from James Buchanan, the founding father of the ‘public choice’ school of 
political economy. Expounding an alternative set of ‘principles’, Buchanan attacked the 
logical foundations of Keynesian theories of the public debt. The bulk of Buchanan’s 
critique was focused precisely on the issue of whether the public debt placed a burden on 
future generations. Buchanan (1958: 33) defines the future generation as ‘…any 
individuals living in any time period following that in which the debt is created’. As a 
result, Buchanan is not concerned per se with the specific burden borne by children or 
grandchildren, but with whether ‘…the debt burden can be postponed’ (ibid: 34). And it 
is on the issue of the postponement of the burden that Buchanan claimed to expose some 
of the key fallacies of Keynesian theories of the public debt.  
 Buchanan first sets his sights on attacking the Keynesian postulate that any ‘burden’ or 
‘sacrifice’ associated with the public debt is borne by the current generation in the form 
of lost purchasing power. In liberal capitalist societies, Buchanan says, exchange is 
voluntary and is based on the ‘mutuality of advantage’ for both sides of the transaction 
(1958: 34). One who purchases a government bond does so voluntarily, and is ‘moving to 
a preferred position on his utility surface by doing so’ (ibid: 34-5). This voluntary – but 
temporary – exchange of command over current resources merely shifts these resources 
from the private to the public sphere. No sacrifice takes place because the utility-
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maximizing bondholder is shifting the time preference of their income stream to give 
them future command over resources (ibid: 39).  
 
Utility and Subjective Cost 
 
This critique of the Keynesian location of the burden of public indebtedness points at 
what Buchanan argued to be the major shortcoming of Keynesian theory: its privileging 
of macroeconomic aggregates over individual utilities. Buchanan (1958: 35) argues that 
the organic or monolithic conception of the state at the heart of Keynesianism is 
completely at odds with the principles of liberal democratic societies ‘whose social 
philosophy lies in the individualistic and utilitarian tradition’ (ibid: 35-6). In place of the 
monolithic state, Buchanan suggests that the individual/family needs to be made the 
‘basic philosophical entity’ of liberal society (ibid: 36). Thus for Buchanan, the 
individual must form the focus of any attempt to locate the burden of public 
indebtedness. And in place of the ‘sacrifice’ arguments, which derive from the 
‘abstinence’ theories of profit of the late classical writers, Buchanan (ibid: 37-8) shifts the 
focus to individual choice and (subjective) opportunity cost, which claims that prices are 
determined by the ‘marginal productivity’ of resources in alternative uses.  
Based on this alternative utility/cost analysis, Buchanan identifies what he sees as the 
true burden of public debt. Buchanan argues that the ‘real’ burden of the public debt is 
not borne by the public creditor, who, as was already mentioned, is engaged in a 
voluntary, utility-maximizing, exchange. The burden is also not located with the current 
taxpayer, who escapes taxation when a government decides to finance its projects with 
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debt. The locus of the problem is that debt-financed public projects are inferior to private 
projects. If we assume for a moment that the debt-financed public project is inferior to the 
point of being entirely wasteful, then Buchanan (ibid: 40) argues that the burden of public 
indebtedness can only lie with the future taxpayer who: (1) must transfer funds to the 
bondholder, and (2) has no productive asset to offset their ‘genuine sacrifice’.  
It should be stressed that the argument outlined thus far has to do with the gross 
burden on future taxpayers. In Buchanan’s (1958: 40) words: ‘If the debt is created for 
productive public expenditure, the benefits to the future taxpayer must, of course, be 
compared with the burden so that, on balance, he may suffer a net benefit or net burden’. 
This recognition means that a more inclusive conception of the burden, incorporating 
both gross and net aspects, hinges on the opportunity cost, or relative productivity of 
public expenditure. The future taxpayer is the final ‘purchaser’ of public goods and 
services ‘whether he is a party to the decision or not’ (ibid: 42). Since the future taxpayer 
is the only one to bear a burden, it is only their sacrifice ‘which is offset, if at all, by the 
income yielded by the public investment of resources made possible by the debt’ (ibid: 
42). 
According to Buchanan, the logic of his argument held up for full employment, as 
well as for depression. In the context of a depression, says Buchanan (1958: 125), 
Keynesians hold that the government is purchasing the services of unemployed private 
resources, so no ‘real’ burden of transfer needs to take place. Since there is no ‘real’ cost 
associated with public expenditure in the context of a depression, debt-financed public 
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projects are always justified regardless of their productivity (so long as that productivity 
is not negative) (Dillard 1948: 103).  
Buchanan (1958: 133) rejects this view on methodological grounds. The Keynesian 
argument, he argues, justifies public expenditure by comparing it with the alternative of 
taking no action at all. For Buchanan, this is not the relevant comparison: what is relevant 
is comparing debt-financed government expenditures with other financing options. In the 
context of depression it is much more efficient for government to secure funds through 
currency creation than through interest-bearing debt. The reason is that currency creation 
is an inflationary policy that increases private purchasing power, while the issuance of 
interest-bearing debt is a deflationary policy that reduces private purchasing power (ibid: 
145). Relative to the currency creation alternative, debt issuance therefore involves 
unnecessary real costs and a sacrifice of individual utilities. Even with unemployed 
resources these costs are inevitably shifted to future generations (ibid: 126-7). The 
relevant comparison, so the argument goes, is not between debt issue and doing nothing, 
but between debt issue and currency issue. The latter places a burden on the current 
generation through the ‘inflation tax’, while the former shifts the burden to future 
generations. 
 
Ricardian Equivalence 
 
Framed as a set of abstract logical principles, Buchanan’s arguments unfold through the 
development of various propositions and caveats. One of the most important caveats 
introduced by Buchanan has to do with the behavior of the current generation to public 
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borrowing. As Buchanan (1958: 44) acknowledges, his arguments about the location of 
the burden of public debt apply only so long as the current generation does not fully 
discount the value of future interest payments.  
Elaborating on an off-the-cuff remark made by David Ricardo (1820: 186), Buchanan 
held that if taxpayers correctly anticipate their future tax burden needed to service the 
public debt by writing down the value of their capital assets, public borrowing and 
taxation would be equivalent forms of financing. This set of assumptions, which hold, 
one must note, only if the current taxpayers are blessed with perfect foresight and 
altruism towards future generations, leads Buchanan to modify his critique of 
Keynesianism. The ‘real’ burden of public debt will only be shifted forward in time if the 
current generation of taxpayers fails to ‘currently anticipate their own or their heirs’ roles 
as future taxpayers, and take action to discount future tax payments into reductions of 
present capital values’ (ibid: 46).  
Buchanan (1958: 36) readily conceded that this caveat was based on an ‘extremely 
restrictive’ set of assumptions. Even Ricardo, who first recognized the hypothetical 
equivalence of borrowing and taxation, expressed doubts about its empirical validity 
(Ricardo 1817: 247; O’Driscoll 1977). These doubts, however, did not stop others from 
contemplating the equivalence of public borrowing and taxation. And in the 1970s, a 
dispute broke out over what came to be known as ‘Ricardian equivalence theorem’.  
In addition to formalizing the mathematics of the Ricardian equivalence theorem 
(RET), Robert Barro (1974; 1979) fleshed out its logic and assumptions and explored its 
implications for government policy making. Barro (1974: 1095-6) begins his analysis by 
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claiming that existing theories of the public debt operate under the assumption that the 
private sector perceives government bonds as net wealth. According to this logic, an 
investor purchasing $20,000 in Treasury bonds will perceive that these holdings represent 
$20,000 in wealth and boost their spending based on this perception (Cowen 2011).  
Yet according to the RET this perception is illusory because the current asset (the 
Treasury bond) is offset by a future tax liability that may fall on the bondholder (Barro 
1974: 1097; Cowen 2011). As long as we assume perfect foresight, perfect capital 
markets, intergenerational altruism and infinite planning horizons, any rational individual 
will recognize that the interest payments on government bonds will eventually be offset 
by the future tax liabilities needed to service the debt. In response to a government debt 
issue, rational individuals will fully discount the value of their bond holdings to save the 
exact amount needed for future tax payments. There will be no change in (perceived) 
aggregate wealth and no increase in private consumption. And in this way, borrowing and 
taxation would represent equivalent forms of financing government expenditures in the 
sense that the current generation would bear the burden of both financing methods.  
 
The Three-Ringed Circus 
 
Postwar liberals thus found themselves in what Karen Vaughn and Richard Wagner 
(1992: 37) have described as a ‘three-ringed circus’: a debate involving three different 
theoretical approaches that could find little common ground when it came to the inter-
generational redistributive effects of the public debt. The growing fixation of liberal 
political economists on the inter-generational redistributive effects of the public debt had 
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two main consequences. First, it placed the doctrine of ‘sound’ finance, which had come 
under sustained attack from Keynesians, back on seemingly firm footing. For Buchanan, 
democratic societies had an in-built bias towards debt financing and this bias, he argues, 
unfairly shifts the real burden of public debt forward in time.15 This unfair bias could 
only be corrected by placing strict limits on when public borrowing could take place. 
RET lent further credence to sound finance doctrine. If the decisions of perfectly rational 
and utility-maximizing individuals made borrowing equivalent to taxation, then why try 
to engage in specifically debt-financed counter-cyclical spending in the first place?  
 The second consequence of the generational debates was to completely remove class 
conflict from the analysis of the public debt.16 Postwar theorists of the public debt 
debated whether future taxpayers bear the burden of public debt repayment, but it is 
never clear precisely who these future taxpayers are. By shifting the terms of the debate 
towards generations, more free market-oriented liberals such as Buchanan were able to 
purge the debates of any uncomfortable talk about the redistributive effects of the public 
debt between classes. At the same time, immersed in a debate about generations, 
Keynesians were let off the hook from having to defend their ideas concerning the class 
redistributive effects of public indebtedness.   
 
                                                
15 The in-built bias towards debt-financed spending is supposedly strong in democratic societies because 
the self-interested (non-Ricardian) individual is free to choose the fiscal policy action that will maximize 
their individual utility (i.e. debt issuance over taxation), passing on the burden of taxation to future 
generations (Buchanan 1958: 157).  
16 Buchanan (1958: 106-7) claims to follow the ‘classical’ theory of public debt, which he claims was 
formulated by C.F. Bastable, P. Leroy-Beaulieu and H.C. Adams in the mid-nineteenth century. Buchanan 
cites a passage in which Adams criticizes the ‘sacrifice’ view of the burden of public indebtedness and 
claims this was Adams’s ‘theory’ of the public debt. But Buchanan completely glosses over Adams’s much 
more extensive arguments concerning the class-based dynamics of public indebtedness.  
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The Marxist Retreat 
 
Surprisingly, even postwar Marxists, who are otherwise attuned to issues of class, treated 
the distributive and redistributive effects of the public debt as little more than a historical 
curiosity.17 In his study The Fiscal Crisis of the State, the Monopoly Capital school’s 
James O’Connor (1973: 188-96) dedicates less than ten of 250 pages to discussing 
various forms of government debt (federal, state and local). Following Marx, O’Connor 
(ibid: 188-9) argued that the US public debt in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries 
gave rise to an ‘aristocracy of finance’; a powerful group of banks and other financial 
institutions that not only traded and distributed government bonds, but who were also the 
dominant creditors to governments (see footnote 6).  
According to O’Connor (1973: 190), during this earlier era of US history ‘the control 
of the national treasury was placed in the hands of the commercial and banking interests 
which owned the debt’. Assessing the situation at the tail end of the postwar era, 
O’Connor (ibid: 190-1) claimed that the ‘aristocracy of finance’ was ‘still very powerful’, 
but that it failed to wield the same influence over the state that it did in the earliest phase 
of US capitalist development. O’Connor (ibid: 191) argued that in the postwar era the US 
state had achieved ‘relative autonomy’ from its powerful creditors, and an important 
reason for this was that the federal government started to issue special ‘intra-
governmental’ debt that allowed it to borrow from itself.18 With the level of public debt 
                                                
17 This neglect is evidence even in the celebrated works of postwar Marxist state theorists. Ralph Miliband 
(1969) makes no mention of the public debt in The State in Capitalist Society, nor does Nicos Poulantzas 
(1973) in Political Power and Social Classes.  
18 As we will see in Chapter Five, the idea that the government ‘borrows from itself’ by issuing intra-
governmental debt is based on a misunderstanding of government trust fund accounting.  
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in decline during the postwar period (see Figure 2.1), the postwar aristocracy of finance 
instead shifted its focus towards lending in the rapidly expanding markets for private 
business and consumer debt (ibid: 190).   
By the 1970s, issues concerning the distributive and redistributive dynamics of the 
public debt no longer seemed relevant. Liberals had completely transformed the debate 
and were now fixated on the inter-generational redistributive effects of the public debt. 
Meanwhile, the linkage between the public debt and the ‘aristocracy of finance’ no longer 
captivated postwar Marxists as it did Marx. The vision of a powerful bondholding class, 
and the class conflict between the bondholding class and the masses of taxpayers, seemed 
completely out of touch with the postwar realities.  
 
Resurgence 
 
 
Today, and within mainstream economics, theorists of the public debt are still 
preoccupied with debating inter-generational redistribution (see Elmendorf and Mankiw 
1999; Cochrane 2011). But in the marginalized corners of political economy, talk about 
the class dimensions of public indebtedness has made a modest comeback. Apart from a 
brief downward trend due to the Clinton-era budget surpluses of the late 1990s, the level 
of US public debt has climbed steadily over the past three decades (see Figure 2.1). And 
over this period, a handful of political economists have become embroiled in a renewed 
debate about the distributive and redistributive dynamics of the public debt.  
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The Return of the Bondholding Class? 
 
A group of heterodox political economists and journalists continue to insist that 
ownership of the public debt is highly concentrated and that interest payments on 
government bonds redistribute income from the majority of taxpayers to a tiny elite of 
bondholders (Schmid 1982; Michl 1991; Kinsley 1986; Shields 1990). For some, the 
‘bondholding class’, a tiny elite of ‘super- or supra-rich families’, still uses its power over 
the government purse strings to influence policy in contemporary US capitalism 
(Canterbery 2000, 2002: 365).  
 Many of the recent heterodox arguments are based on mathematical models, rather 
than empirical evidence (You and Dutt 1996; Michl and Georges 1996; Michl 2006). One 
exception to this is the work of Thomas Michl (1991), who makes a concerted effort to 
quantify the distributive and redistributive dynamics of the public debt. Analyzing data 
for 1982 from the Federal Reserve’s Survey of Consumer Finances, Michl (ibid: 358) 
found that the top 1% of the population ranked by gross income owned 6.2 percent of 
savings bonds, and 43.3 percent of other Treasury issues. Meanwhile Michl (ibid: 358-
61) estimated that the top 1% received approximately 22.5 to 33.3 percent of direct and 
indirect interest payments and paid 11.9 to 14.6 percent of federal taxes. The results led 
Michl (ibid: 364) to reject the Keynesian view that the public debt is harmless because 
‘we owe it to ourselves’.  Michl’s research led him to a definitive conclusion: ‘interest on 
the national debt redistributes income regressively’.  
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John Q. Public 
 
Some Keynesians were willing to concede that the regressive redistributive effects of the 
public debt had become a genuine concern. In their primer on the federal debt and deficit, 
Robert Heilbroner and Peter Bernstein (1989: 50) noted that wealthy households held 
over 20 percent of federal bonds, while ‘the average American family owns no 
government bonds directly’. The US public debt was therefore, according to Heilbroner 
and Berstein (ibid: 50), a ‘net expense’ for the bottom 75 percent of the US population 
and a ‘net benefit’ for the top 25 percent.  
Yet for the most part, orthodox Keynesians continue to follow the line of argument 
first laid down by Hansen and Lerner; the vast majority of them suggest that not much 
has changed since the early postwar period. Some continue to insist that the public debt is 
widely held and that interest payments on federal bonds have no regressive effects on the 
redistribution of income. Robert Eisner (1986: 42; cited in Michl 1991: 352), for 
example, argued that although the rich hold the bulk of government bonds they also pay 
the bulk of taxes. This leads Eisner (ibid: 42) to suggest that a ‘large public debt does not 
particularly affect the distribution of income as between rich and poor’.  
Francis Cavanaugh (1996: 65) goes even further by making a series of claims that 
purportedly dispel the ‘myth’ that the public debt creates an inequitable interest burden. 
First, Cavanaugh suggests that the public debt is widely held, mostly in savings bonds, 
‘which are especially designed for people with modest sums to invest’. Second, he 
suggests that the public debt held by institutions, and especially by government trust fund 
accounts such as social security, largely benefits the lower and middle classes. Third, he 
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cites data from a U.S. Treasury report that suggests that the interest payments on the 
public debt are more progressively distributed than the payment of federal taxes.19 This 
leads Cavanaugh (ibid: 68) to conclude that there ‘…is no basis for the widely held view 
that interest on the public debt is paid to investors who are much wealthier than the 
average taxpayer, who gets stuck with the interest bill’. Based on these three claims, 
Cavanaugh (ibid: 63) confidently asserts that the ‘principal investor in U.S. Treasury 
securities is John Q. Public, not John D. Rockefeller’.  
 
Taking Stock 
 
There have been many twists and turns in the debates concerning the distributive and 
redistributive dynamics of the US public debt. Yet one thing remains constant: political 
economists have never managed to come to any lasting consensus on even the most basic 
facts. Since Adams produced his groundbreaking analysis, political economists have not 
come to any agreement about the pattern of public debt ownership, let alone on whether 
the public debt redistributes income from taxpayers to public creditors or vice versa. And 
as such, the existing literature has fallen short in providing a clear answer to the question 
that matters most: what has happened to the bondholding class that Adams theorized and 
empirically mapped over a century ago? 
 The purpose of this chapter has been to survey the existing debates about the 
distributive and redistributive dynamics of the public debt in order to outline the various 
theories and highlight their lack of consensus. In the next chapter, I address the question 
                                                
19 Despite multiple queries to the Library of Congress, the US Treasury Department and the National 
Archives, I have been unable to track down the 1984 Treasury report cited by Cavanaugh.  
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of why the existing literature has, despite over a century of debate, failed to come to any 
agreement. The answer can be traced to deeper theoretical and empirical problems that 
plague the existing literature, both ‘mainstream’ and ‘critical’. I argue that these problems 
are so deep-seated that we need to radically re-think and research the distributive and 
redistributive dynamics of the public debt. And the first step in developing a radical 
alternative is to start thinking seriously about the concept that matters most to issues of 
distribution and redistribution: namely, power.  
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3  Public Debt, Ownership and Power I 
  The State of the Art 
 
 
 It is absurd to say that our country can issue $30,000,000 in bonds and not 
$30,000,000 in currency. Both are promises to pay; but one promise fattens the 
usurer, and the other helps the people. 
 —Thomas Edison20 
 
 
Introduction 
 
Chapter Two surveyed the existing literature on the distributive and redistributive 
dynamics of the US public debt. Throughout US history there have been many twists and 
turns in the debates but one thing remains constant: political economists have been 
unable to come to any lasting consensus on even the most basic facts concerning the 
ownership of the US public debt and the redistributive consequences associated with that 
ownership pattern.  
In this chapter the task will be to explain why political economists have been unable to 
come to any consensus on these issues. I argue that this lack of consensus is due to 
interrelated empirical and theoretical problems that plague the existing literature. On the 
one hand, there have been few attempts within the existing literature to empirically map 
the disaggregate pattern of public debt ownership and even fewer attempts to measure its 
redistributive consequences. On the other hand, the studies that do engage in empirical 
research offer little theoretical reflection on the concepts, categories and measures that 
                                                
20 Quoted in Anonymous (1921).  
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they use. Mired in narrow empiricism, the few empirical studies that do exist have failed 
to outline a set of transparent conceptual criteria through which to justify and compare 
their respective research methods.  
The exception is the work of H.C. Adams (1887), which provided our point of 
departure in Chapter Two. In developing the first theoretical-empirical study of the 
distributive and redistributive dynamics of the public debt, Adams drew implicit linkages 
between the ownership of the public debt and the exercise of power by the ‘bondholding 
class’. Yet even in Adams’s work these linkages between ownership and power are 
underdeveloped, and at no point does Adams systematically theorize the ownership-
power nexus and its relationship to the concepts – including value, capital and state – that 
are foundational to political economy.  
 At an intuitive level, Adams’s attempts to link the distributive and redistributive 
dynamics of the public debt to power make a great deal of sense. We are, after all, talking 
about the ways in which public indebtedness generates ‘fiscal conflicts’ between social 
classes, and one would be hard-pressed to view these conflicts as anything but struggles 
over power, or at least related to power (Ferguson 2001: 191). These power dimensions 
become all the more apparent when we acknowledge that questions of distribution and 
ownership concentration – which ask ‘who gets what?’ – and also questions of 
redistribution – which ask ‘who gets what at whose expense?’ – are at their root questions 
of power (Laswell and Kaplan 1950). Yet I argue that it is these power dimensions of 
public indebtedness that conventional theories of political economy, both liberal and 
Marxist, find difficult if not impossible to integrate into their frameworks. Without any 
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way of theorizing these power dimensions, existing approaches cannot help us to 
generate the ideas, concepts and categories that would allow empirical research on the 
distributive and redistributive dynamics of the public debt to flourish.  
The remainder of this chapter is organized into four sections. The first section 
scrutinizes the empirical and theoretical track record of the existing literature. The next 
two sections examine and critique the deeper theoretical underpinnings of the literature 
surveyed in Chapter Two. Specifically these two sections explain why conventional 
theories of political economy, both liberal and Marxist, have been unable to theorize the 
power dimensions of public indebtedness. The conclusion then recaps the argument and 
sets out the task for Chapter Four, which will be to develop a new theoretical framework, 
one that contributes to a growing body of literature that conceptualizes capitalism as a 
mode of power.   
 
The Track Record 
 
Before trying to explain why political economists have been unable to come to any 
agreement on the basic facts concerning the distributive and redistributive dynamics of 
the public debt, I should emphasize that I am not trying to suggest that consensus itself is 
the ultimate benchmark of scientific progress. Sustained consensus can lead to stagnant 
thought when a community of researchers faces no outside challenges to engrained 
concepts and assumptions (Bohm and Peat 1987: 54). In fact, it is often the absence of 
consensus that spurs theoretical-empirical creativity and innovation.  
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Perhaps the most prominent example of scientific progress amid conflict came in the 
field of physics in the early twentieth century (see Lindley 2007). Fundamental 
disagreements over the nature of the physical world pitted proponents of classical 
determinism against proponents of quantum uncertainty. And the heated intellectual 
battles between these two camps led to some of the most important advancements in the 
history of science. In particular, Einstein’s steadfast criticisms forced quantum physicists 
to clarify and sharpen the contours of their new theory (ibid: 170).  
The lack of consensus in the field of public debt, however, bears little resemblance to 
the one that spurred advancement in physics in the early twentieth century. Over the past 
century since H.C. Adams produced his pioneering study, protracted disagreements over 
the pattern of public debt ownership and its redistributive consequences have done little 
to stimulate empirical and theoretical innovation. Let us begin by first reviewing the 
empirical track record of the existing literature.  
 
Empirical Shortcomings 
 
Table 3.1 lists all of the existing studies that have offered some empirical mapping of the 
disaggregate pattern of US public debt ownership and redistribution. At least four things 
stand out. First, even though data have become more readily accessible, existing studies 
have done little to improve upon the rather rudimentary empirical methods developed by 
Adams. Like Adams, the subsequent studies offer narrow ‘snapshot’ measures for single 
years. Second, all the studies use different methods to measure ownership concentration 
and redistribution. This makes it difficult to adjudicate between their competing claims 
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and impossible to compare their research results over time. Third, apart from Adams, 
who offers disaggregate data on corporate ownership of the public debt, existing studies 
are focused on the US household sector. Fourth, there has been no attempt to measure the 
pattern of public debt ownership and its redistributive effects since 1996.  
Table 3.1 The Empirical State of the Art 
Author, Date 
of Publication 
Study 
Year(s) 
 
Findings 
 
Conclusions 
 
Adams (1887) 
 
 
1880 
 
1.4% of private investors in the 
public debt owned 47.8% of 
privately held US federal 
government bonds. Top 35% of 
corporations hold 93% of 
corporate share.  
 
 
Revealed the ‘spectre of a highly 
centralized public debt’ (44).   
 
Miller (1950) 
 
 
 
1945 
 
 
5.31% of taxpayers in the top 
income class ($5000 or more) 
paid ca. 50-56% of all federal 
taxes and received 58.7% of 
interest payments on the public 
debt.   
 
 
The progressivity of the federal tax 
and public debt structures the 
same; the public debt does not 
redistribute income.  
 
 
Cohen (1951) 
 
1946 
 
The top income class ($5000 or 
more) paid 47-55% of all 
federal taxes and received 39% 
of interest payments.  
 
 
Public debt has distributional 
effects in favour of lower income 
groups.  
 
Michl (1991) 
 
1982, 1984 
for taxes 
 
Top 1% of households owned 
6.2% of savings bonds, 43.3% 
of other Treasury issues, 
received 22.5-33.3% of direct 
and indirect interest payments 
and paid 11.9-14.6% of federal 
taxes 
 
  
“It seems clear that the 
conventional textbook wisdom that 
we ‘owe to ourselves’ is wrong. 
Interest on the national debt 
redistributes income regressively” 
(364). 
 
 
Cavanaugh 
(1996) 
 
1992 
 
Lorenz curve for 1992 shows 
that distribution of interest on 
the public debt more 
progressive than federal income 
taxes.  
 
“…the principal investor in U.S. 
Treasury securities is John Q. 
Public, not John D. Rockefeller” 
(63).   
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As Table 3.1 suggests, the empirical record on the disaggregate ownership of the US 
public debt is, at best, patchy. Throughout different periods, pundits have fiercely debated 
the distributive and redistributive dynamics of the public debt. But competing claims, 
regardless of whether they assert that the pubic debt is concentrated or widely held, are 
constructed upon shaky empirical foundations. The scant empirical record outlined in 
Table 3.1 gives us a starting point for explaining why the existing literature has had such 
difficulties agreeing on even the most basic facts: there has been insufficient effort to 
establish these facts in the first place.   
Part of the problem has to do with the data themselves. As already mentioned, 
empirical data have become more readily accessible since Adams first mapped the US 
bondholding class, yet subsequent researchers have done little to improve upon his rather 
rudimentary research methods. This fact is not meant to imply that the task of collecting 
and analyzing data on the pattern of public debt ownership has become obstacle-free; like 
many other forms of data, the data on the ownership of the public debt suffer from an 
aggregate bias. Fairly reliable, long-term data breaking down the ownership of the public 
debt into various sectors (e.g. domestic households, domestic businesses, foreigners) are 
easy to access (see Chapter Five). Yet mapping the disaggregate pattern of public debt 
ownership concentration (i.e. the amount of public debt owned by a specific class or 
social group) presents a whole host of challenges. The headaches involved and the 
obstacles faced in collecting these data will become more apparent in Chapters Six and 
Seven.  
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It suffices to note at this point that researchers interested in mapping the disaggregate 
pattern of public debt ownership must rely on data that are sporadic, incomplete and 
inconsistent. The use of narrow snapshots and inconsistent cut-off points for measuring 
concentration is often a reflection of limited data rather than a conscious choice of the 
researcher.21  
 
Theoretical Ambiguities 
 
Unfortunately, this pragmatic explanation only gets us so far in trying to understand the 
lack of consensus in the current literature. While issues of data accessibility are 
important, the paltry empirical record outlined in Table 3.1 does not just stem from a 
shortage of reliable data. Most importantly, these empirical shortcomings are bound up 
with deeper theoretical problems that plague the existing literature. Though existing 
studies often employ the slogans, concepts and categories of conventional theories of 
political economy, they can all, to varying degrees, be accused of engaging in narrow 
empiricism. Specifically, existing studies present a set of data without taking into account 
the theoretical assumptions underpinning their empirical research methods.  
Without having to veer too far off course, we can briefly discuss some aspects of the 
philosophical critique of empiricism to highlight some of the shortcomings of the existing 
studies outlined in Table 3.1. Several philosophers of science have argued that empirical 
                                                
21 As we will see in Chapter 4, in order to measure ownership concentration over long periods of time, we 
need to isolate either a fixed number or a fixed proportion of top households or corporations (e.g. the top 
200 or the top 1%). The exact cut-off point used to isolate top households and top corporations is always to 
a certain extent arbitrary (assuming that the data source allows us to choose this cut-off point in the first 
place). This choice, however, should be transparently discussed and theoretically motivated.  
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facts are shaped and mediated by assumptions that are inescapably theoretical (see 
Morick 1972: 16; Hansen 1958; Quine 1951).  
First, we assume that distribution and redistribution are significant objects of 
investigation that are worthy of attention. This judgment about the significance of these 
processes is in itself value-laden (see Weber 1949). Second, we must make assumptions 
in the empirical research methods we choose to explore these processes. The fact that we 
use a certain cut-off point to measure ownership concentration can never emerge from the 
data itself and must therefore result from a system of beliefs that makes the data 
intelligible in the first place.22  
By ignoring theoretical matters, the existing studies in Table 3.1 offer little 
justification for why they have chosen certain methods over others. And this lack of 
justification leaves fundamental methodological questions unanswered: what are the 
potential explanatory limits of using snapshot data instead of historical time series? Why 
choose certain cut-off points to measure ownership concentration and what do these cut-
off points tell us about social conflict and ‘class’ (an undeniably theoretical construct)? 
Why focus on the household sector instead of the corporate sector? What does comparing 
the federal tax structure to the distribution of federal interest payments tell us about the 
redistributive effects of public indebtedness?   
Unless we have set out in a transparent way the theoretical concepts and assumptions 
that underpin our empirical methods, we have no way of exploring the validity of those 
                                                
22 Recognizing the value and theory ‘laden’ nature of our research does not mean we have to accept the 
postmodern denial of facts and scientific inquiry. What it does mean is that our theoretical constructs are 
developed in a dialectical interplay with empirical research. Theoretical concepts and assumptions shape 
our empirical observations, yet these empirical observations in turn come to shape, refine and even modify 
those concepts and assumptions.  
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methods or of comparing them to rival methods. How can we therefore expect any 
consensus on even the most basic facts regarding the distributive and redistributive 
dynamics of the public debt when the few empirical studies that do exist have failed to 
outline a set of transparent conceptual criteria through which to justify and compare their 
respective research methods?  
 As mentioned in Chapter Two, Adams, the exception in this regard, was careful to 
situate his empirical analysis of public debt ownership within a fairly coherent theoretical 
framework. Adams’s (1887: 9) argument that the public debt is evidence that the 
capitalist class has captured the ‘machinery of government’ has obvious affinities with 
the ‘class domination’ or instrumentalist theory of the capitalist state, which ‘…sees in 
the state an instrument in the hands of the ruling classes for enforcing and guaranteeing 
the stability of the class structure itself’ (Sweezy 1942: 243). Furthermore, Adams offers 
a coherent account of how the class structure of capitalist societies relate to the institution 
of public borrowing. Citing the first volume of Marx’s (1867) Capital, Adams (1887: 8) 
argues that capitalist production based on the private ownership of the means of 
production is the underlying cause of inequality in capitalist societies. The public debt 
merely reinforces the divide between propertied capitalists and property-less labourers 
(ibid: 41; for a similar argument, see Ferguson 2001: 191).  
If only implicitly, Adams’s theoretical framework draws clear conceptual linkages 
between the ownership of the public debt on the one hand and the exercise of class power 
on the other. Adams sought to explore the empirical basis of this power by measuring the 
concentration of the public debt owned by the ‘bondholding class’. Yet even in Adams’s 
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work, the linkages between ownership and power are not developed in any systematic 
fashion and there is no attempt to explore the implications of these linkages for broader 
theories of political economy and their foundational concepts of value, capital and the 
state. 
 
Power 
 
Few would deny that issues of distribution and ownership concentration are related to the 
question of power. And the power dimensions of these issues become all the more 
explicit once we accept that they generate conflicts between social classes. Yet I argue 
that it is the concept of power that conventional theories of political economy have 
trouble integrating into their frameworks and analyses. Unable to account for the power 
dimensions of public indebtedness, existing theories offer no concepts and categories that 
would guide empirical research examining the distributive and redistributive dynamics of 
the public debt.  
Chapter Two surveyed the history of political economic debates on these dynamics in 
the US context, but it did not examine in any detail the theoretical underpinnings of the 
various perspectives within these debates. A more in-depth theoretical discussion will 
allow us to see the problems conventional theories of political economy, both liberal and 
Marxist, encounter in theorizing and empirically mapping with the power dimensions that 
underpin the distributive and redistributive dynamics of public indebtedness. 
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Liberal Political Economy 
 
As we saw in Chapter Two, within the liberal tradition, Keynesianism has been most 
attentive to the distributive and redistributive dynamics of the public debt. Both Hansen 
and Lerner recognized that a rapidly growing public debt could potentially have 
regressive effects on the distribution of income and wealth. Unless coupled with a 
progressive system of taxation, these regressive effects would eventually aggravate the 
deficiency of ‘effective demand’, and in turn undermine the government’s ability to 
engage in counter-cyclical deficit spending. In other words, the disaggregate dynamics of 
power that underpin the public debt would come to limit the government’s efforts to 
manage and steer the aggregate macro-economy.  
 
Keynesianism: The Ambivalence of Power 
 
By arguing that the public debt engenders a potential social conflict, Keynesians open up 
the possibility of incorporating power into their theoretical frameworks. Yet recognizing 
the power dimensions of distribution and redistribution as a potential barrier to Keynesian 
macroeconomic policy is not the same thing as offering a coherent theory of these 
dynamics. And at no point do Keynes or the Keynesian theorists of the public debt 
attempt to provide a theoretical explanation for the distributive and redistributive 
dynamics of the public debt: who exactly are the ‘groups and economic classes’ at the 
heart of these dynamics that Hansen (1944: 136) discusses? And how do we explain 
exactly why one class comes to hold a larger share of the public debt relative to other 
classes or social groups?  
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The reason Keynesians fall silent on these important questions has to do with lingering 
conceptual ambiguities in the relationship between the aggregate and the disaggregate in 
their theoretical frameworks. These ambiguities are themselves a reflection of the 
ambivalent relationship of Keynesianism to the neoclassical doctrine that has come to 
dominate liberal political economy over the course of the past century (see Bleaney 1985: 
Chapter One).  
 
Neoclassical Influence 
 
In the General Theory, Keynes set out to dismantle Say’s Law and the notion of the self-
regulating market. Rather than question the implications of his critique for the entire 
theoretical structure of liberal political economy, Keynes proceeded by splitting the 
economy into two distinct spheres. Nitzan and Bichler (2009: 46) explain how, after the 
General Theory, liberals were forced to make a grand concession: ‘there was not one, but 
two economic realities: a competitive microeconomic sphere where the interaction of 
atomistic consumers and producers generates the efficient outcome stipulated by 
neoclassical manuals; and another macroeconomic realm that unfortunately produces 
occasional failures’.  
Whereas the microsphere allowed liberals to maintain the laissez faire vision of a 
powerless economy governed by principles of competition and efficiency, the macro-
sphere served as a conceptual ‘cesspool’ in which imperfections requiring the ‘political’ 
intervention of governments could occur in complete isolation from the pristine world of 
microeconomics. Thus as Nitzan and Bichler (2009: 46-7) argue, with the General 
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Theory power had entered the liberal economy, but only through the back door (see also 
Dowd 2000: 127–31). And aside from the rather crucial exception of Say’s Law, 
Keynes’s General Theory ended up accepting most of the key facets of neoclassical 
thinking (Dobb 1973: 215; Robinson 1977: 18). 
Most crucially, this included a tacit acceptance of the theory of marginal productivity, 
which provided the neoclassical explanation of (and ideological justification for) the 
distribution of wealth and income in capitalist societies (Keynes 1936: 17). Expounded 
by J.B. Clark (1899) in the late nineteenth century, marginal productivity theory starts out 
from the standard neoclassical assumption of perfect competition under which atomistic 
and fully rational ‘agents’ attempt to maximize their utility in a context of scarcity. Clark 
further assumed there was a functional relationship between factors of production, which 
economists have dubbed the ‘production function’. The factors of labour, land and 
capital, are assumed to be distinct and quantifiable so that we can directly measure the 
input and output associated with each of them (Nitzan and Bichler 2009: 69). The 
production function is then employed to explain the ‘natural laws’ governing the process 
of distribution.  
In Clark’s (1899: 3) own words, when ‘free [i.e. perfect] competition’ reigns, ‘…the 
share of income that attaches to any productive function is gauged by the actual product 
of it’. More specifically, in a perfectly competitive market the income of each factor will 
be proportionate to its marginal contribution: ‘…the wage rate is equal to the productive 
contribution of the last worker added to production, the rent is equal to the contribution of 
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the last hectare of land, and the profit rate is equivalent to the contribution of the last unit 
of capital’ (Nitzan and Bichler 2009: 70)  
Marginal productivity theory and its production function assumed away any concern 
for power. In the context of perfect competition, there was no room for class analysis or 
class conflict: there were only power-less ‘agents’. The origins of the inputs that these 
agents added to the production process were explained away by referring to them as 
‘initial endowments’ (Kirman 1992). There was no room for government, which stood 
outside the market and would only distort the ‘natural laws’ of perfect competition (Clark 
1899: 77). There was also no room for money, debt or other financial instruments; the 
inputs and outputs of production were measured in their hedonic units of pain and 
pleasure that were at their root based on barter (ibid: Chapter 24).  
 In short, the marginal productivity theory that Keynes tacitly accepted in the General 
Theory had little bearing on the distributive and redistributive dynamics of the public 
debt outlined by Keynesians such as Hansen and Lerner.23 With no guidance on how to 
theorize and map the power dimensions of distribution and redistribution in this area, 
Keynesian theorists of the public debt were unable to offer much insight into a problem 
that they nevertheless identified as a potential barrier to their macroeconomic agenda. 
Given the assumptions of neoclassical theory, it is little wonder that liberal theorists of 
                                                
23 Much ink has been spilt debating to what extent Keynes actually endorsed marginal productivity theory 
and whether Keynes had an alternative theory of distribution (see Kaldor 1955-6; Sen 1963; Asimakopulos 
1980-1; Eatwell and Milgate 1983; Wells 1987). The reason I argue that Keynes tacitly accepted the 
marginal productivity theory of distribution is that he never developed a systematic alternative to the 
neoclassical utility theory of value (see Robinson 1962: 79). Any theory of distribution, as Veblen (1909: 
620) points out, always relies on a theory of value. Without a coherent theory of value, we can have, at 
best, only a partial explanation of the prices of goods and services, and in turn, a partial explanation of the 
distribution of those goods and services. 
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the public debt shifted the focus from class to inter-generational redistribution in the post-
war period (see Chapter Two). Focusing on the utility-maximizing behavior of the 
‘representative’ individual taxpayer and public creditor enabled postwar liberal theorists 
of the public debt to ignore the uncomfortable questions that Keynesians had raised but 
could never account for within the prevailing assumptions of their theory. 
 
Marxist Political Economy  
 
Marxism, with its emphasis on class struggle as the engine of history, offers more 
promising avenues through which to explore power and its relationship to the distributive 
and redistributive dynamics of the public debt. As we have already mentioned, H.C. 
Adams (1887) drew insights from Marx in his arguments about the effects of public 
indebtedness on the class structure of capitalist societies. And as we also mentioned, 
James O’Connor (1973) followed Marx in arguing that the US public debt in the 
eighteenth and nineteenth century gave rise to a powerful ‘aristocracy of finance’.  
Yet Marxists on the whole have treated the power nexus between the public debt and 
the financial aristocracy as little more than a historical curiosity. Writing in the 1970s, 
O’Connor argued, albeit with little empirical evidence, that the public debt no longer 
conferred the same power to financial groups that it did in the early history of US 
capitalism. Others make references to Marx’s arguments about the public debt and the 
‘aristocracy of finance’, but have not developed the analytical underpinnings of this 
relationship, let alone explored empirically its relevance for contemporary US capitalism 
(Gottlieb 1956; Sanderson 1963; Hayes 1993; Meckstroth 2000).  
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The handful of contemporary ‘Marxist’ accounts that attempt to model the distributive 
and redistributive dynamics of the public debt have, to put it mildly, a tenuous 
relationship to Marx’s thought. Thomas Michl’s (2006; see also Michl and Georges 
1996) efforts to model how the public debt redistributes income from workers to 
capitalists are symptomatic of this tenuous relationship. Though Marx’s class categories 
loom large in Michl’s models, these categories are translated into the anti-Marxist 
language of neoclassical economics. Capitalists in these models are reduced to a fully 
rational ‘representative capitalist’ who is not bent on extracting surplus value through 
worker exploitation, but instead chooses ‘…an optimal path of consumption by 
maximizing a discounted log utility function’ (Michl and Georges 1996: 51). Michl 
(2006), however, is not bothered by this seemingly incompatible adaptation of Marxist 
categories to neoclassical assumptions; after all, as he willingly concedes, his models 
‘…are best interpreted as analytical frameworks for answering logical questions about 
economic categories under conditions of full utilization rather than for making 
statements about how real economies necessarily function’ (emphasis added).24 The 
philosophers have only interpreted the world; the point is to model it.  
So despite its focus on class power, Marxist political economy also has a rather 
underwhelming record when it comes to exploring the distributive and redistributive 
dynamics of the public debt. In order to explain why this is the case, we need to examine 
                                                
24 Taken as a whole, Michl’s work is symptomatic of the broader criticisms made in this chapter against the 
existing literature. Michl’s (1991) painstaking empirical study provides invaluable research on the pattern 
of household ownership of the public debt (see Table 3.1). Yet this empirical study is not connected in any 
meaningful way to a theoretical framework and certainly has no relationship to his later theoretical models.  
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the theoretical legacy that Marx left to subsequent generations of Marxist political 
economists.  
 
Marx’s Legacy 
 
In his famous section on ‘primitive accumulation’ in Volume I of Capital, Marx (1867: 
874) argued that the classical liberal account of the development of capitalist markets was 
a ‘nursery tale’. The historical transition to capitalism was not, as classical political 
economy had argued, spontaneous or self-regulating: the process required state violence 
from the very beginning. During the phase of primitive accumulation, the state was not a 
fetter to but a direct facilitator of the extension and deepening of capitalist markets (ibid: 
915-6). And crucial to state power, Marx (ibid: 919) argued, was the development of the 
system of public credit. As ‘one of the most powerful levels of primitive accumulation’, 
the public debt allowed governments to meet extraordinary expenses without having to 
immediately burden its population with excessive taxation (ibid: 919–21).  
 For Marx (1867: 920), the real significance of the public debt lay in its impact on class 
relations. On the one hand, the public debt gave rise to the ‘aristocracy of finance’, a 
group Marx referred to as a ‘brood of bankocrats, financiers, rentiers, brokers, 
stockjobbers, etc.’ that amassed fortunes from trading and also owning government 
securities. On the other hand, the tax revenues that were eventually needed to service the 
public debt were financed by over-taxation of ‘the most necessary means of subsistence’ 
(ibid: 921). This over-taxation was not accidental: for Marx (ibid: 921) it was an 
entrenched ‘principle’ of public indebtedness. Thus during the phase of primitive 
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accumulation the public debt created a clear-cut conflict, redistributing or ‘expropriating’ 
income from the working masses of taxpayers to the ‘idle rentier’ class of public 
creditors.  
Yet Marx (1867) cautioned against assigning too much importance to the class 
expropriation at the heart of the public debt. Specifically, he criticizes socialist writers 
such as William Cobbett who identified the public debt and the fiscal system as ‘the 
fundamental cause of the misery of the people in modern times’ (ibid: 921).25 Why the 
criticism? Marx (ibid: 922) argues explicitly that the (pre-modern) phase of primitive 
accumulation was merely an ‘artificial’ and transitory system that hastened the transition 
from the outdated feudal mode of production to the modern capitalist mode of 
production.  
According to Marx, active and direct state power was necessary to sever workers from 
the means of production. But once the transition from feudalism to industrial capitalism is 
completed, state power lingers in the background. The sphere of industrial production 
takes over as the main site of exploitation and class struggle. Of course the state provides 
the necessary legal and ideological superstructure that enables and reinforces the 
economic power of capitalists to extract surplus value from the workers over and above 
the level of subsistence. Workers, however, do not need to be directly coerced into this 
exploitative relationship; without access to property, they are compelled by the market to 
seek out wage labour in order to survive. 
                                                
25 Niall Ferguson (2001: 195) highlights the anti-Semitic tone of Cobbett’s invective against the public 
debt.  
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Under the advanced capitalist mode of production, industrial workers are pitted 
against industrial capitalists, and this struggle is for Marx the key site of class struggle 
and the engine of capitalist development (Marx 1867: 921; Bichler et al 2012: 8). The 
centerpiece of Marx’s theoretical framework, the labour theory of value, explicitly 
demotes the public debt and other forms of finance to the status of ‘fictitious’ capital 
(Marx 1893: 423; 1894: 590-606; see also Hudson 2011: 16). The ontologically 
privileged realm of production has its own universal (quantitative) units of socially 
necessary abstract labour time, which stand apart from the nominal units of finance. Marx 
claims that it is this unit of labour time, and not epiphenomena of ‘fictitious’ finance, that 
provides the basis scientific study of capitalist mode of production, including the 
structure of prices and the distribution of wealth between capitalists and workers (Marx 
1867: 188; Bichler et al 2012: 9).  
Examining Marx’s own writings gives us a better sense of why Marxists have had 
very little to say about the distributive and redistributive dynamics of the public debt. To 
the extent that these dynamics are discussed in the Marxist literature they are treated as a 
historical rather than contemporary aspect of capitalist society. And this is precisely how 
Marx also treated these dynamics: as a historical curiosity confined to the pre-capitalist 
phase of primitive accumulation. Those wedded to a Marxist analysis of contemporary 
capitalism have little reason to explore these dynamics, as the ontological primacy of 
production leaves the public debt clearly outside the core theoretical framework.  
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Moving Forward? 
 
To recap, this chapter has provided an explanation for the lack of consensus regarding the 
distributive and redistributive dynamics of the public debt. This lack of consensus can be 
tied to empirical and theoretical factors, both of which are interrelated.  
Empirically, the track record on the disaggregate ownership of the public debt is 
patchy, and attempts to empirically map the redistributive consequences associated with a 
given ownership pattern are few and far between (see Table 3.1). The few existing studies 
that do offer some empirical evidence all use different empirical research methods so that 
their research results cannot be brought into direct comparison with one another.  
Difficulties in data collection aside, these empirical shortcomings are themselves 
partly a product of deeper theoretical problems with the existing literature. In particular 
the existing studies outlined in Table 3.1 border on narrow empiricism and provide 
insufficient theoretical reflection on the distributive and redistributive dynamics of the 
public debt. Without setting out in a transparent way the (inescapably) theoretical 
concepts and assumptions that underpin their empirical methods, existing studies have no 
way of exploring the validity of their research methods or of comparing them to the 
research methods of those making competing claims.  
H.C. Adams is a partial exception to this rule. In offering a theoretical-empirical 
framework to analyze the distributive and redistributive dynamics of the public debt, 
Adams’s work draws implicit linkages between the ownership of public debt and the 
power of the ‘bondholding class’. Yet even Adams fails to theorize in any systematic way 
the linkages between public debt ownership and power. And existing theories of political 
 
 
 
 68 
economy, both liberal and Marxist, offer little guidance in helping us theorize and 
empirically map the power dimensions of public debt ownership and its redistributive 
consequences.  
Keynesians are alone within contemporary liberal political economy in drawing 
attention to the potential class power relations underpinning the public debt. Yet with 
Keynes’s General Theory tacitly accepting neoclassical microeconomics and its marginal 
productivity theory of distribution, Keynesian theorists of the public debt are left with no 
conceptual signposts to guide them in theorizing and empirically mapping these power 
relations. Marxists are better equipped to deal with class power relations, but neglect the 
distributive and redistributive dynamics of the public debt by giving ontological primacy 
to class conflict within the sphere of production. 
Given the shortcomings in the existing literature, we have to look elsewhere in order 
to rethink and to research the power dimensions that underpin the distributive and 
redistributive dynamics of the public debt. The key question is: how do we move forward 
in order to rethink and research the distributive and redistributive dynamics of the public 
debt? In the next chapter I will develop an alternative framework for theorizing these 
dynamics, one that contributes to a growing body of literature that conceptualizes 
capitalism as a mode of power.  
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4  Public Debt, Ownership and Power II 
  An Alternative Framework 
 
 
 Every man and woman who owned a Government Bond, we believed, would serve 
as a bulwark against the constant threats to Uncle Sam’s pocketbook from pressure 
blocs and special-interest groups. In short, we wanted the ownership of America to 
be in the hands of the American people 
  —Henry Morgenthau Jr.26 
 
 
Introduction 
 
The argument to this point can be summed up in three statements. First, there has been no 
consensus within the existing literature on the distributive and redistributive dynamics of 
the public debt and this lack of consensus is due to both empirical and theoretical 
shortcomings that plague existing studies. Second, questions concerning the pattern of 
public debt ownership and the redistributive consequences associated with that ownership 
pattern are inherently questions of power and these power dimensions cannot be easily if 
at all accounted for within conventional approaches to political economy. Third, in order 
to adequately map and explain these power dynamics of the public debt, we need an 
alternative theoretical framework, one that provides a more solid foundation for exploring 
the nature of power in capitalist societies.  
This last statement provides the point of departure for this chapter. In what follows, I 
develop an alternative theoretical framework that contributes to a growing body of 
                                                
26 Cited in Tufano and Schneider (2005: 11). 
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literature that views capitalism not as a mode of production and consumption, but as a 
mode of power. Pioneered by Jonathan Nitzan and Shimshon Bichler, this framework, 
anchored within the notion of capital as power, offers new insights on how to theorize 
and empirically map the distributive and redistributive dynamics of the public debt (see 
Bichler and Nitzan 1996; Nitzan and Bichler 1995, 2000, 2002, 2009).  
My aim here is to pick up where H.C. Adams (1887) left off and develop more 
explicitly and systematically the conceptual linkages between ownership and power. I 
argue that the institution of private ownership derives its very meaning from the principle 
of exclusion and that the ability to exclude others is itself a matter of organized power 
(Nitzan and Bichler 2009: 228). The accumulation of vendible ownership titles – 
ownership claims on the earnings of governments, consumers, industrial or financial 
corporations – is, in this way, the foundation and the measure of capitalist power. On the 
one hand, the institutional order of capitalist power has a quantitative architecture, 
denominated in units of price and governed by the process of capitalization: the 
discounting of risk-adjusted future earnings into present value. On the other hand, this 
quantitative architecture universalizes the qualitative manifestations of power. As a 
process of power, the accumulation of ownership titles is both dynamic and differential: 
the objective of capitalists is to have the capitalized value of their ownership titles 
increase over time and relative to some average benchmark. And as a top-down 
approach, the theory of capital as power is focused not on ‘capital in general’ but on the 
dominant capitalist owners at the center of the process of accumulation.  
As we will see, this qualitative-quantitative power theory of value that underpins the 
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theory of capital as power stands in contrast to the dual quantity theories of value of 
conventional political economy (Cochrane 2011: 91). Despite glaring differences, the 
neoclassical utility and Marxist labour theories of value share a common bifurcated view 
that splits the economy into two distinct spheres. On the one side is the ‘real’ sphere of 
production and consumption, which is denominated in fundamental units of utility or 
‘utils’ for the neoclassicists and ‘socially necessary abstract labour time’ for the Marxists. 
On the other side is the ‘nominal’ sphere of finance, denominated in universal units of 
price. Both theories give ontological primary to the ‘real’ sphere, whose fundamental 
units are supposed to explain both prices and the distribution of income and wealth. Yet 
closer scrutiny suggests that the fundamental ‘real’ units of both theories represent 
pseudo-quantities that cannot be observed or measured, and this, as we will see, means 
that neoclassical and Marxist theories of value fall short in explaining prices and 
distribution.  
These intractable problems with conventional theories mean that we should focus on 
the singular quantitative reality that matters to capitalists: the quantities of finance in 
which their universal ownership titles are denominated, and contrast these universal 
quantities with the heterogeneous qualities of power. The shift to a qualitative-
quantitative power theory of value may lack the seeming rigour of dual-quantity 
approaches, but it introduces novel empirical research methods that allow us to better 
map and explain the distributive and redistributive dynamics of the public debt.   
The rest of this chapter will be organized as follows. The first section deepens the 
discussion of the power principles underpinning the institution of ownership and outlines 
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some of the basic features of the capital as power approach that informs this study. The 
next three sections contrast the power theory of value to the dual quantity theories of 
value of both neoclassical economics and Marxism. The remaining section then fleshes 
out in greater detail the power-centered research methods that will be used to explore the 
distributive and redistributive dynamics of the public debt. The conclusion briefly 
summarizes the key theoretical propositions and sets up the task for the next chapter, 
which lays the groundwork for the disaggregate analysis of public debt ownership and 
redistribution in Chapters Six and Seven.  
 
Ownership and Power: A Capital as Power Approach 
 
As was discussed in Chapter Three, H.C. Adams (1887) developed a conceptual 
framework implicitly linking the ownership of public debt to the exercise of social power. 
As was also mentioned, these implicit linkages have considerable intuitive appeal, 
touching upon the very questions that are classically associated with power. The purpose 
of this section is to develop a conceptual framework that will make these implicit and 
intuitive linkages explicit and systematic.  
 This study builds upon a growing body of literature that conceptualizes capitalism not 
as a mode of production/consumption, but as a mode of power.  Pioneered by Jonathan 
Nitzan and Shimshon Bichler, the theory of ‘capital as power’ brings together a diverse 
set of radically-mind researchers interested in exploring the possibilities and limitations 
of the concept of power as an alternative basis for re-thinking and re-searching political 
economy. The theory (or perhaps better yet, the set of theoretical approaches) does not 
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form a coherent theoretical ‘school’ or a ‘paradigm’ in the Kuhnian sense of taking for 
granted fundamental concepts and placing strict limitations on the aspects of social life 
that are to be researched (Kuhn 1962; Bohm and Peat 1987: 26). The driving force of 
capital as power is theoretical-empirical research on the constantly changing realities of 
political economy.  
The theory of capital as power has given rise to an online research community, the 
Critical Mass Forum on Political Economy and Power (www.yorku.ca/cmass/forum), a 
peer-reviewed journal The Review of Capital as Power, a volume edited by Tim di Muzio 
(2013), The Capitalist Mode of Power: Critical Engagements with the Power Theory of 
Value, as well as an annual conference series.27 Nitzan and Bichler have employed their 
capital as power framework to research, among other things, mergers and acquisitions, 
stagflation in Israel and the United States, wars in the Middle East, globalization and 
transnational ownership, financial crises and incarceration.28 Other researchers embarking 
from a capital as power perspective have researched the political economy of NAFTA 
(Brennan 2013), campaigns against apartheid in South Africa (Cochrane and Monaghan 
2013), fossil fuels and social reproduction (Di Muzio 2012), food price inflation (Baines 
2013), the political economy of risk in the Hollywood film business (McMahon 2013), as 
well as investment banks and financial regulation (Hager 2012).  
Substantively, the theory of capital as power draws upon a long lineage of radical 
thinking in political economy. Nitzan and Bichler (2009: 14-5), explain that their own 
                                                
27 The Forum on Capital as Power conference series at York University, Toronto, grew out of a set of 
panel series on the theme of capital as power at the Rethinking Marxism conference in Amherst, 
Massachusetts in 2009 and the Eastern Economic Association conference in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania in 
2010.  
28 Most of their publications are freely available at the Bichler and Nitzan Archives (www.bnarchives.net).  
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approach draws on Karl Marx’s emphasis on capitalism as a totalizing political regime 
whilst rejecting his main theoretical pillar, the labour theory of value. Their framework 
also draws on Thorstein Veblen, who emphasized the hologramic nature of production 
and power dimensions of absentee ownership, finance and credit, Lewis Mumford, who 
traced the historical power underpinnings of technology, and also some strands of neo-
Marxism, especially Michal Kalecki, who developed empirical methods linking the 
distribution of national income and power (ibid: 14-5).  
Together these diverse thinkers provide the ‘stepping stones’ for the theory of capital 
as power, which offers a radical new ‘cosmology’ of capitalism (Nitzan and Bichler 
2009: 15; Bichler and Nitzan 2012b). The framework represents a wholesale rethinking 
of the fundamental concepts of political economy. In what follows, I outline what are the 
most essential features of the ‘capital as power’ framework as they relate to the themes of 
this study: namely, its conceptualization of the relationship between ownership and 
power.  
 
The Institution of Ownership 
 
To understand the linkages between private ownership and power, Nitzan and Bichler 
(2009: 228) point towards the etymology of the term ‘private’, which derives from the 
Latin words privatus (‘restricted’) and privare (‘to deprive’). In other words, the 
institution of private ownership derives its meaning from the principle of exclusion. The 
right to exclude, as one legal scholar puts it, is not merely an essential element but the 
sine qua non, of private property: ‘Deny someone the exclusion right and they do not 
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have property’ (Merrill 1998: 730). It follows that private ownership is an institution of 
exclusion, and institutionalized exclusion, as Nitzan and Bichler (2009: 288) argue, ‘…is 
a matter of organized power’.  
The power underpinnings of the institution of private ownership serve as the starting 
point for the capital as power approach developed in this study, with the accumulation of 
ownership titles representing the foundation and measure of capitalist power. In other 
words, in a (hypothetical) fully capitalized world the share of vendible ownership titles 
held by an individual capitalist or group of capitalists represents their ‘…share of control 
over the social process’ (Nitzan and Bichler 2002: 36). These ownership titles are 
denominated in price, which is the fundamental unit of the institutional order of capitalist 
power (Nitzan and Bichler 2009: 150-1). Meanwhile prices themselves are generated and 
organized through the algorithm of capitalization, the discounting of risk-adjusted future 
earnings into present value. This capitalization ritual serves as the underlying pattern of 
capitalist order (ibid: 152-5).  
In this way, capitalization is the symbolic quantification of capitalist power to 
restructure and reshape society. The goal of capitalists is to accumulate by augmenting 
their ownership titles and having capitalized value of those titles grow over time. This 
dynamic power process is inherently relative: capitalists do not accumulate in absolute 
terms, but relative to some average benchmark. As the capitalized value of a capitalist’s 
ownership titles grows faster than the average the capitalist achieves differential 
accumulation and augments his/her relative power. Finally, this dynamic process is top-
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down: the focus is not on ‘capital in general’ but on the dominant capital groups at the 
center of the accumulation process.  
The quantitative architecture of ownership provides one side of a quantity/quality 
power theory of value. According to the power theory of value, the structure of capitalist 
power is mapped quantitatively by examining the distribution of ownership titles and this 
power conferred by ownership extends far beyond machines to anything that can be 
privately owned. This quantitative map, however, only acquires significance once we 
start to link it to the qualitative manifestations of power that underlie the struggle for 
differential accumulation. These linkages between the quantitative and qualitative are 
partly speculative. The validity of these linkages can sometimes depend not on statistical 
correlation, but rather, as Nitzan and Bichler (2009: 313) explain, mostly their hinge on 
our abilities to tell ‘…a “scientific story” – a systematic historical analysis that 
convincingly ties the quantities and qualities of capitalist power’. 
 
Quality/Quantity versus Dual Quantities 
 
In order to flesh the framework out, it is perhaps best to juxtapose it to the conventional 
theories of political economy that it negates and seeks to replace (Bichler and Nitzan 
2012b: 66).  The most important juxtaposition to be made is between the power theory of 
value and conventional theories of value. As was hinted at in Chapters Two and Three, 
both neoclassical and Marxist frameworks are anchored within dual quantity value 
theories. Despite obvious differences, both value theories are united in bifurcating the 
economy into two distinct spheres. On the one hand, both theories posit the existence of a 
 
 
 
 77 
‘real’ sphere where production and consumption take place and where capital, a material-
productive entity, is accumulated. This ‘real’ sphere is denominated in its own 
fundamental (quantitative) units of utility or ‘utils’ for liberals and ‘socially necessary 
abstract labour time’ for the Marxists. On the other hand, there is the ‘nominal’ sphere of 
money and prices.  
As we already hinted at in Chapter Three, the material-productive ontology of these 
value theories means that the ‘real’ sphere gets privileged. For both value theories, the 
fundamental quantities of the ‘real’ sphere are meant to explain the oscillations of 
nominal finance, as well as the distribution of wealth and income. Now the problem with 
conventional value theories has to do with the supposedly universal quantities of the 
‘real’ sphere: these universal quantities remain ever illusive and the efforts to pin them 
down have led both neoclassical and Marxists theories into intractable circularities and 
contradictions (Nitzan and Bichler 2009: 144).  
 
Neoclassical Quantities 
 
Capital as Power builds upon two existing critiques of neoclassical theory. The first 
critique has to do with the theory's conception of capital, which had already received 
considerable scrutiny from Veblen (1908: 161-7) at the turn of the twentieth century, and 
which would later fuel the so-called ‘Cambridge Controversies’ of the mid-twentieth 
century (Robinson 1953–4; for extensive summaries of the debates, see Harcourt 1972; 
Cohen and Harcourt 2003).  The second critique has to do with the fundamental unit upon 
which everything else rests: the util.  
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Capital and the Production Function 
 
As critics have pointed out, neoclassical theory has always relied on an ambiguous dual 
definition of capital: as a fund of 'financial wealth' on the one hand and a stock of 
physical assets, or ‘capital goods’, on the other.  Recall from the discussion in Chapter 
Three of Clark's production function that each factor of production (land, labour and 
capital) could be counted in terms of its own 'natural' physical units (Nitzan and Bichler 
2000: 70). In principle, we can aggregate land by hectares and labour by hours worked, 
but the same aggregation cannot take place for capital.29 The reason is that capital, when 
defined in physical terms, is a heterogeneous entity; there is simply no way to add up 
diverse objects such as blast furnaces, robots for manufacturing Toyotas and shovels into 
a universal physical quantity. Instead, the only way to add up heterogeneous capital 
goods is by summing their values in money (Wicksell 1901–6; Robinson 1977; Nitzan 
and Bichler 2000: 71).  
Neoclassical economists assume that the monetary value of a capital good, calculated 
by dividing its expected profits in perpetuity by the rate of interest, can be taken as 
'indirectly' representative of the physical quantity of capital (expected profits / rate of 
interest = present value). Nitzan and Bichler (2000: 71) have illustrated the problems with 
this supposedly ‘indirect’ measure with simple arithmetic. A capital good that is expected 
to yield a yearly profit of $1 million at an interest rate of 5 percent will have a present 
value of $20 million. But if that same capital good were expected to earn $1.2 million at 
                                                
29 Of course land and, as we will see later, labour are also heterogeneous in crucial respects (e.g. fertile 
versus unfertile land, skilled versus unskilled labour). But as problematic as the aggregation of these two 
factors might be in practice, unlike capital they nevertheless have a physical quantity (hectares, hours) that 
can be counted in universal units separate from money.  
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an interest rate of 5 percent, its present value would increase to $24 million. Using this 
‘indirect’ measure, the same capital good can have more than one physical quantity.30 
Unable to measure capital apart from the rate of profit, the neoclassical production 
function invented by Clark descends into hopeless circularity: ‘…the magnitude of profit 
was explained by the marginal productivity of a given quantity of capital, but that 
quantity was itself a function of profit, which the theory was supposed to explain in the 
first place!’ (Nitzan and Bichler 2000: 71).  
This circularity robs the production function of any scientific footing to explain the 
distribution of income and wealth and places it firmly on the terrain of ideology. Without 
a viable measure of factor productivity to explain distributive shares, the theory instead 
uses distributive shares to explain distributive shares. According to the marginal 
productivity theory of distribution and its production function, if the CEO of a major 
commercial bank earns 600 times that of a Virginia coalminer, then at the margins that 
CEO must be 600 times more productive than the coalminer.  
 
The Util 
 
The measurement problem does not end with capital, but extends to the theory of value 
upon which the whole neoclassical framework is built. Neoclassical theory, as we have 
already seen, builds its theory of value on the concept of utility: hedonic pleasure that the 
                                                
30 Piero Sraffa’s (1960) ‘re-switching’ example demonstrated how, even if we ignore the impossibility of 
aggregating capital into its own physical units and assume that capital can be ‘indirectly’ quantified through 
the rate of interest, the theory still runs into trouble on purely logical grounds (see Nitzan and Bichler 2009: 
78-9; Keen 2001: 137-46). In short, the reason is that a given production technique can appear capital 
intensive at a low rate of interest and labour intensive at a higher rate of interest, which means that the same 
capital goods represent different ‘quantities’ of capital (Nitzan and Bichler 2009: 79). 
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neoclassicists argue can be quantified in a fundamental unit called the ‘util’ (Keen 2001: 
Chapter Two). Now, neoclassical economists readily concede that the ‘quantity of 
pleasure’ that an individual gets from eating a taco or playing squash or listening to 
music is in practice entirely subjective and therefore unquantifiable (Jevons 1871; 
Edgeworth 1881; cited in Nitzan and Bichler 2009: 129). But instead of looking 
elsewhere, neoclassical economics instead proceeded to construct their entire framework 
on this impossible unit (Nitzan and Bichler 2009: 129). 
In the end, neoclassical economists try to get around the insurmountable problem of 
quantifying utility by claiming that prices measure the utility of a given commodity:  
 
Utility is taken to be correlative to Desire or Want. It has been already 
argued that desires cannot be measured directly, but only indirectly, by 
the outward phenomena to which they give rise: and that in those cases 
with which economics is chiefly concerned the measure is found in the 
price which a person is willing to pay for the fulfilment or satisfaction 
of his desire (Marshall 1920: 78; cited in Nitzan and Bichler 2009: 
130).31  
 
 
 This U-turn is itself plagued by hopeless circularity (Robinson 1962: 47; Nitzan and 
Bichler 2009: 129-30). Unable to measure the pseudo-quantities on the ‘real’ side of its 
dual quantity theory of value, neoclassical economists are left with no objective 
explanation of prices and distribution.  
 
 
 
                                                
31 Pigou (1952: 11) made a similar argument, claiming that utility could be known through the ‘measuring 
rod of money’ (see also Stigler 1950).  
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Marxist Quantities 
 
Marx’s labour theory of value, as we saw in Chapter Three, gave ontological primacy to 
the sphere of production. It is within the ‘real’ sphere of production where, for Marx, 
value is generated and where the capitalist appropriates surplus value in the form of 
profit. The ‘real’ sphere has its own fundamental unit of ‘socially necessary abstract 
labour time’ that Marx hoped would allow him to analyze with the precision of physics 
and chemistry the ‘laws of motion’ of the capitalist mode of production.  
Yet Marx’s unit of ‘socially necessary abstract labour’ is just as illusive as the 
neoclassical ‘util’. In order to make labour, in all its complexity and diversity, a universal 
quantum, Marx needs to perform series of conceptual delineations and reductions that are 
plagued by their own logical circularities and contradictions.   
 
Delineation  
 
For Marx, labour employed directly in the productive process creates value and surplus 
value. Other forms of labour, including services, financial intermediation and 
government, are considered unproductive: they consume the value created in the sphere 
of production. Now, in order to operationalize Marx’s equations – which determine the 
rate of exploitation, the rate of surplus value, the organic composition of capital and the 
rate of profit – in any empirically meaningful way, we require objective criteria to 
delineate productive from unproductive labour (Nitzan and Bichler 2009: 110). And this 
is where the theory runs into trouble.  
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If only labour employed in the productive process generates value, then we must have 
a clear idea of what constitutes ‘production’. For Marxists, production is generally 
defined in broad terms as a process that mediates ‘the relationship of society to nature’ 
and that is contrasted to activities that only circulate and reproduce the social order 
(Nitzan and Bichler 2009: 112). Using a series of examples, Nitzan and Bichler (ibid: 
112-3) illustrate how this delineation of the production process is anything but 
straightforward. For example, according to this classification, advertising would clearly 
fall under the category of unproductive labour, since it is designed to promote sales and 
enhance circulation but does not contribute directly to production (ibid: 112). But if we 
accept this argument, then how are we to classify activities relating to the remodelling of 
products, which, like advertising, are primarily intended to enhance sales and circulation 
(ibid: 112)? If we consider remodelling ‘unproductive’, then that means that any new 
characteristic of a product could potentially enhance its circulation, leaving us with no 
clear way to delineate the productive (value-creating) activities from the unproductive 
(circulation-enhancing) ones (ibid: 113).  
 
Reductions 
 
Even if we ignore the problem of delineating productive and unproductive labour, the 
labour theory of value still runs into serious problems trying to reduce labour to a 
universal quantum.  
The first difficulty involves determining what constitutes the ‘socially necessary’ 
aspect of ‘socially necessary abstract labour time’. Marx was able to steer clear of the 
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absurd argument that an inefficient worker who spends more time on the job creates more 
value than an efficient one. For Marx (1867: 129) it is not the total number of hours 
worked that determine the value of the product, but the ‘socially necessary’ or labour 
time expended on average to produce an article within a given branch of production (see 
also Robinson 1962: 43).  
According to Cornelius Castoriadis (1984: 267-8) this emphasis on average time 
amounts to nothing more than an ‘empty abstraction’, one that simply assumes that the 
mechanistic forces of competition are constantly working to bring actual labour time in 
line with average labour time. For Castoriadis (ibid: 268), this elevation of competition to 
a ‘sovereign mediation’ within capitalist production requires that we accept ‘the most 
delirious postulates of neoclassical bourgeois economics’ – including the perfect and 
instantaneous mobility of capital and labour, the absence of impediments to entry, as well 
as market transparency and perfect information (see also Schumpeter 1942: 23-35). And 
in the end, even if we accept these assumptions, there is nothing to guarantee in practice 
that capitalists will obey the laws of an arithmetic exercise ‘which nobody performs or 
could perform’ (Castoriadis 1984: 267).  
 The second difficulty concerns the reduction of heterogeneous ‘concrete’ labour to 
homogeneous ‘abstract’ labour. Marx (1867: 134) states clearly that activities such as 
tailoring and weaving are qualitatively different and therefore incommensurable. Yet 
beneath their appearance as ‘concrete’ labour these diverse activities are both ‘a 
productive expenditure of human brains, muscles, nerves, hands etc.’ (ibid: 134). Thus 
human physiology provides the basis for universal ‘abstract’ labour, which can be 
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reduced to quantitative units of ‘simple average labour’, the labour-power of the 
‘ordinary’ individual that is not ‘developed in any special way’ (ibid: 135). Skilled 
labour, in this way, can therefore be measured as a multiple, or a ‘larger quantity’, of 
simple labour (ibid: 135). This reduction of complex to simple labour, Marx (ibid: 135) 
claims, is ‘constantly being made’ and is ‘…established by a social process that goes on 
behind the backs of the producers’.  
 In this formulation, Marx treats the reduction of concrete to abstract labour in 
contradictory terms as both a social and a physiological abstraction (Castoriadis 1984: 
273; Nitzan and Bichler 2009: 138). On the one hand, Marx (1867: 135) claims that 
simple average labour ‘varies in different countries and at different cultural epochs, but in 
a particular society it is given’. Yet, on the other hand, if abstract labour has to do with 
physiology – brains, nerves, hand, etc. – then the particular spatial and historical context 
should be irrelevant. If abstract labour is a physiological substance, then, as Castoriadis 
(1984: 270) notes, ‘Simple Labour is evidently the same in all societies and all historical 
periods, among the Aborigines of Australia, the Gauls, the serfs of Russia, and the Detroit 
factory workers’.  
In practice, what takes place ‘behind the backs of producers’ is not a reduction of 
complex labour to simple labour but to money (Castoriadis 1984: 271). And indeed, 
Marx’s followers, unable to quantify their illusive fundamental unit, resort to the claim 
that the socially necessary cost of labour is the actual wage, and that surplus value is what 
is left over once the wage has been deducted (Weisskopf 1979; Mosely 1985; Shaikh and 
Tonak 1994; for a critique, see Bichler et al 2012: 10). This move, however, is 
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undoubtedly circular: the labour theory of value sets out to explain wages through the 
quantities of ‘abstract labour’, but instead ends up explaining wages through wages.  
 Like the neoclassical utility theory of value, the Marxist labour theory of value falls 
short in measuring the fundamental unit on the ‘real’ side of its dual quantity theory. As a 
result, the labour theory of value fails to offer an objective explanation for prices and 
distribution (Bichler et al 2012: 11).  
 
Toward an Alternative Theory 
 
Thus the problem with existing theories of public debt runs much deeper than originally 
suggested in Chapter Three. Not only do conventional theories ignore the distributive and 
redistributive dynamics of the public debt; the dual quantity theories of value on which 
they are based also fall short in explaining the so-called ‘productive’ distributive 
processes that they claim to account for in the first place.  
Using the quality-quantity approach mentioned above helps us to avert the intractable 
problems plaguing conventional theories. The linking of quality and quantity may lack 
the formal precision and rigour of the dual quantity value theories; but, as we have seen, 
this formal precision dissipates under closer scrutiny: the fundamental units on the ‘real’ 
side of neoclassical and Marxist value theories lack empirical foundations, and as a 
consequence, the inputs and outputs of production can never be meaningfully quantified 
independent of money. The alternative that I suggest here is to focus on the singular 
quantitative reality that matters to capitalists: the quantities of nominal finance in which 
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their universal ownership titles are denominated – and to link these quantities to the 
qualitative power institutions and processes that underpin them.  
 
The Absentee Ownership of State Power 
 
From this alternative power-centered perspective, in the capitalist order, capital means 
the discounting of future earning capacity into present value. This earning capacity, as 
was argued above, is associated not with production as such, but with the organized 
ability to control and limit production for profitable ends. In other words, earning 
capacity is a matter of institutionalized power. Like any other asset, the value of a 
government bond is generated through the discounting of its risk-adjusted future earnings 
into present value. And following this logic, the public debt, is not a ‘fiction’ but capital 
like any other capitalized asset.  
In the case of government bonds, the income stream that finances interest payments 
and pays back the principle is derived largely from tax revenue. And in this way, the 
capitalized value of the government bond represents or is ‘backed by’ the government’s 
powers of taxation (Nitzan and Bichler 2006: 36; see also Di Muzio 2007). And since the 
power of taxation ultimately rests on the threat and occasional exercise of force, what 
government bondholders therefore own is a share ‘in the organized violence of society’ 
(Nitzan and Bichler 2009: 294).32  
                                                
32 ‘Organized violence’ in this case refers to the state’s power to mete out punishment for evading taxes. 
The penalty for tax evasion in most countries usually takes the form of fines, penalties, incarceration and 
sometimes the death penalty (in China, for example, tax evasion was still punishable by death until 2010) 
(Anderlini 2010). A simple thought experiment can help us to grasp the linkages between the discounted 
value of government bonds, on the one hand, and the state’s powers of taxation, on the other. Imagine what 
would happen to the value of US federal securities if the US federal government were to declare tomorrow 
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A Guiding Hypothesis 
 
Given our top-down focus, we can state, as a guiding hypothesis, that as the dominant 
bondholders increase their share of the public debt relative to other societal groups, they 
augment their relative power to restructure and reshape society.  
Notice that this guiding hypothesis leaves open the question of precisely how this 
power manifests itself. As Bruce Carruthers (1996: 9) notes in his study of the English 
‘financial revolution’ at the turn of the eighteenth century, the power relations 
underpinning contracts of debt and credit are ‘complex’ and run counter to the ‘…usual 
picture of a debtor beholden to his or her creditors’ (see also Graeber 2011: 6–7). By 
contracting debt, a sovereign government is beholden to its creditors: it must pay back its 
obligations or else damage its credit-worthiness in financial markets. Yet on the flip side, 
government bondholders, through the act of lending, must take an interest in the power of 
the sovereign government if they hope to have their money repaid. In other words, ‘The 
same obligation that binds the debtor to the creditor also, in a curious way, binds the 
creditor to the debtor’ (Carruthers 1996: 9).  
 Given the complexity of the debtor-creditor relation, our guiding hypothesis does not 
suggest that the power conferred by ownership of the public debt be restricted to narrow 
‘power over’ the state. While the ownership of the public debt may allow government 
bondholders to influence state behavior and policy making, this cannot be stated a priori. 
On the one hand, the distribution of assets and income streams, in the case of this study 
                                                                                                                                            
that all federal taxes were deemed completely voluntary. The issue of taxation is explored in greater detail 
in Chapter Five.  
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the distribution of federal bonds and federal interest income, map the ‘quantitative 
manifestation’ of the distribution of capitalist power (Bichler et al 2012: 5). On the other 
hand, we have the qualitative underpinnings and consequences of a given pattern of 
distribution. The linkages between quantity and quality – the manifestations of the social 
power conferred by ownership of the public debt – are to be explored empirically.  
 
New Theory, New Methods 
 
The exploratory nature of the research here means that the empirical analysis in this study 
is primarily focused on examining the quantitative aspects of capitalist power, providing 
the first comprehensive map of the distribution of the public debt and exploring its 
redistributive consequences. This shift from conventional theories of value to a power 
theory of value leads to novel empirical research methods, new categories, new data, new 
measures and estimates and also ‘…a non-equilibrium disaggregate accounting that 
reveals the conflictual dynamics of society’ (Bichler and Nitzan 2012a: 65). In the 
remainder of this chapter I sketch the power-centered empirical research methods that 
will inform this study of the distributive and redistributive dynamics of the public debt.  
 
Mapping Distribution 
 
According to the theory of capital as power, the relative or differential ownership share of 
dominant capital groups is the key measure of power. As such, we need to be clear on 
how to measure the distribution (concentration) of public debt ownership. This task 
involves addressing three sets of questions. First, which sector(s) of owners should we 
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focus on? Second, given the top-down approach, who are the dominant owners of the 
public debt? Or keeping with Adams’s terminology, who is the bondholding class? What 
cut-off point do we use to identify the bondholding class of dominant owners and why? 
Third, once we have chosen the relevant cut-off point for dominant owners, which 
method do we use to measure ownership concentration?  
 
Sectors 
 
Table 3.1 indicated that existing studies, apart from Adams’s, are focused narrowly on 
measuring the distribution of the public debt within the US household sector. Yet as we 
will see in Chapter Five, there are in fact four aggregate sectors that dominate the 
ownership of the public debt: domestic households, domestic corporations, the foreign 
sector and the federal government itself.  
Foreign ownership of the public debt raises a whole host of unique issues and debates 
that fall outside the scope of this study, and is therefore left out of the analysis. As will 
become clearer in Chapter Five, intra-governmental debt, that portion of the US public 
debt held in federal government trust fund accounts, is the peculiar outcome of 
government budget accounting and also raises its own set of debates and issues. Intra-
governmental debt will therefore only be examined when it bears upon the sectors 
analyzed here. That leaves two sectors, domestic households and domestic corporations, 
which form the focus of the analysis in Chapters Six and Seven respectively. This then 
brings us to the second question: how do we choose the relevant cut-off point for 
dominant owners within each of these sectors?  
 
 
 
 90 
Cut-Off Points 
 
Turning once again to Table 3.1 we see that the cut-off points for measuring ownership 
concentration have been divergent. For the most part, the researcher does not freely 
choose these cut-off points. Adams’s (1887) investment classes in Table 2.1 are taken 
directly from the 1880 U.S. Census (see Table 2.1), while the top income class ($5000 in 
annual net income or more) in Miller’s (1950) and Cohen’s (1951) studies outlined in 
Table 3.1 are based on the conventions of the Internal Revenue Service (IRS). In contrast, 
Michl’s (1991) cut-off point of the top 1% of households was freely chosen from the 
micro-data of the Federal Reserve’s Survey of Consumer Finances. Cavanaugh’s (1996) 
Lorenz Curve takes into account the entire household distribution of federal income taxes 
and federal interest payments thereby avoiding the issue of cut-off points altogether.  
When the available data does allow us to choose our own cut-off points to formulate 
proxies of dominant owners, we have two options. We can use either a fixed number of 
households or firms (i.e. the top 2000 households or the top 200 firms) or we can use a 
fixed proportion of households or firms (e.g. the top 1% of households or the top 0.01% 
of firms) (Bichler and Nitzan 2012a: 51). In either case, the exact cut-off point is always 
to a certain extent arbitrary and the task of the researcher is to provide some sort of 
conceptual motivation for the chosen proxy for dominant owners. This is paramount 
because different cut-off points lead to different ways of measuring what matters most: 
ownership concentration.   
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Concentration  
 
The standard way of measuring concentration is to take a fixed number of top firms and 
measure their share of total assets, profits, sales, etc. (see Berle and Means 1932; Blair 
1972). To use this conventional measure in the context of this study, we would take a 
fixed number of top households and top corporations and measure the share of the public 
debt held by the top group as a percentage of total share of public debt held respectively 
by each sector. This standard measure is commonly referred to as a measure of aggregate 
concentration (Nitzan and Bichler 2009: 316).  
 One important limitation with the standard aggregate measure of concentration has to 
do with the fact that the numerator (top households or firms) is fixed, while the 
denominator (total households or firms) is constantly changing. In order to illustrate this, 
we start with a simple equation: where (s) denotes average ownership of the public debt 
per dominant household or corporation, (n) the fixed number of dominant households or 
corporations, (S) the average ownership of the public debt per the average household or 
corporation and (N) the total number of households or corporations  (Nitzan and Bichler 
2009: 318):  
1. aggregate concentration =  !  ×  !!  ×  ! =    !!   ×   !! 
As we can see from this equation, the measure of aggregate concentration depends not 
only on the relative or differential ratio of the public debt held by a dominant household 
or corporation relative to the average household or corporation (s/S) but also on the ratio 
of the fixed number of dominant households or corporations relative to the total number 
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of households or corporations (n/N). Thus the relative share of public debt owned by 
dominant owners (s/S) may increase greatly over time, but if the number of total 
households or corporations (N) also increases, then aggregate concentration of public 
debt ownership may move sideways or decrease.  
A decline in aggregate concentration due to an increase in the total number of 
households and corporations (N) suggests a decrease in the power of dominant owners. 
Yet this conclusion is difficult to accept at face value. As Nitzan and Bichler (2009: 319) 
point out in their analysis of aggregate concentration ratios for the corporate sector, a 
proliferation of total firms could just as well increase competition among the smaller 
firms, thereby increasing the power of dominant firms in the numerator. The same can be 
said of the household sector. A rapid increase in the total number of households may just 
as well increase competition at the bottom of the social hierarchy (e.g. for employment 
and for other resources) and this fracturing effect would only serve to increase the power 
of those at the top of the hierarchy.  
There are two ways around this problem of measuring concentration. The first is to use 
not a fixed number of households or corporations as proxies for dominant owners, but a 
fixed proportion of them (i.e. the top 0.1% or the top 1%). The second solution is to 
measure the differential ownership shares of the typical dominant owner relative to the 
average (i.e. the relevant [s/S] in equation 1 above) (Nitzan and Bichler 2009: 320). The 
choice of the cut-off point for isolating top households or corporations [s] is, in the case 
of either measurement, arbitrary. In this study, both these proxies and measures of 
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ownership concentration are employed at different points and will be discussed in further 
detail in Chapters Six and Seven.  
Finally, as a dynamic power process, our efforts to measure ownership concentration 
should map the changes in the ownership share of dominant owners as they unfold over 
time. This means that we should, wherever possible, expand beyond the narrow snapshots 
of ownership that the existing studies in Table 3.1 offer to develop long-term historical 
times series of ownership concentration. 
 
Mapping Redistribution 
 
As the existing literature makes clear, one of the most important implications of increased 
concentration in the ownership of federal bonds lies in the effect it has in redistributing 
income. Once again, the existing literature has come to no consensus on this issue. Those 
who claim that the public debt has become widely held by definition accept that the 
distribution of interest income on federal bonds is also diffused, and in turn claim that the 
public debt redistributes income progressively from wealthy taxpayers to lower and 
middle class public creditors. Meanwhile those who claim that the distribution of the 
public debt and the interest income that derives from it are heavily concentrated, claim 
that the public debt redistributes income regressively from lower and middle class 
taxpayers to wealthy government bondholders.  
The underlying issue can be summarized as follows. Ownership of federal government 
bonds furnishes government bondholders with a stream of interest payments on its bonds. 
In accounting terminology, the ‘stock’ of federal bonds (wealth) provides bondholders 
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with a ‘flow’ of interest payments (income). If the group that receives the interest 
payments on the public debt (i.e. the government bondholders) is not the same as the 
group that pays the taxes that finances those interest payments (i.e. the taxpayers), then 
the public debt will serve as a mode of redistribution from the latter to the former. So in 
order to analyze the possible redistributive effects of the public debt, it is first necessary 
to map the distribution of federal interest payments and the distribution of federal taxes.  
 
Limitations 
 
In order to examine the redistributive effects of this pattern of distribution, we need to 
know whose taxes are financing the share of federal interest received by dominant 
owners. This task of measuring the redistributive effects of the public debt is much more 
difficult than the existing literature would have us believe. The few existing studies that 
attempt to measure the redistributive effects of the public debt offer some comparison of 
the share of federal interest received by top income groups relative to the amount top 
income groups pay in total federal taxes or in federal income tax (Miller 1950; Cohen 
1951).   
The problem with these existing measures is two-fold. First, they overlook some of the 
technical aspects of government accounting. Although interest payments constitute an 
important component of federal expenditures, there is technically no way to determine 
who pays the taxes that finance interest payments on the public debt.33 This problem 
                                                
33 According to the Office of Management and Budget (OMB), since 1980, the ‘net interest’ paid by the 
federal government has on average accounted for 14 percent of current expenditures, and, expressed as a 
ratio, was equal to around two-thirds the overall amount dedicated to military spending. Over this same 
period, the amount paid by the federal government in interest has on average equaled about 27 percent of 
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stems from the fact that in government budget accounting there is not a particular subset 
of taxes ‘earmarked’ for government debt servicing (see Bell 2000; Wray 2012). As such, 
we have no way of knowing exactly whose taxes pay whose interest payments.  
The second, and far more glaring, problem is that the share of taxes paid by dominant 
owners is a questionable indicator of the progressivity of the federal tax system. From 
introductory economics textbooks to more advanced studies, the progressivity of taxation 
is generally defined in relation to the ability to pay (Samuelson and Nordhaus 2001: 39; 
Suits 1977). A useful definition of tax progressivity is offered by Piketty and Saez (2007: 
4), who state that a ‘progressive tax is one in which the share of income paid in taxes 
rises with income’. As such, there is a consensus that the progressivity of the tax system 
is not determined by the share of taxes paid by dominant owners but by the tax rate that 
they pay as a percentage of their income relative to the average. The effective tax rate, or 
the amount of tax paid as a percentage of taxable income relative to the average effective 
tax rate, is therefore a more appropriate measure of tax progressivity than the share of 
taxes paid.  
One way around these measurement problems is to estimate and compare the share of 
gross (before-tax) federal interest payments received by dominant owners to their share in 
net (after-tax) share federal interest payments (Piketty and Saez 2007: 5). Though there is 
no way to determine with any precision whose taxes finance whose interest payments, it 
                                                                                                                                            
total federal tax receipts. In the context of the current crisis, historically low yields on federal bonds mean 
that the federal government’s interest expenses, even despite the massive build-up in debt, have been held 
in check (see also Johnson and Kwak 2012). OMB data indicates that from 2007 to 2012, net interest 
payments on average accounted for 9 percent of total federal government expenditures, 19 percent of 
military spending and 21 percent of federal tax revenues. 
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is nevertheless possible to get a sense of the role that the federal income tax system plays 
in redistributing the interest income received by dominant owners of the public debt.  
 
Conclusion 
  
The theory of capital as power provides a conceptual basis for the development of 
alternative empirical methods and accounting techniques to map the distributive and 
redistributive dynamics of the public debt. A focus on the top-down nature of power 
leads us to examine the dominant owners of the public debt, while the relative nature of 
power leads us to examine the differential ownership share of dominant owners. A focus 
on the dynamic aspects of power leads, where possible, to the replacement of ‘snapshots’ 
of ownership data with long-term historical time-series that map the ownership pattern as 
it changes over time. And finally, taking into consideration the intricacies of government 
budget accounting and the precise meaning of tax progressivity leads to a focus on the 
role of the federal income tax system in redistributing the federal interest income 
received by dominant owners.  
 Of course this alternative theoretical framework will ultimately be judged on the 
empirical insights that it generates, and whether or not these empirical insights help us to 
overcome the protracted lack of consensus that characterizes the existing literature on the 
distributive and redistributive dynamics of the public debt. The remaining chapters in this 
study will be dedicated to empirically exploring these dynamics through the conceptual 
lens of capital as power. The task of the next chapter will be to lay the groundwork for 
 
 
 
 97 
the disaggregate analysis of the pattern of public debt ownership and its redistributive 
consequences found in Chapters Six and Seven.  
Few issues have inspired more controversies amongst political economists than the 
issue of public indebtedness. Though it is a central institution of capitalist societies, much 
ambiguity surrounds the public debt, including how it operates, how it relates to taxation 
and spending, and how it is measured and accounted for in government budgeting 
practices. These ambiguities have meant that debates about the public debt have taken on 
a mystical, even religious, quality. An attempt to first de-mystify the public debt seems 
necessary before seeking to uncover its distributive and redistributive dynamics.    
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5  Accounting for the Public Debt 
  An Exercise in De-Mystification 
 
 
 
 I must confess, that there is a strange supineness, from long custom, creeped into all 
ranks of men, with regard to public debts, not unlike what divines so vehemently 
complain of with regard to their religious doctrines. 
 —David Hume34 
 
 Like sex or religion, the public debt is a subject that it does little good to argue 
about, and yet nobody can help doing so. 
 —Paul Samuelson35 
 
 
 
Introduction 
 
 
Few issues have generated more heated debate and controversy within political economy 
than the public debt. In the mid-eighteenth century, David Hume (1752) argued that the 
public debt had grown so large that it weakened British society and state to the point of 
rendering it vulnerable to foreign conquest. The situation seemed so dire that Hume (ibid: 
102) warned: ‘either the nation must destroy public credit or public credit will destroy the 
nation’. Over two decades later, Adam Smith (1776: 881) reiterated Hume’s fears, 
asserting that the public debt ‘…has gradually enfeebled every state which has adopted it’ 
and that, without a drastic change to its fiscal practices, the British state would eventually 
succumb to the same fate. Nearly a half century after Smith, Ricardo (1820: 197) 
proclaimed public debt to be ‘one of the most terrible scourges which was ever invented 
to afflict a nation’. He also argued that without an immediate reduction in the level of 
                                                
34 Hume, D. 1752 [1970]. ‘Of Public Credit’ in E. Rotwein (ed), David Hume:Writings on Economics, 
Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, p. 101.  
35 Samuelson, P.A. 1948. Economics, New York, McGraw-Hill, p. 433.  
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public debt, Britain faced the prospect of public bankruptcy, with potentially devastating 
consequences for private commerce and trade. 
In his magisterial tome on the history of economic thought, Joseph Schumpeter (1954: 
327) lambasted the classical views on the public debt, which allowed ‘judgment and 
advocacy’ to prevail over ‘analysis’. Schumpeter (ibid: 327) chastised the classics for 
their failed predictions about the impending cataclysmic consequences of Britain’s heavy 
debt burdens, suggesting they did little more than reproduce the popular sentiments of the 
time. When it came to discussing the public debt, it seems even the earliest theorists of 
the capitalist regime substituted rigorous inquiry for emotionally charged political 
‘advocacy’.  
The passage of time has done little to temper sentiments about the public debt. In the 
context of the current financial crisis, the US public debt has increased from 70 percent of 
GDP in 2008 to over 100 percent in 2012 (see Figure 2.1). And with this latest explosive 
rise in government borrowing has come a protracted and emotionally charged debate over 
how to deal with a large public debt that is expected to balloon even further unless 
existing budget policies are changed (an issue to be developed in Chapter Eight).  
Yet no matter what side of the spectrum participants fall on within this feverish 
debate, most rarely ask fundamental questions about how the public debt actually works 
in contemporary capitalism: How do government budget deficits get accumulated as 
public debt? How is the public debt measured and accounted for? How do we explain the 
changing aggregate pattern of public debt ownership by various sectors?  
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Lacking any serious effort to address these fundamental questions, the current debates 
imbue the US public debt with a mystical, even religious, quality. And so, much like the 
classical political economists before them, contemporary political economists have 
allowed emotionally charged debate to prevail over rigorous analysis.   
With this shortcoming in mind, the purpose of this chapter is to take a step back from 
the current debates and explore the fundamental questions about the public debt posed 
above. First, I make use of some macro accounting techniques developed and refined by 
Post Keynesians to outline how government borrowing works in practice in the 
contemporary US political economy. These techniques are anchored within a stock-flow 
consistent framework that matches flows of income to stocks of wealth. Second, I offer a 
systematic sectoral decomposition of the US public debt. I start with broadest ‘gross’ 
measure of the public debt and show through stock-flow consistent accounting how 
federal bonds come to be held by various sectors and how the sectoral ownership pattern 
shifts over time.  
By focusing on how government borrowing works in practice and how it is accounted 
for, the overarching aim of this chapter is to provide a much-needed de-mystification of 
the public debt. This aggregate exercise lays the groundwork for the disaggregate 
analysis of the distributive and redistributive dynamics of the public debt that follow in 
the remaining chapters.  
The chapter begins with a brief overview of the principles of stock-flow consistent 
accounting before starting to systematically decompose the broadest ‘gross’ measure of 
the US public debt. This exercise in decomposition starts out by dividing the gross public 
 
 
 
 101 
debt into two categories: intra-governmental debt (i.e. the public debt owned by the US 
federal government) and ‘debt held by the public’. Intra-governmental debt, we will see, 
is a peculiar outcome of government trust fund accounting and measures the stock-flow 
consistent transactions that take place internally between the US Treasury and the 
respective trust fund accounts. ‘Debt held by the public’, meanwhile, results from the US 
federal government’s external transactions with the non-governmental sector.  
Examining in greater detail the external transactions of the federal government, the 
chapter then proceeds by making use of the ‘sectoral balances’ accounting technique that 
is most commonly associated with Post Keynesian macroeconomics (Godley and Cripps 
1983). This technique, derived from the standard national income and product accounts, 
allows us to see how the stock-flow consistent role of the federal government’s budget 
balances within the macro-economy as a whole. The chapter then turns to examine the 
process through which a federal budget deficit is accumulated as a stock of ‘debt held by 
the public’, unpacking it into various sectors, starting with the broad division between 
foreign and domestic owners. Some concluding remarks discuss the limits of these macro 
accounting techniques and set up the task for the next chapter, where we will go beyond 
aggregate macro accounting and start to examine the disaggregate dynamics of 
distribution and redistribution that underpin the public debt.  
 
Stock-Flow Consistency 
 
As the name suggests, stock-flow consistent (SFC) accounting is a double-entry system 
that matches changes in stocks of wealth with increases and decreases in respective flows 
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of income (Juniper and Mitchell 2008: 16).36 The basic principle behind SFC accounting 
is that, on the flow side, the deficit of one entity is another’s surplus, and that, on the 
stock side, the debt of one entity is another’s asset (Wray 2012: 6-7).37 In order to clarify 
the relationship between stocks and flows for the macro-economy, Post Keynesians make 
use of a bathtub analogy (ibid: 30-3). 
 
The Bathtub Analogy 
 
The stock of wealth for a given entity – a household, firm, government or sector – is like 
the volume of water in a bathtub measured at a snapshot in time. The flow of income is 
like the water flowing into the tub from the faucet, while the flow of expenses is like the 
water flowing out of the tub through the drain. While stocks are measured at a snapshot 
in time, flows are measured per unit of time (a unit per year, a unit per minute, etc.). If 
the flow of water into the tub via the faucet over a period of time is stronger than the 
outflow from the drain, then the stock or level of water rises (and vice-versa). Similarly if 
the flow of income into a given entity is stronger than the outflow of expenses over a 
period of time, then the stock of wealth of that entity rises (and vice-versa).  
To illustrate, suppose I have a stock of wealth in the form of a checking account with a 
balance of $500 at the start of the year (t). Over the course of the year, I receive a flow of 
income of $200 and spend $100. At the end of the year (t+1) the stock of wealth in my 
checking account has grown to $600.  
                                                
36 Irving Fisher (1896) developed a pioneering analysis of stock/flow consistent relations in the field of 
capital theory.  
37The early pioneers of stock-flow consistent accounting in macroeconomics have likened it to the principle 
of conservation in physics (Godley and Cripps 1983: 14). 
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Of course the actual relationship between stocks and flows for the macro-economy as 
a whole is far more complex than the simple bathtub analogy suggests. We have 
examined the stock-flow consistent accounting framework for a single entity. This 
framework will become much more complex, as we gradually develop a stock-flow 
consistent framework for the US macro economy as a whole. 
 
Gross Public Debt 
 
We can start our task by discussing the broadest measure of the public debt: the gross 
public debt. This gross measure of the public debt includes all of the financial 
instruments (e.g. bills, notes, bonds and other securities) issued and backed by the ‘full 
faith and credit’ of the US government. The US Treasury issues most of these 
instruments, but they also include a small amount of securities issued by other agencies 
such as the Tennessee Valley Authority.38 Not included in the gross public debt are the 
liabilities of state and local governments or ‘government sponsored enterprises’ (GSEs) 
such as Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac and Sallie Mae.39  
Figure 2.1 offered a long-term historical view of the gross public debt expressed as a 
percentage of US GDP and is reproduced here as Figure 5.1. As we see, the level of gross 
                                                
38 As of June 2012, non-Treasury securities comprised a mere 0.25 percent of the gross US public debt. 
http://www.fms.treas.gov/bulletin/b2012_2.pdf 
39 Some have argued that GSE debt should be counted as part of the gross public debt. As Ambrose and 
King (2002) point out, the reductions in the public debt in the 1990s preceded alongside the growth of GSE 
indebtedness, suggesting that GSE debt, with its implicit backing of the US federal government, became a 
close substitute for Treasury securities. More recently, the US federal government’s efforts to takeover and 
rescue the GSEs by injecting them with billions of dollars of federal funding has strengthened calls that 
GSE liabilities be put ‘on budget’ and thus counted as a part of the gross public debt (see Acharya et al 
2011: 69; CBO 2010).   
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public debt outstanding has fluctuated greatly throughout US history. The data date back 
to 1792 and over time we see four significant waves of public indebtedness.  
 
Due largely to efforts to pay back the debts incurred during the Revolutionary Wars 
(1775-1783), we see a first wave: a gradual decline in the outstanding gross public debt 
from around 1792 to the mid-nineteenth century. The second wave of indebtedness 
follows in the wake of the Civil War (1861-1865). By far the most significant is the third 
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Figure 5.1 US Gross Public Debt as a Percentage of GDP 
 
Note: Gross public debt includes intra-governmental debt (the debt held in 
government trust fund accounts) and 'debt held by the public'.  
 
Source: From 1792-2010, Global Financial Data (series codes: for GDP, GDPUSA, 
for public debt USFYGFDA); from 2010-2012, Office of Management and Budget 
(Table 7.1) 
percent percent 
sbhager.tumblr.com 
 
 
 
 105 
wave of indebtedness that comes with the turbulence of the early twentieth century, with 
its two world wars and inter-war global depression. Upon the conclusion of hostilities in 
World War II, we see a rapid decrease in the level of gross public debt outstanding during 
the so-called ‘Golden Age’ of the postwar period. The fourth wave of indebtedness 
begins in the early 1980s with the beginning of Reagan-era budget deficits and extends, 
with a brief downturn during the Clinton-era and its budget surpluses, to the present with 
the rapid accumulation of public debt in the wake of the current financial crisis. As we 
also see, in 2012 the level of gross public debt as a percentage of GDP breached the 100 
percent mark, the only time this has happened in US history outside of WWII. 
 
The Map and the Territory  
 
Starting from the broadest gross measure, we can begin to break down the ownership of 
the public debt. Table 5.1 provides an illustrative map of the sectoral breakdown of 
public debt ownership.40 Note here that the table is not calibrated to reflect the relative 
size of each sector’s holdings. The table is meant to serve as a visual guide for the 
sectoral deconstruction of public debt ownership that follows in the remainder of this 
chapter.  
In line 2 of Table 5.1 the gross public debt is divided into two parts. The first of these 
parts is intra-governmental debt: the public debt that is owned by the government itself. 
When we ‘net’ out the intra-government holdings from the gross public debt, we arrive at 
our second part: debt held by the public. The levels of intra-governmental debt and debt 
                                                
40 This empirical technique is inspired by Bichler and Nitzan’s (2012a: 32) mapping of the distribution of 
US national income.  
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held by the public, both expressed as percentages of GDP, are plotted in Figure 5.2. We 
now turn to discuss both these measures, starting first with intra-governmental debt. 
 
Table 5.1 Deconstructing the US Public Debt 
 
1 
 
 
2 
 
 
3 
 
 
4 
 
 
Intra-governmental Debt  
 
As we can see from Figure 5.2, one of the most significant owners of the public debt is 
the government itself. From 1940 until the late 1980s, intra-governmental debt hovered 
steadily around 10 percent of GDP. This share has since grown to just over 30 percent of 
GDP. Expressed as a ratio relative to the outstanding level of debt held by the public (the 
dotted line in Figure 5.2), intra-governmental debt reached its record high in the first 
decade of the 2000s, climbing to around 0.7. Over the past four years, the debt held by 
the public has exploded, reducing this ratio to under 0.5.  
Gross Public Debt 
Intra-Governmental 
Debt  Debt Held by the Public 
Foreign  Domestic 
Business 
 
Federal 
Reserve 
Household 
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Why does the US federal government hold its own debt? And why has the federal 
government’s share of its own debt grown so rapidly over the past three decades? The 
answer to these questions lies in the operation of government trust fund accounts. In 
2011, the largest five trust funds, the Federal Old Age and Survivors Trust Fund Account, 
the Federal Employees Retirement Funds, the Federal Hospital Insurance Trust Fund, the 
Federal Disability Insurance Trust Fund and the Federal Supplementary Medical 
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Figure 5.2 Intra-governmental Debt and Debt Held by the Public (% of GDP) 
 
Source: Office of Managment and Budget (table 7.1) 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/budget/Historicals 
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 108 
Insurance Trust Fund, accounted for nearly 80 percent of the ownership of intra-
governmental debt (US Department of the Treasury 2012). By far the largest of the trust 
funds, the Federal Old Age and Survivors Trust Fund Account, referred to commonly as 
the Social Security Trust Fund, held 52 percent of intra-governmental debt in 2011.41  
 
Trust Fund Accounting 
 
To understand how the federal government comes to hold its own debt, we need to delve 
into the somewhat peculiar world of trust fund accounting. Government trust funds are 
accounting devices created by US federal law. Within the budgeting practices of the US 
federal government, certain taxes and expenditures are ‘earmarked’ for certain trust fund 
accounts. For example, in the case of social security, budget conventions dictate that 
payroll taxes be earmarked for the social security trust fund. The expenditures associated 
with paying out social security benefits are also earmarked in the same social security 
trust fund. When payroll tax receipts exceed the amounts paid out in social security 
benefits, the social security account runs a surplus. When the payroll tax receipts fall 
short of the amounts paid out in social security benefits, the social security account runs a 
deficit.  
The trust fund is required by law to invest its surplus balances in special non-
marketable, interest-bearing, US Treasury securities. In effect, the trust fund lends its 
surpluses to the Treasury in exchange for securities that are backed by the full faith and 
                                                
41 It is common to include the Federal Disability Insurance Trust Fund under the rubric of ‘Social Security’, 
in which case the amount of intra-governmental debt owned by Social Security in 2011 increases to 57 
percent (Government Accountability Office 2012: 17). 
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credit of the federal government. This exchange is purely an internal transaction within 
the US federal government, hence the name intra-governmental debt. The outstanding 
level of intra-governmental debt reflects the overall balances of government trust fund 
accounts. A surplus in these accounts leads to an increase in intra-governmental debt, 
while a trust fund account deficit leads to a decrease in intra-governmental debt. 
Large increases in the level of intra-government debt since the 1980s are primarily due 
to major reforms enacted in 1983 (Levit 2008: 15). Based on the recommendations of the 
National Commission on Social Security Reform, the Social Security Reform Act of 
1983 mandated increases in payroll taxes due to a fear that the Social Security Trust Fund 
account was facing impending insolvency.42  
Intra-governmental debt operates according to the principles of SFC accounting. A 
surplus in one entity, the trust fund account, is matched by a deficit for another entity, the 
US Treasury (and vice-versa). The inflow of payroll taxes becomes a stock of wealth, in 
this case, in the form of Treasury securities, which count as an asset to the creditor (the 
trust fund) and a liability to the debtor (the Treasury). It is important to keep in mind that 
this SFC relationship is an internal accounting device (Wray 2004). The overall balance 
in the trust fund accounts has no direct bearing on the federal government’s 
surplus/deficit with external entities. Since trust fund accounting earmarks only a portion 
of federal taxes and expenditures, it has no direct relationship to the external budget 
surplus/deficit of the federal government. For example, as has been the actual case in the 
US for most of the past decade, the social security trust fund account could run a massive 
                                                
42 The commission is commonly referred to as the ‘Greenspan Commission’ because of its chairman, Alan 
Greenspan.  
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surplus (i.e. payroll taxes greatly exceed payouts) while the overall budget balance of the 
federal government could be massively in deficit.  
 
The Great Equalizer?  
 
It is difficult to situate intra-governmental debt within our analysis of the power 
underpinnings of public debt ownership. Given the fact that intra-government debt claims 
proliferate only due to internal transactions within the federal government, we can say 
that it constitutes one instance where ‘we’ do actually ‘owe it to ourselves’. This is of 
course only if ‘we’ is defined as the federal government. And since intra-governmental 
debt represents an internal (and non-marketable) claim between government departments, 
it cannot be used to exercise exclusionary social power. Intra-governmental debt is 
indeed held exclusively by the federal government, but it does not hold this debt to the 
exclusion of any other social group. Without the power to exclude an external entity, 
intra-governmental debt is little more than an accounting device.  
This does not mean, however, that intra-governmental debt has no bearing on our 
analysis here. Most importantly, as we saw in Chapter Two, Keynesians have suggested 
that intra-governmental holdings in trust funds such as social security serve to mitigate 
the domestic private concentration of public debt ownership (Cavanaugh 1996: 68; 
Heilbroner and Bernstein 1989: 34). The very significant holdings of intra-governmental 
debt, Keynesians claim, serve the public interest by providing the social security trust 
funds with a safe and secure asset to invest the future retirement benefits of low and 
middle class Americans.  
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The problem is that these claims are always asserted and never explored through 
systematic empirical research. How, then, do we go about exploring empirically the claim 
that intra-governmental holdings somehow benefit ordinary Americans? In and of itself, 
the overall level of intra-governmental debt tells us nothing about the underlying interests 
that are served by it. But technically speaking, when the federal government pays out 
social security benefits and other forms of transfer payments, what it does is cash in some 
of the Treasury securities from its trust fund account to pay out transfer payments to 
individuals and families in dollars and cents. It is therefore possible to examine the 
disaggregate flow of transfer payments in order to determine indirectly whose interests 
are served by intra-governmental holdings of the public debt. 
The disaggregate flow of transfer payments bears on our analysis of the household 
sector in Chapter Six and will be dealt with further then. Suffice it to say at this point that 
once we start empirically mapping the disaggregate distribution of transfer payments, the 
issue becomes much more complicated than orthodox Keynesians would have us believe.  
 
Debt Held By the Public 
 
We are now ready to turn to the second part of line 2 in Table 5.1. Unlike intra-
governmental debt, which accumulates from the internal transactions of the federal 
government, debt held by the public, as the name suggests, accumulates from the 
transactions of the federal government with external entities.  
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The Federal Budget Balance 
 
Keeping within a SFC framework, we can start by dissecting the inflows and outflows of 
the federal government. It is important to note that when accounting for the federal 
government’s transactions with external entities, no earmarking of specific tax revenues 
and expenditures takes place. When the federal government’s total tax revenues exceed 
its total expenditures for a given period of time, it runs a budget surplus. When the 
federal government’s total tax revenues fall short of total expenditures for a given period 
of time, it runs a budget deficit. And when the federal government’s total tax revenues 
equal total expenditures for a given period of time, it runs a balanced budget.  
The historical relationship between federal tax revenues, federal expenditures and the 
federal budget balance are plotted in Figure 5.3. All three series are plotted as 
percentages of GDP. The pre-twentieth century (1791-1899) US system of public finance 
tended balanced budgets and small government. Apart from the War of 1812 (1812-1815) 
and the Civil War period (1861-1865), tax revenues and expenditures were closely 
aligned. And for 69 percent of the years from 1791-1899, the US federal government 
registered a small surplus. The situation changes quite dramatically from 1900 onwards 
as budget deficits began to increase along with the size of government. Here we see very 
large deficits registered for the two World Wars. And in general terms since the early 
twentieth century, the federal government has tended to run budget deficits.  
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From 1900-2012 the federal government registered a small surplus in only 31 percent 
of years. Since 1950, the federal government has registered surpluses in only nine years 
or 15 percent of the total. The last budget surplus came in the second term of Bill 
Clinton’s presidency. And since the onset of the crisis in 2007-8, the tax revenues of the 
federal government have collapsed while expenditures have increased, pushing the 
federal government deeply into the red.  
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Figure 5.3 Spending, Taxation and the Federal Budget Balance 
 
Source: From 1791-2009, Global Financial Data (series mneumonics: USFYONET for 
federal expenditures; USFYFRA for federal tax revenues; USFYFSDA for federal 
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According to our SFC, double entry, framework, a budget deficit of the federal 
government always registers as a surplus for external entities (and vice versa). This 
relationship between federal deficits and non-federal government sector surpluses is not a 
theoretical proposition, but an accounting identity that can be derived from the standard 
national income and product accounts. To better understand the relationship between the 
federal government and external entities, we can employ another accounting technique 
used by Post Keynesian macroeconomists: sectoral balances.  
 
External Accounting and Sectoral Balances 
 
Sectoral balances are accounting categories that are derived from the standard national 
income and product accounts. The balances are associated with a three-way aggregate 
division of the macro-economy: this division consists of the domestic private sector 
(households and firms), the government sector (which, in the US case, includes federal, 
state and local governments) and the foreign sector (households, firms and governments 
from the ‘rest of the world’) (Wray 2012: 4).  
Each of these sectors has an inflow of income and an outflow of expenditures over a 
period of time. If the income of a given sector is more than its expenditures, the sector 
runs a surplus; if the income of a given sector is less than its expenditures, the sector runs 
a deficit; and if the income of a given sector is equal to its expenditures, the sector is 
balanced (ibid: 4). As an accounting identity, the overall balance of deficits and surpluses 
between the aggregate sectors must, by definition, sum to zero:  
 
domestic private balance + domestic government balance + foreign balance = 0 
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The Algebra 
 
In unraveling the balance between sectors, we start with gross domestic product (GDP), 
the most common measure of national income. GDP, a flow concept, is defined as the 
market value of all goods and services produced in a national economy over a period of 
time (Bureau of Economic Analysis 2007: 1). GDP can be tabulated either on the basis of 
sources of national income or on the basis of uses of national income.43 From a sources 
perspective, GDP is the sum of consumption spending (C), private investment spending 
(I), government spending (G) and net exports, or exports minus imports (X – M): 
 
1.   GDP (sources) = C + I + G + (X – M)  
 
 
From a uses perspective, GDP is the sum of consumption spending (C), private saving 
and taxation (T): 
 
2.   GDP (uses) = C + S + T  
 
 
Given that these tabulations are different ways of expressing the same magnitude, GDP, 
we can combine them in the following identity: 
 
3.   C + I + G + (X – M) = GDP = C + S + T  
 
 
When we subtract C, I, G and (X – M) from both sides of the equation and rearrange, we 
arrive at:  
                                                
43 This explication of sectoral balances has relied on various blog entries by Bill Mitchell: 
http://bilbo.economicoutlook.net/ 
 
 
 
 116 
 
4.   0 = (S – I) + (T – G) – (X – M) 
A simple re-arrangement of net exports (X – M) gives us the US foreign balance (M – X).  
This gives us the overall balances of income and expenditures for the government and 
non-governmental sectors. The sum of the government balance, government spending 
minus total taxation (G – T), the private sector balance, private saving minus total private 
investment spending (S – I), and the foreign balance, imports minus exports (M – X), 
sum to zero: 
 
5.    0 = (S – I) + (T – G) + (M – X) 
 
 
[private balance + government balance + foreign balance = 0] 
 
Finally, we break down the consolidated government sector balance into the federal 
balance (Gf – Tf) and the state and local balance (Gs+l – Ts+l): 
 
6.   (S – I) + (T – G) + (Gf – Tf) + (Gs+l – Ts+l) = 0  
 
 
So to summarize, equation 6 states that the sum of government sector balances must 
be equal to the sum of the private sector and foreign balances. In other words, if two of 
the sectors are in deficit, the third must, by definition, run a surplus.  
 
In Balance 
 
We are now ready to look at the actual data to illustrate the historical relationship 
between the government and non-governmental balances. Figure 5.4 plots the quarterly 
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balances of each of our four sectors expressed as a share of GDP: the federal government, 
the state and local government, the private domestic and the foreign balance. 
The foreign balance as a percentage of GDP in Figure 5.4 is expressed in terms of the 
US capital account. According to balance of payments accounting, a current account 
deficit (the inflow of imports is greater than exports) must be matched by a capital and 
financial account surplus (the inflow of credits is greater than debits). This is another way 
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of saying that the US trade account deficit is registered by the rest of the world as a 
capital account surplus (see Carbaugh 2007: Chapter 10). 
As we see, the sum of federal and state and local government balances are mirrored by 
the sum of private sector and the foreign balances. During the post-World War II period, 
the US capital account, as well as state and local government, were usually in a small 
deficit. Meanwhile small federal government surpluses/deficits oscillated counter-
cyclically with small private sector surpluses/deficits. Since the early 1970s dramatic 
changes have taken place. The state and local government sector has continued to record 
a small and relatively stable deficit, while the other three sectors have fluctuated 
significantly.  
To illustrate these fluctuations, we can explain the situation as it has unfolded since 
2000. In that year, a federal government surplus, large by historical standards, was 
combined with a large capital account surplus and a very large private deficit. This 
dynamic started to change in the early part of the 2000s. From its previous surplus 
position, the US federal government went deeply into deficit, while the capital account 
surplus increased and the private sector went into surplus. During the mid-2000s, before 
the onset of the current crisis, the federal government moved towards a balance, the 
private sector fell deeper into deficit, while the capital account surplus continued to grow.  
In the early stages of the current crisis, the federal government went very deeply into 
deficit, registering a deficit of 11 percent of GDP. Meanwhile the capital account surplus 
began to shrink and the private sector surplus increased. Since 2009, the federal 
government deficit has decreased from 11 to 8 percent of GDP, the private sector surplus 
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has decreased from around 10 to 6 percent of GDP, while the capital account surplus has 
stabilized at around 3 percent of GDP. If one factors in the 1 percent of GDP deficit 
registered by state and local governments and one sees that our accounting entities in 
equation 6 do indeed sum to zero (8 + 1 – 6 – 3 = 0).  
As we saw earlier, the federal government has tended to run budget deficits since 
1900, as the outflow of federal spending (Gf ) has tended to exceed the inflow of federal 
taxes (Tf). Our exposition of sectoral balance accounting illustrated how these federal 
budget deficits flow to other entities as surpluses. 
What is left to demonstrate is how these government flows accumulate as a stock of 
debt (liability) for the federal government and a stock of wealth (asset) in the form of 
‘debt held by the public’ (the second part of line 2 in Table 5.1). To recap, a federal 
budget deficit leads to an increase in debt held by the public, while a federal budget 
surplus leads to a decrease in debt held by the public. This relationship between the flow 
of deficits and the accumulation of a stock of debt is illustrated in Figure 5.5. The figure 
plots the federal budget deficit as a percentage of GDP (the thin dotted series) alongside 
the annual percentage change in the debt held by the public (the thick series), also 
expressed as a percentage of GDP.  
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Here we see that the series are practically identical, as they should be, with 
fluctuations in the federal budget balance matched by fluctuations in the annual change of 
debt held by the public.44 Now that we have outlined how the federal budget deficit is 
                                                
44 The intricate details of how the budget deficit is accumulated as public debt need not concern us here. 
One of the main contributions of Post Keynesian ‘modern monetary theorists’ or ‘Chartalists’ has been to 
outline, through careful dissection of policy and accounting, the fiscal and monetary operations of a 
monetarily sovereign government like the US federal government (i.e. a government that issues its own 
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accumulated as a stock of debt, we can start to unpack the debt held by the public. In line 
three of Table 5.1 we further de-compose the federal debt held by the public into foreign 
and domestic ownership. 
 
The Globalization of US Public Debt Ownership 
 
As noted earlier, the issue of foreign ownership will not be covered in this study. There 
are potentially interesting, and as yet, unexamined linkages between the rise of foreign 
indebtedness and the class dynamics of distribution and redistribution that form the focus 
of the analysis here. But given the rather exploratory nature of the research on these 
domestic dynamics, the task at hand is already fairly arduous. In order to explore in any 
meaningful way the potential linkages between the global and domestic aspects of this 
issue would require a research project in itself. And this is something I plan to pursue in 
future research. In the remainder of this section I outline the evolution of foreign 
ownership of the US public debt and elaborate on some of its potential linkages to this 
study.  
The rapid globalization of public debt ownership is shown in Figure 5.6. Here we see 
that from the end of World War II through the 1950s, foreign ownership was 
                                                                                                                                            
currency). As proponents of modern monetary theory (MMT) point out, the US Treasury spends by 
crediting accounts or issue cheques before it collects taxes or issues bonds (Wray 1998: 78; Bell 2000). 
Since the government is the monopoly issuer of the currency, it has the unique ability to inject net financial 
assets into the system (Wray 1998: 79). Taxation allows a government to drain purchasing power from the 
private sector and to ensure private demand for government currency. By demanding that tax obligations, 
as well as other government-imposed fines and fees, be met in its own currency, a monetarily sovereign 
government can induce the population to provide it with goods and services (Peacock 2003; Wray 1998). 
Bond issuance by the Treasury serves as a mechanism that ‘mops up’ the excess reserves in the banking 
system created by the initial government spending. Central bank purchases/sales from/to the public of 
(normally short term) bonds serves to inject/absorb liquidity to affect the short-term rate of interest (Wray 
1998: 86; Ingham 2004: 143). 
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insignificant, with foreigners holding, on average, only 2.1 percent of the debt held by the 
public over the period. In the 1960s this share started to gradually increase, averaging 4.7 
for the decade as a whole. Then, with the Bretton Woods System ending in the early 
1970s, foreign ownership of the US public debt skyrocketed, and through the 1970s 
foreigners on average held a share of 15.6 percent. The foreign share of the US public 
debt remained more or less steady through the 1980s at 15.8 percent, then climbed 
significantly through the 1990s to 22.7 percent. Since 2000, the foreign share of the US 
public debt has increased rapidly, averaging 40.3 percent in the 2000s and 41.9 percent in 
the 2010s. In the final quarter of 2008, the foreign share breached the 50 percent mark for 
the first time, but has fallen slightly since then.  
How do we explain this rapid accumulation of US public debt by foreigners? The 
main driver of foreign accumulation has been the US current account deficit, the primary 
component of which is the US trade deficit.45 As we saw in the sectoral balances of 
Figure 5.3, the US has persistently run current account deficits since the early 1980s. The 
tendency for trade deficits to exist alongside federal budget deficits, often referred to as 
the ‘twin deficits’, was paralleled by the rapid increase in foreign ownership of the US 
public debt over this period.  
                                                
45 The other components of the current account include net earnings on US investments abroad, as well as 
unilateral transfers (gifts in kind or money gifts) (Carbaugh 2007: 340).  
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Persistent current account deficits for the US mean that foreigners, either private 
entities or foreign central banks, accumulate surpluses in US dollars. And a significant 
amount of these surpluses get recycled back into the US as foreigners invest in US 
Treasuries (among other assets) as an interest-bearing alternative to dollar reserves. 
Without this recycling of dollar surpluses, the value of the US dollar would have 
plummeted, making the current account deficit unsustainable (Hudson 2002). As we see 
-7 
-6 
-5 
-4 
-3 
-2 
-1 
0 
1 
2 0 
10 
20 
30 
40 
50 
60 
1945 1950 1955 1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 2015 
Figure 5.6 Foreign Holdings of US Public Debt and the Current Account Balance  
 
Source: Federal Reserve's Flow of Funds Accounts (series F.8 and L.209).  	  
Current Account Balance 
(% of GDP) 
(right) 
percent, reversed percent 
Foreign Holdings of Public Debt 
(% of Debt Held by the Public) 
(left) 	  
sbhager.tumblr.com 
 
 
 
 124 
in Figure 5.6, the foreign share of the US public debt tends to track the trend of the US 
current account deficit.  
 
Foreign Ownership and Power 
 
There are at least two substantive reasons why the issue of foreign indebtedness is 
relevant to the themes of this study. The first reason has to do with the fact that foreign 
ownership of the public debt involves a flow of tax-financed interest payments outside of 
the national economy. For Keynesian theorists of the public debt this outflow of interest 
income had potentially damaging consequences for the national economy (see Hansen 
and Greer 1942: 492).46 Unlike an internally held debt, in which income flows between 
taxpayers and bondholders within the same national unit, a foreign held debt involves a 
transfer of income from domestic taxpayers to an external bondholder (private or 
official). According to Keynesians, the fact that foreign indebtedness involves an external 
transfer means that it is bound to the same rules of ‘sound finance’ as private forms of 
indebtedness (see Chapter Two).  
Yet again one of the main limitations of the Keynesian argument is that it is overly 
preoccupied with the aggregate level and does not take into account the disaggregate 
power relations that underpin foreign indebtedness. While Keynesians recognize the 
potentially harmful effects of foreign indebtedness and the external transfer of income 
that it entails for national macro-economy, they do not investigate the possible linkages 
                                                
46 Keynesians were not the first to express concerns about the harmful effects of foreign ownership of the 
public debt. In his polemic against the British system of public borrowing, Hume (1752: 96) expressed 
similar concerns when he states: ‘As foreigners possess a great share of our national funds, they render the 
public, in a manner, tributary to them, and may in time occasion the transport of our people and our 
industry’.  
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between foreign indebtedness and the domestic distributive and redistributive dynamics 
of the public debt. For example, if foreigners own major portion of the US public debt, 
and if this distributive pattern is combined with a regressive system of income taxation, 
then foreign indebtedness might serve to intensify domestic social inequality.  
Another reason foreign indebtedness is relevant to this study has to do with its 
consequences for government policymaking. The issue involves two interrelated 
questions. First, does ownership of the public debt give foreign owners power over 
government decision-making and behavior? Second, do the motives of foreign owners of 
the public debt differ in any meaningful way from those of domestic owners?  
In the US case, despite four decades of debate, political economists have come to no 
consensus on these questions. Some argue that foreign owners of US public debt have no 
power over the US federal government. According to this argument, the increase in US 
foreign indebtedness merely reinforces the role of the Treasury securities market as a 
powerful ‘safe heaven’ for global capitalism and may in fact allow the US federal 
government to influence or exploit its foreign creditors (Hudson 2002, 2005; Panitch and 
Gindin 2009).  
Others see US foreign indebtedness as a sign of the mutual interdependence between 
the US government and its foreign creditors; this stable and symbiotic relationship, so the 
argument goes, is unlikely to unravel even in the context of the current crisis (Dooley et 
al 2004, 2009; Drezner 2009). According to this argument, foreign owners and the US 
federal government are locked into a power-less relationship of mutual advantage 
whereby neither side can influence the decisions of the other.  
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Still others argue that US foreign indebtedness represents a major threat to global 
security and financial stability (Kennedy 1987; Ferguson 2004; Arrighi 2005). According 
to some who espouse this argument, foreign indebtedness did not become a weakness 
until recently when the central bank of a major geopolitical rival, China, became the 
largest foreign creditor to the US federal government (Thompson 2007).47 And now with 
substantial holdings of US federal debt, so the argument goes, China will somehow use 
these holdings to steer US policymaking to its own advantage.  
What appears to be lacking within these existing studies is rigorous, in-depth empirical 
research that documents the impact of foreign ownership of public debt on US federal 
government behavior and policymaking. The evidence garnered to support these 
arguments is thin, often based on little more than a handful of newspaper reports or a few 
government documents. And without any effort to research systematically the 
consequences of foreign ownership of the US public debt, we are left with little 
understanding of whether foreign owners exert power over US policymaking and whether 
the motives of foreign owners somehow differ from domestic ownership of the US public 
debt.   
 
Domestic Ownership  
 
Leaving the issue of foreign ownership aside for future research, we are now ready to 
move to the right-hand side of line 3 of Table 5.1 and examine domestic ownership of the 
debt held by the public. The domestic debt held by the public is further divided into three 
                                                
47 Current estimates suggest that the Chinese central bank, the People’s Bank of China, owns over $1 
trillion, or over 20 percent, of the foreign share of the US public debt (Flitter 2012). 
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main sectors in line 4 of Table 5.1: the Federal Reserve (whose classification as ‘public’ 
will be explained below), domestic business and domestic households.48 We will discuss 
each of these in turn. 
 
Federal Reserve 
 
As Figure 5.7 indicates, the share of the public debt owned by the Federal Reserve, the 
US central bank, is significant. Since 1945, the Federal Reserve has owned on average 14 
percent of the debt held by the public, with its share peaking at a high of 24 percent in 
1974 and reaching its nadir of 7 percent in 2008.  
The existing literature on the distributive and redistributive dynamics of the public 
debt has had little, if anything, to say about the Federal Reserve’s ownership of the public 
debt.49 Given that this study is framed as an engagement with the existing literature, the 
share of the public debt owned by the Federal Reserve falls outside of the scope of this 
study.50 Furthermore, the Fed’s ownership of the public debt and its relationship to the 
                                                
48Also excluded from this study is the portion of the public debt held directly by state and local 
governments, representing around 4 percent of the total ‘debt held by the public’ in 2012.  
49 James O’Connor (1973: 191) argues in passing that the power of the ‘aristocracy of finance’, the 
dominant owners of government bonds, is bound up with the power of the Federal Reserve, but does not 
make any effort to explore the disaggregate winners and losers associated with the oscillations in the 
central bank’s ownership of the public debt (for further discussion of O’Connor’s arguments, see Chapters 
Two and Seven). Similarly E. Ray Canterbery (2000) refers to Alan Greenspan, the former Chairman of the 
Federal Reserve as the ‘pope’ of Wall Street, working in the interest of the ‘bondholding class’. But like 
O’Connor, Canterbery does not examine whose interests are served by the Federal Reserve’s own holdings 
of the public debt.  
50 This is not to deny potentially important, if indirect, linkages between the distributive and redistributive 
dynamics of the public debt and Federal Reserve policy. For example, a recent study by the Bank of 
England (2012) examined the distributional implications of quantitative easing in the United Kingdom 
during the current crisis. Quantitative easing (or ‘QE’ as it has been dubbed by pundits) is an 
unconventional monetary policy that involves swapping longer-term government bonds and other assets for 
cash when conventional monetary policy, the manipulation of short-term interest rates through open market 
operations becomes ineffective (i.e. when short-term interest rate become zero bound). The study estimated 
that the £375 billion QE program in the UK had led to a 26 percent increase in the value of corporate shares 
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inner workings of monetary policy is an extremely complex topic that deserves a full 
book-length treatment in its own right.  
 In the remainder of this sub-section, I briefly explain the Federal Reserve’s ownership 
of the public debt by exploring the following questions. First, why does the Federal 
                                                                                                                                            
and bonds, with 40 percent of the gains from this increase going to the wealthiest 5% of households. In the 
US a debate, without the empirical evidence, has emerged over whose interests are served by the Fed’s own 
successive rounds of QE (see Spitznagel 2012; cf. Krugman 2012a).  
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Reserve own the public debt? Second, why are Federal Reserve holdings of the public 
debt not counted as ‘intra-governmental debt’ (see line 2 of Table 5.1)? 
The Federal Reserve comes to own the public debt primarily through its open market 
operations, which involve purchases and sales of short-term federal securities (e.g. 
Treasury notes and bills) as a method of adjusting the federal funds rate (the short-term 
interest rate at which depository institutions lend excess balances to one another) (see 
Meulendyke 1990; Akhtar 1997).51 Bond purchases, which increase the Fed’s share of the 
debt held by the public, are undertaken to increase liquidity in the banking system and put 
downward pressure on the federal funds rate. As such, bond purchases by the Fed are an 
expansionary policy action meant to increase the money supply and stimulate bank 
lending (Bernstein 1965: 93). Bond sales, which decrease the Fed’s share of the debt held 
by the public, are undertaken to decrease liquidity in the banking system and put upward 
pressure on the federal funds rate. In other words, bond sales by the Fed are a 
contractionary policy action meant to decrease the money supply and discourage bank 
lending.  
Federal Reserve holdings of the public debt therefore play a key role in the steering of 
monetary policy. And this raises the question of why the Fed’s holdings are counted as 
part of ‘debt held by the public’ and not ‘intra-governmental’ debt. In short, the inclusion 
of the Fed’s ownership of the public debt in ‘debt held by the public’ reflects the 
institution’s role as ‘…a peculiar sort of public-private hybrid’ (Graeber 2011: 364).  
                                                
51 I say primarily because the Fed also started purchasing long-term Treasury securities as part of its second 
round of quantitative easing (QEII), which lasted from late 2010 to mid-2011.  
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On the one hand, the US President appoints the Federal Reserve Chairman and the Fed 
coordinates its activities with the US Treasury in order to carry out the federal 
government’s monetary and fiscal policies (Wray 2012: 98 –109). And in this way, the 
Fed is firmly planted with the institutional set-up of government. On the other hand, a 
consortium of banks privately owns the Fed whose expenses are primarily paid for, not 
out of federal taxes, but the interest it receives on its holdings of Treasury securities. In 
pursuing open market operations, the Federal Reserve can only change the overall 
composition of private sector assets (i.e. the amounts held by households and business as 
bonds or as cash, etc.). However, unlike the US Treasury the Federal Reserve cannot alter 
the overall amount of private sector assets in the system. The Fed is in fact legally 
prohibited from purchasing bonds directly from the Treasury. Thus the Fed’s restricted 
access to federal securities through the ‘open market’ explains why its share of the public 
debt is counted as part of ‘debt held by the public’.  
 
The Household Sector 
 
With intra-governmental, foreign and Federal Reserve ownership of the public debt out 
of the way, we are now ready to turn to the final two sectors remaining in line 4 of Table 
5.1: domestic households and domestic business. The discussions of the public debt 
holdings of these two remaining sectors will be brief at this point, as they are discussed in 
much more detail in Chapters Six and Seven respectively.  
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Figure 5.8 plots two measures of household ownership of the public debt.52 The top 
(thick) line measures the household share of total ‘debt held by the public’, while the 
bottom (thin) line measures the household share of the domestic ‘debt held by the public’ 
(total ‘debt held by the public’ minus foreign holdings).  
Both series follow the same general trajectory as well as shorter-term fluctuations, 
with the household share of domestic public debt obviously higher than its share of the 
total public debt. In the first 25 years of the postwar period, the household share of total 
and domestic public debt held steadily above 30 percent, reaching highs of 35 and 37 
percent respectively in 1970. From this high point, the household share of the public debt 
declined steadily until the mid-1980s, then climbed over the next decade. From the mid-
1990s to the early 2000s, both series plunged before recovering in the mid-2000s. Since 
the onset of the current crisis, the household share of total and domestic ‘debt held by the 
public’ has fluctuated dramatically. Early on during the crisis, both series plunge, with 
the household sector share of total and domestic ‘debt held by the public’ reaching their 
respective nadirs of 3 and 7 percent in the fourth quarter of 2007. Since that time, both 
series have rebounded slightly: the household share of total public debt stood at 8 percent 
in the third quarter of 2012, while its share of domestic public debt stood at 16 percent. In 
                                                
52 It is important to note that the Federal Reserve’s Flow of Funds household sector data plotted in Figure 
5.9 is not directly comparable with Federal Reserve’s Survey of Consumer Finances household sector data 
that forms the focus of the disaggregate analysis in Chapter Six. First, the flow of funds household sector 
comprises not only US households but also non-profit organizations and, somewhat curiously, hedge funds, 
while the survey household sector is focused solely on US households. Second, the flow of funds data 
measure only the portion of the public debt that is directly owned by US households, while the survey data 
includes direct holdings as well as some indirect holdings that households may own in investment funds 
that invest primarily in federal bonds (and which would fall under the ‘domestic business’ sector in the 
flow of funds accounts). A more detailed description of the Survey of Consumer Finances can be found in 
the appendix to Chapter Six.  
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absolute terms, the household share of the public debt amounted to $945 billion in the 
third quarter of 2012.  
 
The most obvious observation to be made from Figure 5.8 is the long-term decline in 
the household’s ownership share in the public debt. Even with the recent increases the 
household ownership of the total and domestic public debt is still well below its historical 
averages of 23 and 26 percent respectively.  
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If the household share of the public debt is in decline, then why dedicate a separate 
analysis to this sector in Chapter Six?53 One reason is that the existing literature outlined 
in Chapter Two is focused almost exclusively on the household sector. To engage with 
this literature on its own terms, it is necessary to make reference to its object of analysis.  
Another reason is that the relative share of households, though in considerable decline, 
is still significant. Though much has been made about the rise of financial intermediaries 
and ‘pension fund capitalism’ (Clark, 2000; Toporowski, 2000) or ‘money manager 
capitalism’ (Minsky 1990; see Chapter Seven), the share of the public debt held directly 
by households remains comparable to the amounts held in investment vehicles such as 
pension and mutual funds. Since 1980, the household average share of the total and 
domestic holdings of the public debt equals 16 and 22 percent respectively, while over 
the same period the amount held in investment funds is almost exactly identical at 16 and 
23 percent respectively. So in the end, analyzing the household share is not only about 
being able to engage with the existing literature on its own terms: from an aggregate 
view, the household sector is still a major component in the ownership of the public debt. 
 
The Business Sector 
 
We now arrive at the final sector in line 4 of Table 5.1: domestic business. Figure 5.9 
plots the US business sector’s share of total and domestic ‘debt held by the public’. Over 
the course of the postwar period, the business sector’s share of the public debt, by both 
                                                
53 It should be pointed out that the household sector of the Federal Reserve’s Flow of Funds accounts 
differs slightly from the household sector of the Federal Reserve’s Survey of Consumer Finances, which is 
used in Chapter Six. The former contains only the share of the public debt that is owned directly by 
households, while the latter includes the share of the public debt owned directly by households, as well as 
some indirect household holdings of the public debt through federal bond funds.  
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measures, was gradually halved from over 50 percent to around 25 percent by the early 
1970s.  
 Both series show a recovery up until the mid-1980s, with the business sector’s share of 
total and domestic public debt climbing to 42 and 45 percent respectively. These shares 
then declined up until the mid-2000s, before again shooting upwards with the initial onset 
of the current crisis. Over the past four years, both shares have once again fallen, so that 
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Figure 5.9 Business Ownership of Public Debt 
 
Source: Federal Reserve's Flow of Funds Accounts (series L.209). 
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in the third quarter of 2013, the business sector held 23 and 45 percent of the total and 
domestic shares of the ‘debt held by the public’ respectively.  
US business, as we see in Figure 5.9, is a major component in the ownership of the 
public debt. The disaggregate pattern of the business sector’s ownership of the public 
debt will be examined in detail in Chapter Seven. The Internal Revenue Service (IRS) 
data used in Chapter Seven are focused on the corporate sector rather than the business 
sector as a whole. In the end, however, the distinction makes little difference given that 
the corporate sector is the dominant form of business enterprise within the US political 
economy. According to the IRS’s Integrated Business Data, since 1980 the corporate 
sector has, on average, accounted for only 20 percent of all business tax returns, but 87 
percent of the business sector’s total sales and 71 percent of its net income.  
 
The Outside Stakeholders 
 
Excluding intra-governmental and Federal Reserve ownership, the analysis in this chapter 
indicates that there are three major outside stakeholders that dominate ownership of the 
public debt: the foreign, the private business and household sectors. Taken together, these 
three sectors have on average owned 92 percent of non-governmental holdings of the 
public debt since 2000. The distribution of non-government holdings of the public 
between these three sectors is plotted in Figure 5.10.  
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Conclusion: Whose Private Wealth? 
 
This chapter has made use of the stock-flow consistent accounting techniques of Post 
Keynesian macroeconomics in order to systematically explain the relationship between 
budget deficits and public debt and to break down the ownership of the public debt into 
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Figure 5.10 Non-governmental Distribution of the Public Debt 
 
Note: Non-governmental holdings include the gross public debt less intra-government 
and Federal Reserve holdings.  
 
Source: Federal Reserve's Flow of Funds Accounts (series L.209). 
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several broad sectors. Proponents of these macro-accounting techniques have developed 
and refined them with the express purpose of de-mystifying the role of the public debt in 
the modern capitalist political economy. 
Though macro-accounting plays a key role in de-mystifying public finances, it does 
not reveal anything about the disaggregate dynamics of power that underpin the public 
debt. Sectoral balances and stock-flow consistent accounting tell us nothing about public 
debt ownership concentration or about the potential redistributive consequences 
associated with that disaggregate ownership pattern. In other words, macro-accounting 
techniques allow us to see precisely how the public debt gets accumulated as private 
wealth, but they do not allow us to go one step further to uncover whose wealth the public 
debt represents. The remainder of this study goes beyond these macro-accounting 
techniques and systematically maps the distributive and redistributive dynamics of the 
public debt. We embark on this task in the next chapter, starting with the US household 
sector.  
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6  For Richer or Poorer? 
  Public Debt and the Top 1% 
 
 
We should never forget, then, that the National Debt represents the savings of the 
poorer classes, rather than the money-bags and coffers of the rich and luxurious. 
  —William Stanley Jevons54 
 
Introduction 
 
As we saw in Chapter Three, the scant empirical evidence on the distributive and 
redistributive dynamics of the US public debt is focused almost entirely on the US 
household sector. Some claim that the public debt is heavily concentrated in the hands of 
a powerful ‘bondholding class’ and redistributes income regressively from poor to rich. 
Others claim that the public debt is widely held by middle class investors or ‘John Q. 
Public’ and redistributes income progressively from rich to poor. This lack of consensus, 
as we saw in Chapter Three, is partly due to the fact that researchers use snapshots of data 
for single years in different periods, all with different cut-off points for measuring 
ownership concentration and with questionable methods for measuring the progressive 
redistributive effects of interest payments.  
Anchored within the new power-centered framework, with its top-down, differential 
and dynamic methods, this chapter offers that first systematic effort to map historically 
the distributive and redistributive dynamics of the public debt for the household sector. 
The argument I develop unfolds in three steps.  
First, I use the top 1% of households as an ‘indirect proxy’ for dominant capital and 
                                                
54 Jevons, W.S. 1884. Investigations in Currency and Finance, London: Macmillan and Co., p. 92.  
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map its share of the public debt over the past century (Bichler et al 2012: 5). I show how 
concentration in the ownership of the US public debt follows the general U-shaped 
pattern of wealth and income inequality in the US. Over the past three decades or so the 
concentration of the public debt in the hands of the top 1% has increased at a rapid rate; 
by 2010, ownership concentration was nearly as high as it was in the early 1920s, the 
period of the highest concentration for which reliable data first becomes available. 
Second, I explore the redistributive consequences associated with this growing 
inequity in the distribution of the public debt. I demonstrate how the federal income tax 
system has done little to offset the increasingly regressive pattern of public debt 
ownership. While the distribution of federal interest income has become more 
concentrated in favour of the top 1% over the past three decades, the relative federal 
income tax rate that the top 1% pays relative to the average has remained steady. 
Third, I assess the claim made by some orthodox Keynesians that the intra-
governmental portion of the public debt, the debt held by the federal government in trust 
fund accounts such as social security, serves the interests of ordinary Americans. The 
distribution of government transfer payments provides an indirect measure of the 
interests served by the federal government’s holdings of its own debt. Recent data 
collected by the Congressional Budget Office indicate that the top 1% of households has 
never had much of a stake in transfer payments. But this is no reason to celebrate intra-
governmental debt as a progressive force. If we dig deeper and examine the distribution 
of transfer payments within the bottom 99%, an admittedly diverse group with its own 
social hierarchy, it becomes clear that over the past three decades intra-governmental 
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debt has, if anything, intensified inequality and polarization. 
These observations lead me to conclude that, over the past three decades, the public 
debt has come to serve as an institution of power that works increasingly in the interests 
of the most affluent Americans in general and the top 1% in particular. Though much has 
changed since Adams’s time, the analysis here indicates that there is indeed still a 
powerful bondholding class in the US, one whose power has increased rapidly over the 
past three decades. 
The rest of the chapter will be organized as follows. Picking up on the theoretical 
discussion of capital as power in Chapter Four, I begin by offering a brief conceptual 
justification for using the top 1% as my cut-off point to measure the distributive and 
redistributive dynamics of holding sector holdings of the public debt. Following the 
three-step argument outlined above, I then go on to empirically map the pattern of 
household public debt ownership and its redistributive consequences. I conclude the 
chapter with a brief discussion of the implications of these empirical findings and set up 
the task for the next chapter, which will be to examine corporate ownership of the public 
debt.   
 
The Power of the Top 1%  
 
In Chapter Four we discussed some of the conceptual issues surrounding the 
measurement of ownership concentration. Differential ownership was identified as the 
quantitative manifestation of the distribution of capitalist power. And top-down 
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differential measures of ownership require that we employ some form of cut-off point 
that isolates dominant owners of the public debt.  
 The choice of cut-off point is often dictated by the way that statisticians have 
organized the data. Yet when the data are organized in such a way that the researcher 
freely chooses the cut-off point, this choice is always arbitrary and requires some 
conceptual justification. In this chapter, I use the top 1% of households as my cut-off 
point for measuring ownership concentration. Why focus on the top 1%? What are the 
possible limitations of using this cut-off point? And what does an analysis of the top 1% 
tell us about dominant capital and capitalist power?  
 The onset of the current financial crisis has brought with it a growing awareness of 
inequality in the US. Due primarily to the efforts of the Occupy movement, the top 1% of 
the population has come under intense scrutiny for its growing shares of wealth and 
income. The very fact that the top 1%, and in some cases the 0.1%, has become the focal 
point of public debate, as opposed to say, the top 10% or the top 20%, points to a degree 
of polarization that has not been experienced in the US for quite some time. And even 
mainstream economists have begun to speak candidly, in language usually reserved for 
more radical circles, about the ‘class warfare’ that pits the top 1% against the bottom 99% 
(Stiglitz 2012: 179). Thus the main reason for focusing on the top 1% is simply 
convention: mapping the share of public debt owned by the top 1% will allow us to tap 
into and relate the research to the widespread debates that are currently taking place over 
income and wealth inequality.  
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This still begs the question of how the political economy of the top 1% relates to 
capital as power framework sketched in Chapter Four. In an interview with Tim di Muzio 
in the Review of Capital as Power, Shimshon Bichler and Jonathan Nitzan (2012) offer 
some ideas on how the division between the top 1% and the bottom 99% can be 
employed for more than catchy sloganeering and serve as the foundation for theoretical-
empirical explorations of capitalist power. A focus on the wealth and income shares of 
the top 1%, they caution, cannot tell us everything about the capitalist ruling class, nor 
can the simple contrast between ‘rich’ and ‘poor’ at the heart of existing debates tell us 
everything about the capitalist mode of power (ibid: 3).  
If we choose to focus on the differential wealth and income shares of the top 1% then 
we should recognize that this is one of many possible ‘quantitative manifestations’ of 
capitalist power (Bichler et al 2012: 5). In this way, the top 1% serves as an ‘indirect 
proxy’ for the power of the dominant owners at the center of accumulation (ibid: 5). 
 
The Dynamics of Distribution 
 
With these conceptual issues out of the way, we can begin to map the distributive and 
redistributive dynamics of the public debt for the US household sector. Figure 6.1 offers, 
to my knowledge, the first attempt to map the long-term historical share of the public 
debt that is held by the top 1% of US households (ranked by net worth). The series  in 
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Figure 6.1 measures the top 1% share of federal bonds over the past century or so (see 
data appendix at the end of the chapter).55 
 
                                                
55 The Survey of Consumer Finance data that Figure 6.1 is based on include the total direct holdings of 
federal securities by households as well as some of the indirect holdings in federal bond funds.  
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Figure 6.1 The Top 1% Share of the Public Debt 
 
Note: Missing data are interpolated linearlly by connecting adjacent observations. See 
data appendix for further details.  
 
Source: Lampman (1962) for 1922-1961; the Federal Reserve's Survey of Consumer 
Finances for 1962-1968, 1970-2010; the IRS's Personal Wealth Report for the 1% 
share of the public debt in 1969: 
http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-soi/69inpwar.pdf 
Smith (1974) for individual ownership of the public debt in 1969.  	  
percent percent 
sbhager.tumblr.com 
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In 1922, ownership was heavily concentrated with the top 1% owning 45 percent of 
the public debt. This ownership share fell gradually over the course of the next four 
decades, and reached its nadir, at least according to the available data, of 17 percent in 
1969. In 1983, the next year for which data is available, the ownership share of the top 
1% increased to 33 percent. By 2010, the last year for which data is available, the 
ownership share of the top 1% approached the level of 1922, climbing to 42 percent. 
With the ownership share of the top 1% in 2010 nearing the highs of the 1920s, Figure 
6.1 contradicts claims that the public debt has become widely held.  
Expanding beyond snapshots and looking at the dynamic or historical rate of 
concentration, the existing data in Figure 6.1 show that there has been a rapid increase in 
the ownership share of the top 1% over the past four decades. However, any claims we 
make about the historical pattern of public debt ownership concentration must be 
tempered by the fact that the data in Figure 6.1 are incomplete (see the data appendix). In 
particular the 1970s present an empirical blind spot as no data available for public debt 
ownership concentration during this decade. Put simply, the nadir of ownership 
concentration may have come sometime in the 1970s, rather than in 1969. And if that 
were the case, then the upward trend towards concentration highlighted in Figure 6.1 
could span three decades instead of four. With this in mind, we can say that over the past 
three decades at least the top 1% has rapidly increased its ownership share in the public 
debt. This steady upward trend towards concentration takes place through the so-called 
neoliberal phase, starting in the 1980s, through to the current global financial crisis.  
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Table 6.1 disaggregates the category of public debt further and measures the top 1% 
share of various types of federal government bonds alongside other major asset 
categories.  
Table 6.1 Breakdown of the Top 1% Ownership of Financial Assets  
(percentage share) 
 
  1922 1953 1962 1983 1992 2001 2010 
Total Federal Bonds 45 31.8 24.6 33.6 28.7 36.7 42.0 
Other Federal Bonds*     87.4 39.9 52.3 59.6 72.9 
Federal Bond Funds         16.1 15.3 47.1 
Savings Bonds     8.6 12.7 9.1 18.5 7.8 
Corporate Stocks 61.5 76 61.0 56.8 48.8 52.8 51.3 
Corporate Bonds 69.2 77.5 39.0 57.1 68.7 64.3 68.7 
Life Insurance 35.3 11.5 12.4 14.8 7.3 12.7 21.2 
Pension Assets 8 5.5 4.6 8.5 14.3 13.7 15.3 
 
*Includes all Federal securities (notes, bills, certificates) other than savings bonds.  
 
Source: For 1922 and 1953, Lampman (1962); For 1962-2010, Federal Reserve’s Survey of Consumer 
Finances.  
 
The table shows that the level of concentration of federal government bonds as a 
whole has historically been lower than for corporate stocks and corporate bonds, but 
much higher than for life insurance plans and pension assets. Ownership concentration 
for savings bonds is very low, approximating the levels of the most widely held financial 
assets. The limited data available for bond funds indicates a similarly diffuse pattern of 
ownership until 2010 when the ownership share of the top 1% increased dramatically. 
When it comes to other US federal government bonds, the level of concentration is 
comparable to the levels for corporate stocks and corporate bonds. 
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The Death of Savings Bonds  
 
Table 6.1 gives some insights into why the misleading image of a widely held public debt 
persists. Recall from Chapter Two the arguments made by Francis Cavanaugh, who backs 
up his assertion that the public debt is widely held by claiming that most direct holdings 
of the public debt by US individuals and households comes in the form of savings bonds.  
As Table 6.1 shows, household ownership of savings bonds is indeed very diffuse. 
Savings bonds were introduced in the 1930s with the express purpose of ‘democratizing’ 
public finance (Tufano and Schneider 2005: 2). Offering a safe and secure asset in 
smaller denominations, savings bonds were meant to appeal to lower and middle class 
households. During World War II, propaganda posters called on ordinary Americans to 
fulfill their patriotic duty by investing in war savings bonds, a move that not only would 
ensure ally victory, but also help ensure financial security for the bondholders. In the 
1950s and 1960s, ‘national bond drives’ headed by NASA, as well as Hollywood and 
Broadway celebrities, continued to play on patriotic sentiments, urging Americans to 
‘underwrite’ the might of the US government by investing in savings bonds (U.S. 
Department of the Treasury 1991: 36–46). Most personal encounters with the public debt 
are likely to come from investment in savings bonds, or at least for older generations, 
which were exposed to these high profile campaigns. And so it is little wonder that the 
image of a widely held public debt comes from its association with mass investment in 
savings bonds. 
This image, however, is a relic of a distant past. In the brave new world of complex 
and highly vendible finance, savings bonds have been dying a rapid death. According to 
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flow of funds data, savings bonds on average accounted for just over 20 percent of the 
outstanding net public debt from 1945 to 1970. By the 1980s, this share fell to just over 6 
percent and has fallen steadily ever since. In 2011, savings bonds made up a meager 1.8 
percent of the public debt. Thus the U-shaped pattern of concentration that we witnessed 
in Figure 6.1 can at least in part be explained by the replacement over the past four 
decades of widely held savings bonds with more heavily concentrated types of federal 
government bonds.  
 
Top Heavy 
 
How does inequity in the ownership of the public debt compare to the distribution of 
wealth in general? Much has been made in recent years about growing wealth inequality 
in the US. In his pioneering study in the mid-1990s, Edward Wolff (1996) unveiled a U-
shaped pattern in the share of wealth of the top 1% of US households in the twentieth 
century. Wolff demonstrated that the top 1% share of wealth had increased rapidly 
starting in the 1980s, leading him to proclaim that the distribution of wealth in the US 
had become increasingly ‘top heavy’. Figure 6.2 charts the top 1% ownership of the 
public debt alongside its share of net wealth.  
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 The thin dashed series reproduces the research results from Edward Wolff’s original 
study, as well as some of his subsequent studies that have updated this research to 2007, 
and which I update to 2010. As is clear in Figure 6.2, the top 1% share of the public debt 
follows more or less the same U-shaped pattern as its share of wealth in general. The 
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Figure 6.2 Top Heavy: The Top 1% Share of Net Wealth and the Public Debt 
 
Note: Missing data are interpolated linearlly by connecting adjacent observations.  
 
Source: For public debt, see Figure 2; For net wealth, Wolff (1996, 2010) cited in 
Domhoff (2012): 
http://www2.ucsc.edu/whorulesamerica/power/wealth.html  
The observation for 2010 is based on my own calculation from the Federal Reserve's 
2010 Survey of Consumer Finance.  	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results are clear: if wealth distribution is to be deemed increasingly ‘top heavy’, so too is 
the ownership of the public debt. In fact, in the context of the current crisis, concentration 
in the ownership of the public debt has increased much more rapidly than the 
concentration of wealth.   
Figure 6.3 maps the distribution of federal interest income that flows from the 
ownership of federal bonds. This figure is also comprised of two series: the thin dotted 
series measures the share of federal interest income received by the top 1%, while the 
thick series measures its share of general or total income.  
Once again we see that both series follow the same long-term U-shaped pattern, with 
high concentration in the 1920s and 1930s gradually giving way to more equitable 
distribution through the post-World War II period. Over the past three decades or so, the 
top 1% shares of both federal interest and general income have increased rapidly, 
returning recently to the historic highs of the pre-WWII era. 
This analysis of the pattern of distribution indicates that the top 1% of households has 
rapidly increased its ownership share of federal bonds and federal interest income since 
the postwar period. Using the top 1% as a proxy for dominant owners or Adams’s 
bondholding class, we see that over the past three decades at least, the power of this class 
has been rapidly resurgent. This power of the bondholding class has augmented at the 
expense of small-time investors or ‘John Q. Public’.   
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Figure 6.3 The Top 1% Share of Income and Federal Interest Income 	  
Note: Missing data are interpolated linearlly by connecting adjacent observations. From 
1922-1961, the top 1% share of federal interest is assumed to be equal to the top 1% 
share of the public debt. From 1962-2010, interest payments for both the top 1% and all 
debt holders are imputed by multiplying the dollar value of different types of Treasury 
securities held by the group (savings bonds, ‘other’ federal others and ‘bond funds’) by 
their corresponding year-end interest rate, and then adding the sum of these products. 
 
Source: For ownership of the public debt, see Figure 2. For interest rates, the US 
Treasury's Monthly Statement of the Public Debt reports: 
(http:/www.treasurydirect.gov/govt/reports/pd/mspd/mspd.htm). For the top 1% share of 
income, The World Top Incomes Database:  
(http://topincomes.g-mond.parisschoolofeconomics.eu/). 
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The Dynamics of Redistribution 
 
The significance of the pattern of distribution outlined above hinges in many ways on the 
role of the tax system in redistributing the federal interest income of the top 1%. Again, 
as we saw in our survey of the existing literature in Chapter Two, political economists 
have come to no consensus on this issue. Some claim that a regressive pattern of 
distribution has been combined with a regressive system of taxation, and that this 
combination has led to the redistribution of income from poor taxpayers to rich public 
creditors. Others have attempted to downplay this regressive pattern of distribution by 
invoking the progressive nature of the federal income tax system. According to this 
argument, the rich do indeed own most of the public debt, but they also pay most of the 
taxes and as a result, the vast sums of federal interest that federal government pays to the 
top 1% in the form of interest simply flow back to the federal government in the form of 
income taxes levied on the top 1% (Eisner 1986: 42).  
 The problem with these arguments, however, is that they are confidently asserted 
without ever being subjected to systematic historical and empirical scrutiny. And as was 
made clear in Chapter Four, there is no way to determine with any precision whose taxes 
finance whose interest payments. As was also made clear in Chapter Four, we can, 
however, get a sense of the role that the federal income tax system plays in redistributing 
the interest income received by the top 1% by comparing its share of gross (before-tax) 
federal interest payments to its share of net (after-tax) federal interest payments. 56   
                                                
56 The net share of the top 1% in federal interest is calculated as follows: 
 !"#  !%  !"#"$%&  !"#$$  !"#$%$&#  !"#"$%"&!"!#$  !"#"$%&  !"#$$  !"#$%$&#  !"#"$%"&   ×    !!  !"#  !%  !""!#$%&!  !"#"$%&  !"#$%&  !"#  !"#$!!  !"#$!%#  !""!#$%&!  !"#"$%&  !"#$%&  !"#  !"#$ 
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Gross and Net 
 
A progressive federal income tax system will make the federal net interest share of the 
top 1% smaller than its gross interest share (the difference between the gross and net 
shares will be positive). A regressive federal income tax system will make the federal net 
interest share of the top 1% greater than its gross share (the difference between the gross 
and net shares will be negative). A neutral federal income tax system will keep the net 
and gross federal interest share of the top 1% the same. 
Expressed in dynamic or historical terms, an increasing gap between the top 1% gross 
and net shares of the federal interest will indicate an increasingly progressive federal 
income tax system; a narrowing gap between the top 1% gross and net shares of the 
federal interest will indicate a decreasingly progressive federal income tax system; and a 
steady gap between the top 1% gross and net shares of federal interest will indicate a 
federal income tax system whose progressivity remains unchanged.  
Figure 6.4 uses this template to gauge the effects of the federal tax system on the 
distribution of federal interest income. The top two series measure the gross and net share 
of federal interest received by the top 1%, while the bottom series is a ratio of the top 1% 
net and gross shares of federal interest. The closer the ratio is to 1, the less substantial the 
impact of the federal income tax system on the distribution of federal interest income.  
Fluctuations in the ratio at the bottom of Figure 6.4 give us an indication of the 
changing effects of the federal income tax system on the distribution of federal interest 
income: when the ratio is rising/falling, the tax system becomes more/less progressive.  
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In the 1960s, the ratio of the gross to net interest shares moved sideways, indicating 
that the federal income tax system had neutral effects on the distribution of federal 
interest income. The data in Figure 6.4 suggest that in the 1970s the federal income tax 
system became more progressive, as the net interest share fell relative to the gross share. 
But again, missing data forces us to refrain from making any definitive claims about this 
decade. In the 1980s, the federal income tax system became less progressive, as the ratio 
of net to gross interest began to move downwards.  
In the next decade or so, the federal income tax system once again had increasingly 
progressive effects, as the ratio followed an upward trend. In the early to mid-2000s the 
ratio began to move sharply downwards. In the context of the current crisis, the ratio has 
begun to move upwards. This is unsurprising given that the incomes of households in the 
bottom 99%, and therefore the rate at which they are taxed, have fallen significantly since 
2007, while the tax rates of the top 1% declined only slightly or not at all.  
As we can see from the ratio series in Figure 6.4, the effect of the federal income tax 
system on the distribution of federal interest income has fluctuated historically. Over the 
long term, however, the effect of federal income tax on the distribution of federal interest 
income has been fairly constant. Over the past five decades, keeping in mind the 
empirical blind spot of the 1970s, the gap between the net and gross series has widened, 
but only very slightly. Meanwhile the distribution of federal interest has become rapidly 
concentrated.  
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In broad terms, there has been a massive concentration in the distribution of federal 
interest towards the top 1%, while at the same time the federal income tax system has 
done little to offset the growing inequity in the distribution of federal interest payments. 
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Figure 6.4 Giving and Receiving: Gross versus Net Federal Interest Income 
 
Note: Missing data are interpolated from the trend growth rate. The net share of 
interest is calculated by multiplying the top 1% share of total gross interest by the 
differential complements of the income tax rate (see note 8).  
 
Source: For the top 1% share of federal interest, see Figure 4. For the effective tax rate 
from 1962-2004, Piketty and Saez (2007):  
(http://elsa.berkeley.edu/~saez/).  
From 2005-2009, the IRS Statistics of Income:  
(http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-soi/12inwinbulratesshare.pdf).  	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Put another way, what the top 1% gives to the federal government in income taxes as a 
percentage of its income has, at least since the early 1980s, failed to keep pace with what 
it receives in federal interest payments.  
 
Intra-governmental Debt: The Great Equalizer? 
 
There is still one more argument that ardent naysayers could invoke to downplay the 
regressive dynamics of distribution and redistribution that underpin the public debt. 
Recall again from Chapter Two one key argument made by orthodox Keynesian, Francis 
Cavanaugh (1996: 68), who suggested that the holdings of the public debt in federal 
government trust fund accounts such as Social Security, Medicare and Medicaid 
represent the interests of ordinary Americans or ‘John Q. Public’.  
Intra-governmental debt is a peculiar outcome of the government budget accounting 
process. The public debt held in government trust fund accounts represents the 
accumulated surpluses in the federal government trust funds. Unlike general government 
revenues and expenses where there is no one-to-one correspondence between revenues 
and the expenses they fund, government trust funds are budget accounting devices that 
‘earmark’ certain types of taxes to corresponding expenditures (see Wray 2004).  
For example, federal payroll taxes are earmarked specifically for the Social Security 
trust fund account. When the amount the federal government takes in from payroll taxes 
exceeds what it pays out in social security benefits, the social security trust fund account 
accumulates a surplus, which the federal government is required by law to invest in 
special interest-bearing Treasury securities. As we saw in Chapter Five, intra-
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governmental holdings of the public debt are significant. In 2011, they stood at $4.6 
trillion, equivalent to nearly half the $10 trillion of the public debt held by private 
investors.   
 
The Distribution of Transfer Payments 
 
How, then, do we go about exploring empirically Cavanaugh’s claim that these 
substantial intra-governmental holdings somehow benefit ordinary Americans? And what 
bearing would this empirical exploration have on our analysis of the regressive dynamics 
of private household ownership of the public debt outlined above?  
In and of itself, the overall level of intra-governmental debt tells us nothing about the 
underlying interests that are served by it. But technically speaking, when the federal 
government pays out social security benefits and other forms of transfer payments, what 
it does is cash in some of the Treasury securities from its trust fund account to pay out 
transfer payments to individuals and families in dollars and cents. It is therefore possible 
to examine the disaggregate flow of transfer payments in order to determine indirectly 
whose interests are served by intra-governmental holdings of the public debt. In the 
context of this analysis, the bottom 99% of households has served as a proxy for the 
ordinary Americans or ‘John Q. Public’. In short, if the bottom 99% of households 
receives the bulk of government transfer payments, then intra-governmental debt would 
indeed serve ordinary Americans rather than the top 1% bondholding class.  
A recent study by the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) (2012) on income 
inequality offers a rare glimpse into the distribution of government transfer payments 
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since 1979. The CBO data indicate that the share of transfer payments received by the top 
1% of households has changed little over the past three decades. Since 1979, the top 1% 
has received on average a paltry 0.89 percent of transfer payments, and this share fell 
even further to 0.68 percent in 2009. As a result, there is really no question that over the 
past three decades intra-governmental debt has been an institution that serves the interests 
of the bottom 99%.  
 
The Bottom 99% and the Hierarchy of Social Power 
 
But the fact that the bulk of transfer payments flow to the bottom 99% of households 
should not lead us to overstate the role of intra-governmental debt as a progressive 
redistributive force. The reason for this can be seen once we start to break down the 
distribution of transfer payments within the bottom 99%. Though the 99% has in recent 
years become a catch-all category used to distinguish the majority from the wealthy elite, 
it is, in reality, a very diverse group with its own hierarchical structure. The bottom 99% 
includes social groups ranging from the ‘power belt’ of professionals in the 90th to 99th 
percentiles of income distribution that ‘surrounds, serves and protects’ the top 1% 
(Bichler et al. 2012: 5), all the way down to the 46 million Americans who live in 
poverty (Denavas-Walt et al. 2012: 13).57 And once we take into account the hierarchical 
structure within the bottom 99% into our analysis of the distribution of transfer payments, 
we see that sweeping transformations have taken place over the past three decades.   
                                                
57 The Office of Management and Budget (OMB) develops statistical thresholds for determining who is in 
poverty. In 2010, the weighted average poverty threshold for a single individual was a total annual income 
of $11,139 or less, while the weighted average threshold for a family of nine people or more was a total 
annual income of $45,220 or less (Denavas-Walt et al. 2012: 61).  
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Figure 6.5 offers a breakdown of the CBO data on the distribution of transfer 
payments within the bottom 99% of households. Specifically, the figure is divided into 
two broad categories: the thin line shows the share of transfer payments received by 
households in the 60th to the 99th percentiles of income distribution (i.e. the top 40% 
minus the top 1%), while the thick line shows the share of transfer payments received by 
households in the bottom 40 percent.  
The CBO data indicate that the share of government transfer payments received by the 
upper strata of US households within the bottom 99% (i.e. households in the 60th to the 
99th percentile of income distribution) has increased modestly over the past three decades 
from 15 percent in 1979 to 20 percent in 2009. Meanwhile, households in the bottom 
40% saw their share of transfer payments fall from 73 percent to 63 percent over the 
same period. The fall has been particularly dramatic for households that are most likely to 
rely on government transfers for survival, with the share of transfer payments received by 
households in the bottom 20% falling markedly from 54 to 40 percent from 1979 to 2009. 
 Invoking intra-governmental debt to downplay the distributive and redistributive 
dynamics of the public debt turns out to be rather misleading. It is undoubtedly true that 
the top 1% of households has never had much of a stake in the transfer payments that 
flow from the intra-governmental debt held in government trust fund accounts. And in 
this sense the intra-governmental portion of the public debt can be said to broadly 
represent the interests of the bottom 99% of households. Yet once we begin to dig deeper 
and break down the distribution of transfer payments within the bottom 99%, we see that 
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over the past three decades intra-governmental debt has, if anything, intensified social 
inequality and polarization.  
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Figure 6.5 Transfer Payments and the Bottom 99% 
 
Note: Transfers include federal, state and local government cash (e.g. social security) 
payments and in-kind (e.g. voucher) payments.  
 
Source: The Congressional Budget Office (2012):  
http://www.cbo.gov/publication/43373 
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Conclusion 
 
Expanding beyond the narrow snapshots of data offered by the existing literature, the 
power-centered analysis here offers a more rigorous historical analysis of the distributive 
and redistributive dynamics of public indebtedness for the household sector.  
Over the past three decades or so, the distribution of federal bonds and interest has, 
much like the distribution of wealth and income more generally, become increasingly 
unequal. The federal income tax system and the transfer payments that flow from intra-
government debt, contrary to orthodox Keynesian claims, have done little to reduce this 
inequality. In the current context there is simply no evidence to support their claim that 
the public debt serves the interests of ‘John Q. Public’. Through the so-called neoliberal 
period, the public debt has come to serve as an institution of power working in the 
interests of the top 1%. And though much has changed since Adams’s time, the analysis 
in this chapter indicates that the power of the bondholding class, at least its household 
component, has become resurgent over the past three decades.  
The concluding chapter of this study will flesh out in greater detail the broader 
implications of these findings. Yet before doing so, the next chapter will expand upon the 
analysis here by mapping the distributive and redistributive dynamics of the public debt 
for the US corporate sector.  
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Appendix 
 
Though the time series in Figure 6.1 spans from 1922 to 2010, it is based on observations 
for only 15 years. The data for the missing years are interpolated linearly, by connecting 
adjacent observations. Data on the top 1% share of the public debt for 1922, 1945, 1949 
and 1953 are from Robert J. Lampman’s (1962) pioneering study The Share of Top 
Wealth-Holders in National Wealth, 1922-1956, which in turn relies on federal estate tax 
data from the Internal Revenue Service (IRS).58  The data for 1969 are pieced together 
from two sources: for the top 1% holdings of the public debt (the numerator), I rely on 
the 1969 IRS Personal Wealth Report, again based on IRS estate tax data, and for the 
total amount of public debt held by individuals (the denominator), I rely on the estimates 
of James D. Smith (1974: 174). The data for 1962, 1983, 1989, 1992, 1995, 1998, 2001, 
2004, 2007 and 2010 are based on my own analysis of micro-data from the Federal 
Reserve’s Survey of Consumer Finances.  
Figure 6.1 thus relies on two main data sources: the IRS federal estate tax database 
(ETD) and the Federal Reserve’s Survey of Consumer Finances (SCF). There are two 
important differences between these two sets of data. First, the primary unit of 
observation for SCF data is the household and includes all the interdependent adults 
living at the same residence, while the primary unit of the ETD is the individual (Johnson 
                                                
58 Lampman (1962) also includes estimates of the top 1% ownership of various types of wealth for 1929 
and 1939. Yet the data observations for these years seem to radically over-estimate the share of wealth held 
by the top 1%. For federal bonds, Lampan’s estimates suggest that the top 1% in 1929 and 1939 held 100% 
and 91% respectively. For state and local bonds, Lampman’s estimate even suggest that the top 1% held 
more than 100% for both of these years. Lampman (ibid: 209) suggests that these irregularities may be due 
to a number of factors, including sampling errors and double counting of assets. I exclude the data for 1929 
and 1939 from my analysis for these reasons.  
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and Moore 2005: 82). Second, the SCF data is survey-based, while the ETD is based on 
information gathered from estate tax filings with the IRS.  
The SCF consists of a two-part survey design: ‘a standard, geographically based 
random sample and a special oversample of relatively wealthy families’ (Bricker et al 
2012: 3). The most recent 2010 SCF is based on a sample of 6492 US households, which 
contains detailed questions about household income, savings and net worth, as well as the 
composition of their assets and liabilities (ibid: 3). Data compiled for the ETD are based 
on estate tax filings with the IRS. In 2010, descendants were required to file estate tax 
returns if the gross assets in the estate exceeded $5 million and there were just over 
15000 that reached this filing threshold. In their filings, descendants are required to report 
in detail the components of income and the asset composition of the gross estate. Both 
data sources use multiplier variables for each group to ‘blow up’ the data sample to 
represent its corresponding size in the US population as a whole.  
Despite the differences in the purpose and design of both data sets, Johnson and 
Moore (2005: 87-96) suggest that the statistics of SCF and the ETD in general, and in 
regards to the measurement of ownership concentration in particular, ‘compare quite 
favorably’. Johnson and Moore (ibid: 96) go on to conclude that SCF and the ETD are 
‘complimentary sources of data on both wealth and income’. As such, it seems 
reasonable to splice together data from these two different sources in order to develop a 
long-term historical time series of the top 1% ownership share of the public debt.  
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7  Mapping the New ‘Aristocracy of Finance’ 
  Public Debt and Corporate Power 
 
 
 
 By the aristocracy of finance must here be understood not merely the great loan 
promoters and speculators in public funds, in regard to whom it is immediately 
obvious that their interests coincide with the interests of state power. All modern 
finance, the whole of the banking business, is interwoven with public credit […] If 
in every epoch the stability of state power signified Moses and the prophets to the 
entire money market and to the priests of this money market, why not all the more 
so today, when every deluge threatens to sweep away the old states, and the old 
state debts with them? 
 —Karl Marx59 
 
Introduction  
 
Though existing studies of public debt ownership and redistribution are focused almost 
exclusively on the household sector, this has not stopped some pundits from discussing 
the significance and the consequences of corporate holdings of the public debt for the US 
political economy.  
One argument put forward by orthodox Keynesians suggests that substantial corporate 
holdings by commercial banks, life insurance companies, private pension funds and other 
investment funds are held ‘…largely for the benefit of middle-income depositors, policy 
holders, pension beneficiaries and shareholders’ (Cavanaugh 1996: 63; Hansen 1941: 
179). Much like the intra-governmental debt analyzed in Chapter Six, corporate holdings 
of the public debt are assumed to indirectly serve the interests of middle income 
Americans that own bank deposits, insurance plans, pensions and shares.  
                                                
59 Marx, K. 1852 [1963]. The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte, New York: International 
Publishers, p. 104.  
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Yet this argument fails on empirical grounds.60 The distribution of financial (non-
home) wealth held by households is in fact more ‘top heavy’ than both the household 
distribution of net wealth and the public debt that we mapped in Chapter Six. According 
to Edward Wolff’s empirical research, the top 1% has consistently owned between 40 and 
47 percent of financial wealth in the US since 1983 (cited in Domhoff 2013). The 
suggestion that corporate holdings are indirectly beneficial to middle class Americans is 
even less defensible than the claim, debunked in Chapter Six, that household and intra-
governmental shares of the public debt serve this same purpose.  
Another problem with the orthodox Keynesian argument has to do with the fact that, 
when it comes to the distributive and redistributive dynamics of the public debt, 
corporations do not just serve the interests of households: they are significant power 
entities in their own right (Nitzan and Bichler 2009: 249–53). First, individuals exercise 
their power primarily through organizations and the corporation is one of the central 
power organizations of contemporary capitalist societies. Second, corporations are also 
stand-alone entities that in many respects serve not only their owners but also the broader 
power logic of capitalism. On both of these counts it makes sense to place corporations at 
the center of the analysis.  
As we have seen at various points throughout this study, heterodox political 
economists have long argued that ownership of the public debt has bolstered the power of 
business groups (see Gottlieb 1956). In various writings Marx made references to a 
                                                
60 Adams (1887: 47) recognized and dismissed arguments suggesting that the ownership of corporate shares 
would counteract the concentrated direct holdings of the bondholding class. In his own words: ‘Other 
citizens may be interested in the public debt through their ownership of stock in corporations that hold it; 
but when one remembers how corporations stand related to the question of social inequality, this fact 
cannot alleviate the harshness of the conclusion suggested’.  
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powerful ‘aristocracy of finance’ in Western Europe and the United States that exercised 
power over state and society through the ownership and trading of government bonds 
(Marx 1852: 104; see also Marx 1867: 920; Marx and Engels 1846: 79-80). Concentrated 
ownership of government bonds was combined with regressive systems of taxation on 
‘the most necessary means of subsistence’ (Marx 1867: 920). And this situation meant 
that the public debt served as a mode of redistribution or ‘expropriation’ from the masses 
to the tiny elite of public creditors. 
In Chapters One and Two of this study we saw how researchers of the US experience, 
taking cues from Marx, have drawn similar linkages between the public debt and business 
power. Adams’s (1887: 44) ‘bondholding class’ was comprised not only of wealthy 
individuals, but also large corporations. James O’Connor (1973: 189–90) argued that in 
the eighteenth and nineteenth century ownership of the public debt allowed a financial 
aristocracy of commercial and banking interests to control the US Treasury. O’Connor 
also claimed that the ‘aristocracy of finance’ was still very powerful in the post-World 
War II period, but that the basis of its influence had shifted from public to private debt. 
And most recently, E. Ray Canterbery (2000) claims that since the mid-1970s the 
‘bondholding class’ of wealthy families and dominant Wall Street firms has used its 
concentrated holdings of the public debt to dominate the US political landscape.  
Yet with limited empirical research the linkages that heterodox political economists 
draw between the public debt and business power remain largely speculative. As a result, 
many important questions are left unanswered. How has the pattern of public debt 
ownership within the corporate sector changed over time? Have corporate holdings of the 
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public debt become more or less concentrated? What role does the federal income tax 
system play in redistributing the federal interest income of dominant corporations? With 
the trend towards conglomeration and diversification, are corporate holdings still 
dominated by financial groups? What has been the effect of the rise of institutional 
investors on the pattern of corporate public debt ownership?  
My purpose in this chapter is to address these questions by mapping the distributive 
and redistributive dynamics of the public debt for the US corporate sector. Analyzing 
data from the IRS Statistics of Income, my research indicates that corporate sector 
holdings of the public debt have become rapidly concentrated in favor of large 
corporations over the past three decades and especially in the context of the current crisis. 
The federal income tax system, though marginally progressive in the household context, 
has been neutral in the corporate context. In other words, federal income taxes have done 
nothing to stem the rapid concentration of federal interest income received by large 
corporations.  
I then analyze the sectoral and sub-sectoral pattern of public debt ownership within the 
corporate sector. If we equate ‘finance’ with the Finance, Insurance and Real Estate 
(FIRE) sector, then the data suggests that Marx’s aristocracy of powerful corporations 
that dominate ownership of the public debt is still very much financial. Over the past half 
century, FIRE has owned most of the public debt held by corporations and this ownership 
share has steadily increased from 84 percent in the 1950s to over 98 percent in the past 
decade. At the sub-sectoral level within FIRE, the position of ‘traditional’ bank 
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intermediaries as the dominant corporate owners of the public debt has been superseded 
over the past four decades by institutional investors.  
Overall, the analysis of the corporate sector suggests that, much like with the 
household sector, the public debt has served as an institution of power that increasingly 
works in the interests of those at the very top of the hierarchy of social power. The 
research suggests that the ‘aristocracy of finance’ is not a relic confined to the nineteenth 
century, but a persistent, and indeed increasingly important feature of, contemporary US 
capitalism.  
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows. First, I use the top 2,500 corporations 
as an indirect proxy for dominant capital and map its ownership of the corporate share of 
the public debt over the past half-century. This section includes a detailed discussion of 
the limitations of the main data source for the corporate sector, the Internal Revenue 
Service’s (IRS) Statistics of Income. Second, I discuss the redistributive consequences of 
the pattern of corporate public debt ownership by examining the role of the federal 
income tax system in redistributing the federal interest income of large corporations. 
Third, I map the sectoral and sub-sectoral distribution of the public debt within the 
corporate sector. Fourth, I offer a critical power-centered discussion of Minsky’s concept 
of ‘money manager capitalism’. In the conclusion, I summarize the empirical results and 
set the task for the eighth and final chapter of this study, which will be to examine the 
implications of increasing public debt ownership concentration in the hands of a 
dominant power block of domestic owners: the top 1% of households and large 
corporations, primarily financial intermediaries.   
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The Dynamics of Distribution 
 
Part of the reason that researchers have neglected the distributive and redistributive 
dynamics of the public debt for the corporate sector may have to do with the problem of 
finding reliable data. In Chapter Six, we saw that the primary source of data on household 
ownership of the public debt is not without its shortcomings. Disaggregate data on 
household ownership of the public debt are available only sporadically over the past 
century. And in some cases whole decades, such as the 1970s, are a major blind spot in 
our empirical picture. 
 Yet one advantage of the main source of household public debt ownership, the Federal 
Reserve’s Survey of Consumer Finances, is that it gives researchers access to a raw 
micro-data set. These micro-data afford us considerable flexibility in mapping the pattern 
of public debt ownership for the household sector. Specifically the data allow us to 
choose the exact cut-off point, whether a fixed number or a fixed proportion of 
households, to measure ownership concentration. The data also allow us to choose the 
method to rank US households (e.g. by net income, net worth, total assets, etc.). Using 
this micro-data set and combining it with earlier studies based on the IRS estate tax 
database, we were able to develop a consistent time series that measured the share of the 
public debt owned by the top 1% of households over the past century. 
Unfortunately the main data set that exists and that allows us to map the disaggregate 
ownership pattern for the corporate sector, the IRS Statistics of Income (SOI), does not 
offer the same conveniences. The SOI division of the IRS does not make a micro-data set 
available to the public. Researchers therefore have to rely on the data tabulated and 
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published by SOI statisticians. And the conventions that SOI statisticians follow in 
arranging the data are not amenable, at least in a straightforward way, to the power-
centered methods for measuring concentration outlined in Chapter Four.  
 
Cut-off Points in Flux 
 
Recall from the discussion in Chapter Four the different methods of measuring ownership 
concentration. The conventional aggregate measure of concentration uses a fixed number 
of corporations (e.g. the top 100 or top 500, etc.) as the cut-off point in the numerator and 
measures the ownership share of top corporations relative to the entire corporate 
universe. As we saw, constant fluctuations in the number of entities in the denominator 
(i.e. the total number of corporations) make the aggregate measure of concentration 
ambivalent from the perspective of power. And to correct for the ambivalence created by 
a fluctuating denominator, we can use either a fixed proportion of corporations (e.g. the 
top 1% or the top 0.01%, etc.) as our cut-off point in the numerator or we can use 
differential methods that measure the per corporation ownership share of a top 
corporation (e.g. the top 100 or the top 500, etc.) relative to the average corporation. 
 SOI data, however, do not allow us to consistently use any of these measures of 
ownership concentration. The SOI tabulates the share of the public debt owned by 
corporations divided into different categories based on the size of their total assets (see 
data appendix). From 1954 to 2000 any corporation with assets of $250 million or more 
was placed into the top asset bracket. And it was not until 2001 that the IRS refined its 
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categories and made assets of $2.5 billion or more the cut-off point for the top asset 
bracket.  
 The nominal value of assets rises over time. As a result, keeping the cut-off point for 
top corporations at a given level of assets, whether $250 million or $2.5 billion or any 
other number, means that the overall number of top corporations and the proportion of 
top corporations, and therefore their asset share, increases greatly over time. These 
dynamics are captured in Figure 7.1. As we see the total number of corporations (counted 
by their tax returns) included in the asset bracket of $250 million or more has increased 
exponentially over the past half century.  
 In 1954, only 391 corporations, or 0.06 percent of the total number of corporations, 
were included in the top asset bracket of $250 million or more. Yet by 2000, the last year 
that this cut-off point was used to designate the top bracket, 10,883 corporations, or 0.2 
percent of the total corporations, made the cut of $250 million or more in assets. With the 
refined categories introduced in 2001, 1,896 corporations, or 0.04 percent of total 
corporations, were included in the top bracket of $2.5 billion or more in assets, and these 
totals increased to 2,772 and 0.05 percent respectively by 2010.  
Basing its cut-off point on the size of assets, rather than the number of corporations, 
the SOI data present obvious problems for our efforts to map the pattern of public debt 
ownership for the corporate sector. In order to map ownership concentration using the 
methods outlined in Chapter Four, we need a fixed cut-off point for identifying the 
numerator of dominant corporations. And the SOI data simply do not offer a fixed cut-off 
point: from a power perspective, a change in the share of public debt held by corporations 
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in the top asset bracket could reflect changes in the fluctuating number of corporations, 
rather than a change in ownership concentration. 
To illustrate the problems that arise from the fluctuating number of corporations, we 
can proceed by taking the SOI data at face value and map the share of the public debt 
owned by large corporations (e.g. those with assets of $250 million or more). Figure 7.2 
employs two different measures: the conventional aggregate measure of concentration, 
referred to as the ‘distributive’ shares of the public debt held by large corporations with 
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Figure 7.1 Cut-off Points in Flux 
 
Source: IRS Statistics of Income (http://www.irs.gov/uac/Tax-Stats-2).  
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$250 million or more in assets, and the differential ratio of public debt held by large 
corporations (i.e. the public debt ownership share of a large corporation relative to the 
average corporation).  
 
The two top series plot the distributive share of corporate holdings of the public debt 
held by large corporations (i.e. the share of corporate holdings of the public debt owned 
by large corporations). The top thick series, which maps the share of federal bonds held 
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Figure 7.2 Concentration or Diffusion? Corporate Ownership of the Public Debt 
 
Note: Large corporations are those with total assets of $250 million or more.  
 
Source: IRS Statistics of Income (http://www.irs.gov/uac/Tax-Stats-2).  
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by large corporations, appears ‘broken’ because observations are missing for several 
years. This thick series is supplemented by the thin dashed series, which offers a more 
complete data on the share of total government debt (federal, state and local) owned by 
large corporations. The bottom two series use the same data to plot the differential ratio 
of federal debt and total government debt owned by a large corporation relative to the 
average corporation  
The two measures paint opposing pictures of the pattern of public debt ownership for 
the corporate sector. On the one hand, the distributive share of public debt held by large 
corporations has doubled from around 45 percent in the 1950s to over 90 percent in the 
most recent decade. Without a fixed cut-off point for isolating dominant capital, these 
rapid increases in the holdings of large corporations could signify concentration or they 
could merely be the product of an increasing number of corporations meeting the 
criterion for ‘large’ corporations with assets of $250 million or more.  
On the other hand, the differential share of the public debt owned by a large 
corporation relative to the average corporation has more than halved over the same 
period. In the postwar period large corporations owned around 850 times the amount of 
public debt owned by the average corporation and this ratio has fallen steadily to just 
over 400 times in the most recent decade. As more and more corporations enter the 
numerator by meeting the criteria of $250 million in assets or more, the per corporation 
share of the public debt held by a large corporation relative to the average becomes 
significantly diluted. 
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Making Sense of SOI Data: Historical Snapshots 
 
The nature of the SOI data hinders our efforts to map the distributive and redistributive 
dynamics of the public debt for the corporate sector. Is there any way to get around the 
problems associated with the fluctuating corporations in the numerator and the 
denominator and use these data to meaningfully map the pattern of public debt ownership 
concentration for corporations?  
 Luckily there is a roundabout method we can use to tease out meaningful results from 
the SOI data. It involves playing around with the SOI asset class categories in order to 
come up with a fixed number of corporations in different snapshots of time. As was 
already mentioned, the SOI finally refined its asset classes in 2001, increasing the top 
cut-off point from assets of $250 million or more to assets of $2.5 billion or more. For the 
most recent five years (2006-10) around 2,500 corporations were included in this top 
asset bracket of $2.5 billion in assets or more.  
Obviously the top 2,500 corporations does not represent an ideal proxy for dominant 
capital, which existing studies have tended to identify with the top 100 to top 500 US 
corporations (Nitzan and Bichler 2009; Hager 2012). The top category is likely to contain 
not only the largest corporations at the center of the accumulation process, but also a 
significant number of medium-sized corporations. But due to the limitations built into the 
SOI data, the top 2,500 is the absolute minimum number of corporations that we can use 
as our cut-off point.  
If we go back in history, we can examine the asset classes and try to isolate the top 
2,500 corporations at different points in history. For the five-year period from 1977-81 
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there were on average just over 2,500 corporations with assets of $250 million or more. If 
we go back further to 1957-61, there were only around 500 corporations that meet the 
criterion of having assets in top bracket of $250 million or more. But if we include 
corporations with assets of $50 million or more, we come close to 2,500 top corporations 
for 1957-61. 
Using these three snapshots periods (1957-61, 1977-81, 2006-10) we get a reasonably 
consistent, long-term view of ownership concentration for a fixed number of top 
corporations in the numerator. The historical snapshot data for these three periods are 
outlined in Table 7.1.  
 
Table 7.1 Historical Snapshots of Corporate Ownership of the Public Debt 
 
Period Large 
Corporations 
(total) 
Large 
Corporations  
(% total) 
Distributive  
Ownership 
Differential 
Ownership 
1957-61 2,344 0.2% 66% 302 
1977-81 2,676 0.1% 65% 616 
2006-10 2,675 0.05% 82% 1,846 
 
Note: The values in the last four columns are calculated as simple averages for the 
corresponding five-year period. Distributive ownership refers to the total share of 
corporate holdings of the public debt that are owned by large corporations. Differential 
ownership the ratio between the public debt owned by an average large corporation and 
the public debt owned by an average corporation. The cutoff point for large corporation is 
assets of $50 million or more for 1957-61, $250 million or more for 1977-81, $2.5 billion 
or more for 2006-10.  
 
Source: IRS Statistics of Income.  
 
 
Here we see that the number of corporations included in the top asset bracket is nearly 
constant. Skeptics will point out that the number of corporations in the first period (1957-
61) in the second column of Table 7.1 is 14 percent lower than for the latter two periods. 
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But this discrepancy is compensated for when we take into account the third column of 
the table, which measures the number of top corporations as a proportion of the total 
number of corporations. The successive decline in the proportion of top corporations 
through the three periods is far more significant than the increase in the fixed number of 
corporations from 1957-61 to 1977-1981. Given the successive halving in the fixed 
proportion of top corporations, we could argue that these data may very well understate 
the level of ownership concentration. 
 
The Aristocracy 
 
We now move to two remaining columns in Table 7.1. The fourth column maps the 
distributive share of the public debt owned by large corporations. From 1957-61 to 1977-
81 there was little change in the distributive pattern of ownership, with the share of large 
corporations falling one percentage point from 66 to 65 percent. It is from 1977-81 to 
2006-10 that we see important changes, with large corporations increasing their 
distributive share of public debt from 65 to 82 percent.  
 The fifth column maps the differential ownership of the public debt, denoted by the 
ratio between the debt owned by an average large corporation and the debt owned by an 
average corporation. In differential terms, the debt ownership of a typical large 
corporation doubled from 302 times the average in 1957-1, to 616 times the average in 
1977-81. Then from 1977-81 to 2006-10, we again see important changes, with the 
differential debt ownership of a large corporation more than tripling to 1,846 times the 
average corporation.  
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What do the data in Table 7.1 tell us about the concentration of public debt 
ownership? From the postwar period (1957-61) to the early neoliberal period (1977-81) 
the situation is still somewhat ambivalent. The distributive share of the public debt owned 
by large corporations held steady through the two periods, while the differential share 
more than doubled. In other words, there was little change in the power of dominant 
owners according to the conventional measure (approximated by ownership 
concentration) but a rise in their elemental power (approximated by differential 
ownership). With one measure constant and the other increasing, we can make the 
cautious assessment that there was a modest increase in public debt ownership 
concentration from the postwar to the early neoliberal period.  
From the early neoliberal period (1977-81) to the current late neoliberal period (2006-
10) the situation is much clearer. Judging by both the distributive and differential 
measures, there has been a rapid increase in the power of dominant corporate owners of 
the public debt over the past three decades. Though the top 2,500 corporations make up 
only 0.05 percent of total corporate returns in 2006-10, they now own 82% of the public 
debt. The increase in ownership concentration has been particularly stunning in the 
context of the current crisis: the distributive share of the public debt owned by large 
corporations increased from 77 percent in 2006 to 86 percent in 2010.  
Our empirical picture of the disaggregate ownership of public debt for the corporate 
sector is more limited than for the household sector. But the data indicate clearly that the 
same pattern has been at play in both sectors over the past three decades: much like the 
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top 1% of households, since the early 1980s, large corporations have greatly increased 
their share of the public debt, especially through the current crisis.  
 In this way, much like the household component, the corporate component of H.C. 
Adams’s bondholding class is very much a powerful feature of the contemporary US 
political economy. The pattern of public debt ownership concentration for the corporate 
sector also suggests that Marx’s ‘aristocracy’ of powerful business interests that lie at the 
heart of the US public debt has contemporary relevance. While James O’Connor, perhaps 
rightfully, dismissed the notion of a powerful nexus between the ‘aristocracy’ and the 
public debt in the postwar period, it now appears that this nexus has been restored over 
the neoliberal period of the past three decades.  
 
The Dynamics of Redistribution 
 
We can now turn to examine the role of the federal income tax system in redistributing 
the share of federal interest income received by large corporations. As we saw in the case 
of the household sector, many Keynesians claimed that federal income taxes would 
progressively redistribute the ‘top heavy’ distribution of federal interest income. Our 
empirical analysis in Chapter Six questioned this claim. Though marginally progressive 
over the course of the past half century, federal income taxes have done little to reduce 
the net (after-tax) share of federal interest held by the top 1% of households relative to 
their gross (after-tax) share.  
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The Demise of Corporate Taxation 
 
Before exploring the redistributive dynamics of the public debt for the corporate sector, it 
is important to point out some of the far-reaching changes that have taken place in the 
system of corporate income tax since the 1930s. These changes are highlighted in Figure 
7.3.  
The thick bottom series measures corporate incomes taxes as a percentage of total 
federal government revenues, while the thin top series measures the effective corporate 
income tax rate. Both series follow the same general pattern and reflect what researchers 
for the Citizens for Tax Justice advocacy group already recognized in the 1980s as the 
‘demise of the corporate income tax’ (McIntyre et al. 1984: 1).  
From a high of 40 percent in 1943, federal revenues from corporate income taxes have 
fallen consistently over the past half century and stood at a mere 8 percent in 2011. 
Meanwhile during the postwar period the effective corporate income tax rate was 
consistently above 40 percent, but has fallen since the 1970s. In 2012, the effective 
corporate income tax rate was 18 percent.  
In the aggregate, the federal tax system has played a decreasingly significant role in 
the corporate sector. The significant decline in corporate taxation makes it unlikely that 
the federal tax system will play a meaningful role in redistributing the highly 
concentrated federal interest income of large corporations. What is interesting from our 
disaggregate power perspective is whether or not large corporations bear most of the 
relative burden of (decreasing) corporate taxation. If this were the case, then it would still 
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be possible that the federal income tax system plays a role in redistributing the federal 
interest income received by large corporations.   
 
Table 7.2 adapts the empirical techniques for gauging the effects of the federal income 
tax system on the distribution of federal interest payments as outlined in Chapter Four 
and as first explored for the household sector in Chapter Six. In the first column we retain 
our three historical snapshot periods from Table 7.1. The second and third columns show 
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Figure 7.3 The Demise of Corporate Taxation 
 
Note: The effective corporate income tax rate is calculated by dividing federal 
revenues from corporate income tax by corporate gross (before-tax) profits.  
 
Source: For the bottom (thick) series, corporate income tax revenues and total federal 
revenues, the Office of Management and Budget, Table 2.1, (http://
www.whitehouse.gov/omb/budget/Historicals); for the top (thin) series, tax receipts 
on corporate income and corporate profits before taxes, Federal Reserve Economic 
Data (http://research.stlouisfed.org/fred2/) 
Federal Effective Corporate Income 
Tax Rate  
Corporate Income Tax Revenues 
(% of total federal revenues) 
percent percent 
sbhager.tumblr.com 
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the gross (before-tax) and net (after-tax) share of federal interest income received by 
large corporations respectively.61 The fourth column shows the ration between the gross 
and net shares of federal interest income received by large corporations. 
 
Table 7.2 Federal Income Tax Neutrality and the Corporate Sector  
 
Period Large Corporations 
Gross Interest Share 
Large Corporations 
Net Interest Share 
Ratio Gross/Net 
1957-61 66.3 66.1 1 
1977-81 64.6 61.6 1.05 
2006-10 81.7 81.3 1 
 
Note: The gross share of federal interest received by large corporations is assumed  
to be equal to their share of the public debt. The net share of interest is calculated by 
multiplying large corporations’ total gross share of interest by the differential 
components of the income tax rate (see footnote 62).  
 
Source: IRS Statistics of Income (http://www.irs.gov/uac/Tax-Stats-2).  
 
Recall from our discussion in Chapter Six that a progressive federal income tax system 
will make the net federal interest share of dominant owners, in this case the top 2500 
corporations, smaller than their gross interest share (the different between the gross and 
net shares will be positive).62 A regressive federal income tax system will make the net 
federal interest share of dominant owners larger than their gross interest share (the 
difference between the gross and net shares will be negative). And a neutral federal 
                                                
61 SOI data does not provide reliable data on the distribution of federal interest income, nor does it provide 
a breakdown of the different types of federal securities (e.g. Treasury bonds, bills, etc.) owned by 
corporations in the different asset classes, which would allow us to impute federal interest income by 
multiplying the dollar value of different types of federal securities by their corresponding interest rate (see 
Figure 6.3).  As a result, we are unable to measure with precision the distribution of federal interest income. 
The data in Table 7.2 merely assumes that the distribution of federal interest income is equal to the 
distribution of federal bonds.  
62 The net share of the top 1% in federal interest is calculated as follows: 
 !"#$%  !"#$"#%&'"()  !"#"$%&  !"#$$  !"#$%$&#  !"#"$%"&!"!#$  !"#"$%&  !"#$$  !"#$%$&#  !"#"$%"&   ×   !!  !"#$%  !"#$"#%&'"()  !""!#$%&!  !"#"$%&  !"#$%&  !"#  !"#$!!  !"#$!%#  !""!#$%&!  !"#"$%&  !"#$%&  !"#  !"#$  
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income tax system will keep the net and gross federal interest share of dominant owners 
the same.   
 
Tax Neutrality 
 
The data in the fourth column of Table 7.2 indicate that the ratio of the gross and net 
share of federal interest received by large corporations has remained remarkably constant 
over the past half century. Though the share of federal interest received by large 
corporations has become more concentrated, the federal income tax system has remained 
consistently neutral: the gross and net shares of federal interest are the same for all three 
periods.  
 Marx and other radical political economists have speculated that the public debt 
redistributes income upwards from the mass of taxpayers to the tiny elite or ‘aristocracy’ 
of public creditors. As should be clear by this point in the study, there is no way to 
empirically gauge whose interest payments are funded by whose taxes. Working within 
the empirical limits of government budget accounting, it is nevertheless evident that the 
federal income tax system has no effects, neither regressive nor progressive, on the 
distribution of federal interest income within the corporate sector.  
In short, the redistributive dynamics of the federal income tax system are a non-factor 
within corporate sector. Large corporations have greatly increased their share of federal 
bonds and federal interest income over the past three decades, while the federal income 
tax system has remained neutral. In Chapter Six we saw that since the early 1980s what 
the top 1% of households gives in federal income taxes is marginally progressive but has 
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failed to keep pace with what it receives in federal interest payments. For the corporate 
sector, this dynamic is even more pronounced: what the aristocracy of large corporations 
give in federal income taxes is neutral and has certainly not kept pace with what it 
receives in federal interest payments.  
 
Is the Aristocracy Still Financial?  
 
Of course the ‘aristocracy’ that Marx identified was specifically an aristocracy of finance, 
a group that comprised not only the ‘loan promoters and speculators’ (the modern day 
equivalent of investment banks) but ‘all modern finance’ and ‘the whole of the banking 
business’ that dominated the ownership and trading of government securities. It still 
remains to be seen whether ‘finance’, meaning institutions classified as financial 
intermediaries, still dominates the ownership of the public debt within the contemporary 
US corporate sector. In this section, we unpack corporate ownership of the public debt by 
sector, with the aim of determining whether the aristocracy of dominant owners mapped 
above still falls under the classification of financial intermediaries.  
 
FIRE Power 
 
Figure 7.4 traces the share of corporate holdings of the public debt owned by 
corporations within the Finance, Insurance and Real Estate (FIRE) sector. Once again the 
thick ‘broken’ series measures the share of federal bonds owned by the FIRE sector, 
while the thin dotted series measures its share of total (federal, state and local) 
government bonds. By both measures we can see that the share of the public debt owned 
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by FIRE has increased greatly since the 1950s. Even at its lowest point of 81 percent in 
1959, the FIRE sector was by far the most dominant corporate owner of the public debt, 
and over the past five decades its share has steadily increased. From 2000 to 2010 the 
FIRE sector owned on average 98 percent of the corporate share of the public debt.  
 
Expanding our empirical picture, we see that it is not just large corporations, but large 
FIRE corporations that are the dominant corporate owners of the public debt. And if we 
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Figure 7.4 FIRE's Ownership of the Public Debt Held by Corporations 
 
Note: Total government debt includes the local, state and federal levels.  
 
Source: IRS Statistics of Income (http://www.irs.gov/uac/Tax-Stats-2).  
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equate ‘finance’ narrowly with FIRE sector corporations, then it is difficult to deny the 
relevancy of Marx’s notion of an ‘aristocracy of finance’ that owns an increasingly 
concentrated share of the public debt.  
 
The Rise of Institutional Investors 
 
We can deepen our analysis by mapping the distribution of the public debt within the 
FIRE sector. Once again, the SOI data present a number of stumbling blocks in our 
efforts to develop a consistent time series of public debt ownership, this time for the 
distribution of the public debt within the FIRE sub-sector. From 1954 to 1997, the SOI 
data offered a sub-sectoral breakdown of the distribution of the public debt based on the 
Standard Industrial Classification (SIC). But since 1998, the IRS has used the North 
American Industrial Classification System (NAICS) to breakdown the sub-sectoral 
distribution of the public debt.  
Unfortunately these two classification systems are not compatible and the FIRE sector 
in particular underwent major changes with the shift from the SIC to the NAICS (see 
Ambler and Kristoff 1997; Krishnan and Press 2003). Some significant sub-sectors, such 
as bank holding companies, that were included in one category under SIC (depository 
institutions) were shifted to a completely different sub-sector in NAICS (the management 
of companies and enterprises). In other cases, entirely new sub-sectors were introduced in 
NAICS (e.g. funds trusts and other financial vehicles), which were spread across many 
different sub-sectors in SIC.  
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 These drastic changes that took place in the transition from SIC to NAICS make it 
impossible to construct a long-term time series of the sub-sectoral distribution of the 
public debt within FIRE. More reliable and consistent data can, however, be found in the 
Federal Reserve’s Flow of Funds Accounts. While the IRS SOI is focused specifically on 
financial corporations, the Federal Reserve’s Flow of Funds includes both incorporated 
and unincorporated financial businesses. Recall, though, from our discussion in Chapter 
Four the dominant position that the corporate sector has within the US system of business 
enterprise. Given the corporate sector’s domination of business sales and net income, we 
can use Flow of Funds data to compliment SOI data in order to analyze the distribution of 
public debt within the FIRE sector.63 Using flow of funds data, Figure 7.5 maps the 
distribution of the public debt by three main sub-sectors within FIRE: banking, insurance 
and money managers.  
In the post-World War II period banking institutions were clearly the dominant 
entities. From 1945 to the early 1970s the share of FIRE sector holdings of the public 
debt owned by banks oscillated between 73 and 80 percent. From the early 1970s 
onwards, the banks’ share has declined precipitously and stood at 12 percent at the end of 
2012. The declining share of the banks has been met by a rapid increase in the share of 
FIRE sector holdings of the public debt by money managers. In the postwar period 
money managers held on average only 8 percent of the FIRE sector holdings of the public 
debt. But this share started to skyrocket in the 1970s and by the end of 2012 stood at 79 
                                                
63 According to IRS Integrated Business Data, in 2008 corporations made up 20 percent of total business 
tax returns, 58 percent of total business net income and 87 percent of total business sales within the FIRE 
sector.  
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percent. Insurance companies, meanwhile, have held a fairly steady share of the FIRE 
sector’s holdings of the public debt. The share held by insurance companies has ranged 
from its peak of around 20 percent in the late 1940s, the early 1990s and the mid-2000s to 
a low of 7 percent in the mid-1970s.  
 
Our analysis of the sub-sectoral distribution of the public debt highlights changes that 
have taken place within the ‘aristocracy of finance’. While ‘traditional’ bank 
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Figure 7.5 The Sub-sectoral Distribution of the Public Debt within FIRE 
 
Note: 'Banks' includes depository institutions, foreign banking offices in the US and 
credit unions; 'Insurance' includes property-casualty and life insurance companies; 
'Funds' includes private pension funds, state and local employee retirement funds, 
federal government retirement funds, money market mutual funds, mutual funds, closed-
end funds and exchange-traded funds.  
 
Source: Federal Reserve's Flow of Funds Accounts (table L.209).  	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intermediaries were the dominant corporate owners of the public debt in the postwar 
period, their position has been usurped over the past four decades by institutional 
investors.64  
 
Conclusion 
 
The analysis in this chapter suggests that Marx’s ‘aristocracy of finance’ is still a very 
real feature of contemporary US capitalism. Though the data may be limited, the 
empirical analysis indicates that the pattern of corporate ownership of the public debt has 
become rapidly concentrated since the early 1980s, and especially in the context of the 
current crisis. The increasing concentration of the public debt in the hands of large 
corporations over the past three decades mirrors the ‘top heavy’ pattern of public debt 
ownership for the US household sector. H.C. Adams suggested that the bondholding class 
was comprised of wealthy individuals and large corporations. Given the fact that the 
ownership of the public debt by households and corporations at the top of the social 
hierarchy still move in tandem, and given the fact that the top 1% of households are the 
dominant ownership of corporate debt and equity, it is no stretch to say that these two 
entities are still two main components of the bondholding class.  
                                                
64 The late Keynesian economist Hyman Minsky (1996) and his followers have labeled the phase of 
capitalist development in the US since the 1970s as ‘money manager capitalism’ (see Nersisyan 2012). One 
of the main features of this new phase of capitalism is that highly leveraged institutional investors, 
especially pension and mutual funds, have replaced traditional banking intermediaries as the ‘…proximate 
owners of a vast proportion of financial instruments’ (Minsky 1996: 358). In a general sense, the Minskian 
notion of ‘money manager capitalism’ adequately describes the sub-sectoral pattern of public debt 
ownership outlined in Figure 7.5. 	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 While the federal income tax system was shown to be marginally progressive in the 
case of households, reducing very slightly the share of federal interest received by the top 
1%, it has been inconsequential in the case of the corporate sector. For the three historical 
periods analyzed, the effects of the federal income tax system have been completely 
neutral, even though the distribution of federal interest within the corporate sector has 
become more and more concentrated in favor of large corporations.  
 Finally, our sectoral and sub-sectoral analysis of the pattern of public debt ownership 
for the corporate sector indicates that the FIRE sector has greatly increased its already 
significant share of the public debt over the past half century. If we equate finance 
narrowly with the FIRE sector, then the ‘aristocracy’ of powerful business groups that 
dominates ownership of the public debt is still very much ‘financial’. Digging deeper into 
sub-sectoral level, we see that institutional investors have replaced banks as the major 
owners of the public debt.  
Taken together, the empirical analysis in Chapters Six and Seven points toward a 
powerful block of dominant owners of the public debt. Having mapped the distributive 
and redistributive dynamics of the public debt, we are now ready to conclude the study by 
considering some of the implications of these findings.  
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Appendix  
 
The only source for disaggregate data on corporate ownership of the public debt is the 
IRS Statistics of Income. These data are not available through an organized database: the 
research has to hand pluck data from the yearly releases of corporate tax reports from the 
IRS Tax Statistics webpage and that are available in PDF (from 1954 to 1993) and 
spreadsheet (from 1994 to 2010) formats.65  
To give a sense of the procedures involved in collecting the data, Figure 7.6 
reproduces the relevant balance sheet from Table 2 of the 1993 IRS Corporate Income 
Tax Returns report. The table ranks corporations according to the size of their total assets, 
with 6,798 corporations meeting the criterion of $250 million in assets or more for 1993 
(column 13). The breakdown of the ownership of the public debt by the various asset 
classes is given in the rows “Investments in Government Obligations” (federal 
government securities) and “Tax Exempt Securities” (state and local government 
securities).  
We can use the data on “Investments in Government Obligations” to calculate public 
debt ownership concentration for the corporate sector. As we see from the balance sheet 
tables in Figure 7.6, large corporations (those with total assets of $250 million or more) 
held approximately $1.1 trillion in federal securities in 1993. In distributive terms, this 
amount is equal to about 85 percent of the $1.3 trillion in federal securities held by the 
corporate sector as whole. In differential terms, the average large corporation owned 
                                                
65 The IRS Tax Statistics homepage can be reached through by the following url: 
http://www.irs.gov/uac/Tax-Stats-2 [accessed 9 April 2013].  
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$162 million in federal securities ($1.1 trillion / 6,798 large corporations), while the 
average corporation owned $325 000 in federal securities ($1.3 trillion / 3,964,629 
corporations). Thus, in 1993 the differential amount of public debt owned by the average 
large corporation was about 500 times larger than the amount of public debt owned by 
the average corporation (see Figure 7.2).  
 
Figure 7.6 The IRS Statistics of Income Data: A Sample 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: IRS Statistics of Income (1993: 37-8).  
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8  Conclusion 
  America’s Real ‘Debt Dilemma’ 
 
 
 
 …the exercise of power is the most intoxicating of narcotics. Sexual power, the 
power of wealth, the power which can grind to a stop the wheels of industry at a 
mere lifting of a finger, that can hold a whole nation dithering in fear, the power of 
the blackmailer – what does it matter what kind of power it is? It’s always the same 
potent drug, desirable for its own sake 
 —Anthony Burgess66 
 
 
Introduction 
 
The purpose of this concluding chapter is four-fold. First, I outline some of the 
limitations of this exploratory study and suggest some avenues for future research. In 
particular, I suggest that future research efforts be concentrated on incorporating other 
major sectoral entities (e.g. the Federal Reserve and the foreign sector) into the 
quantitative map of US public debt ownership, on expanding the research into countries 
other than the US, and on analyzing in greater detail the consequences of the historical 
changes in the distributive and redistributive dynamics of the US public debt examined in 
this study.  
Second, I summarize the research findings in order to recap what we have learned 
from the analysis and how it relates to the existing literature that was surveyed in Chapter 
Two. Dividing the research results into five historical phases, I show how the power-
centered analysis developed in this study offers a nuanced understanding of the 
                                                
66 Burgess, A. 1978. 1985, 1st Edition, Boston: Little, Brown and Company, p. 185. 
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distributive and redistributive dynamics of the public debt, one that allows us to 
overcome the lack of consensus that plagues the existing literature.  
Third, I discuss some of the implications of this research for current debates about the 
explosive rise in the US public debt that has taken place in the wake of the current 
financial crisis. Current debates suggest that the US faces a ‘debt dilemma’ over whether 
to bring its fiscal house into order through tax hikes on the super-rich or spending cuts to 
America’s supposedly ‘bloated’ social programs (Harding 2013). Though the debates 
recognize that relations of power are at the heart of debt repayment and fiscal re-
adjustment, they do not go one step further and examine, as this study has, the power 
relations that underpin the very existence of the public debt. I argue that once we take 
seriously the distributive and redistributive dynamics of the public debt analyzed in this 
study we come to a completely different understanding of the ‘debt dilemma’ currently 
faced by the US. In short, the real debt dilemma is that, in the absence of progressive 
spending or taxation, policy actions to both increase and decrease the public debt cannot 
be instituted without causing major social upheaval.  
Fourth, I address one potential counter-argument that is likely to arise in light of the 
conclusions of this study. For some observers, the conclusions reached here may seem 
somewhat counter-intuitive if not completely contradictory. After all, during the 
neoliberal era we have been taught to believe that the ruling class is adverse to big 
government and to large public debts. And if that is the case, can the public debt serve as 
an institution of power when the most powerful seem so opposed to it?  
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I argue that ruling class opposition to the public debt is more apparent than real for 
two reasons. On the one hand, if we look closely at ruling class initiatives for public debt 
reduction, they focus almost solely on cuts to social entitlement programs and advocate a 
‘pro-growth’ tax regime to enable tax reduction. What the ruling class therefore seeks, I 
argue, is not debt reduction per se, but austerity. Fear mongering about the public debt is 
a ploy to broaden support for this austerity agenda. On the other hand, I argue that if we 
want to understand how the ruling class really feels about the public debt, we can look 
back to their response to Clinton-era budget surpluses, which many projected would set 
the federal government on the path towards eliminating its debt entirely. The prospect of 
debt elimination received a lukewarm response at best from powerful financial 
corporations, who feared the consequences of the outright disappearance of ‘risk free’ 
federal assets from their balance sheets. This raises an important question: if the ruling 
class offers a lukewarm reaction to substantial public debt in times of prosperity, how 
seriously are we to take similar claims in a period of systemic global crisis?   
 In the remainder of this chapter, I address all four of these points in turn.  
 
Future Directions: Navigating the Map 
 
As with any exploratory research project, the analysis here is likely to raise as many 
questions as it answers. Our quantitative mapping of the distributive and redistributive 
dynamics of the public debt, as I will argue later in this concluding chapter, provides new 
insights that help to overcome the lack of consensus within the existing literature. But 
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there are still many different avenues of research that remain to be explored. In this 
section, I discuss some priority areas for future research in this area.    
 One of the most obvious priorities for future research involves expanding the 
quantitative map. As Chapter Five made clear, the foreign sector and the Federal Reserve 
are two entities that own significant portions of the US public debt. And the share of the 
public debt owned by these entities needs to be carefully analyzed and assessed alongside 
the disaggregate analysis developed in Chapters Six and Seven.  
Another priority has to do with extending the research to analyze the distributive and 
redistributive dynamics of the public debt for countries other than the US. A comparative 
analysis of these dynamics that places the US experience alongside different types or 
‘varieties’ of capitalist states would help to deepen our understanding of the power 
relations of public indebtedness. How does, for example, the pattern of public debt 
ownership in similar political economies such as the United Kingdom and Canada, 
compare to the US experience? What role does the income tax system in these countries 
play in redistributing federal interest income? How does the pattern of public debt 
ownership and the role of the federal income tax system in other advanced capitalist 
countries with quite different political economies, such as Sweden, Germany and Japan, 
compare to the US experience? Are the bondholding classes of these countries more or 
less powerful domestically than the US bondholding class? And how do the dynamics in 
all of these national contexts change over time?  
 Any attempt to tackle these important comparative questions is likely to encounter 
major stumbling blocks. As we have seen in this study of the US experience, the 
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disaggregate data that allow us to map the distributive and redistributive dynamics of the 
public debt is frustratingly patchy. And yet the US generally offers the most reliable and 
extensive statistics, both aggregate and disaggregate. The challenges we have 
encountered in this study of the US experience are likely to be amplified when studying 
other national contexts.  
Perhaps the most important area of future research will involve examining in much 
greater detail the consequences of the research findings in this study. We now have, for 
the first time, a reasonable quantitative map of the historical pattern of public debt 
ownership and the redistributive consequences associated with that ownership pattern. 
And according to the alternative ‘capital as power’ framework sketched in Chapter Four, 
the dynamics of distribution and redistribution represent the quantitative architecture or 
manifestation of the power of dominant owners of the public debt. But in order to further 
substantiate this theoretical claim, we need to look more closely at the effects of these 
dynamics on both government behavior and policy-making and on society more broadly. 
Part of the task of deepening the analysis of the effects of power will involve further 
quantitative work that correlates the distributive and redistributive dynamics of the public 
debt with other quantitative indicators.  
For example, we could correlate the pattern of public debt ownership with other public 
finance data in order to gauge how, if at all, changes in ownership (read power) affect 
government spending patterns, tax policies, monetary policies, etc. Of course the 
robustness of any correlation between these two quantitative realms will depend on our 
abilities to weave in a qualitative account that speculatively links the two together. Does 
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the qualitative evidence suggest that government officials fear reprisals from bondholders 
when the public debt becomes more heavily concentrated in the hand of dominant 
bondholders? What do dominant bondholders themselves claim to want from government 
policy? In-depth interviews with government officials and dominant bondholders, as well 
as more extensive archival research of official government documents and the 
publications of dominant bondholders, would provide starting points for this qualitative 
analysis.  
Another example of how to deepen this study would be to examine the effects of the 
rise of institutional investors or ‘money managers’ as dominant corporate owners of the 
public debt. As we saw in Chapter Seven, money managers have replaced bank 
intermediaries as the major corporate bondholders over the past three decades. Yet it is 
unclear what the consequences of this shift are. When it comes to the US overall political 
economy, Hyman Minsky (1996: 358) claims that the rise of money managers as the 
‘…proximate owners of a vast proportion of financial instruments’ has had a 
destabilizing influence. According to this line of argument, money managers are 
distinguished from other capitalist investors in seeking to maximize the short-term total 
return on their investments (ibid: 358–9). And this short-term maximizing behavior leads 
to heightened uncertainty and predatory business practices, as companies are pressured to 
downsize and cut costs in order to boost short-term profits and share prices. Minksy’s 
followers now claim that the rise of money manager capitalism is an important factor 
lying at the root of the current global financial crisis (Wray 2009, 2011; Whalen 2008).  
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When it comes to the public debt, though, neither Minsky nor his followers have 
offered an examination of the effects of the rise of money managers as the dominant 
owners of the public debt. An important avenue for future research would be to explore 
the ‘money manager capitalism’ thesis specifically as it relates to the distributive and 
redistributive dynamics of the public debt. What are the investment strategies of money 
managers that dominate the federal bond market? Do these money managers seek to 
‘maximize’ short-term returns by investing in the public debt, or maybe their concerns 
are longer term in nature and/or differential in character? What are the broader effects of 
money managers’ investment strategies in the federal bond market? Does the shift from 
banks to money managers as the dominant corporate owners of the public debt lead to 
increased uncertainty/volatility and ‘predatory’ behavior by the federal government? 
Once again, an analysis exploring these questions would involve extensive quantitative 
research that examines federal bond market volatility and data on public finance. Such an 
analysis would also involve qualitative research, such as in-depth interviews with, and 
archival analysis of the documents of, government officials and money managers.  
These are all big questions that fall outside of the scope of this exploratory study. With 
this basic research now having been conducted and a more extensive quantitative map 
now in place, we have a better sense of the future course we need to navigate in order to 
deepen our understanding of the distributive and redistributive dynamics of the public 
debt.  
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Beyond Dissensus: The Nuances of Power 
 
Now that we have discussed the limits of this study and the priority areas of future 
research, we can turn to summarize and assess this study’s findings. In Chapter Four, I 
argued that the alternative capital as power framework developed in this study will 
ultimately be judged on two grounds: (1) the empirical insights that it generates; (2) 
whether these empirical insights help us to overcome the protracted lack of consensus 
that plagues the existing literature on the distributive and redistributive dynamics of the 
public debt. With the general contours of these dynamics mapped in Chapters Six and 
Seven, we are now ready to assess, however tentatively, the empirical contribution of this 
theoretical framework.  
As we saw in Chapters Two and Three, the existing literature has based its claims 
about the distributive and redistributive dynamics of the public debt on weak and 
sometimes no empirical foundations. The handful of empirical studies that do exist use 
limited data, often based on snapshots for single years, in order to make trans-historic 
claims about distribution of the public debt and its redistributive consequences. Anchored 
in thin empirics, the public debt is either proclaimed to be widely held and to redistribute 
income progressively or to be heavily concentrated and to redistribute income 
regressively. Within the existing literature there is no attempt to deepen these claims by 
subjecting them to historical scrutiny. As a result, we are left with gaping holes in our 
knowledge of how the distributive and redistributive dynamics of the public debt evolve 
over time.  
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The historical research in Chapters Six and Seven offers a more extensive analysis and 
leads to a different assessment of these dynamics. Above all, what this research indicates 
is that neither position within the existing literature – whether claiming that the public 
debt is widely held and progressive or that it is heavily concentrated and regressive – 
stands as a trans-historic reality. Over the past century, the distributive and redistributive 
dynamics of the public debt have been transformed alongside deeper changes in the US 
political economy. These transformations uncovered through empirical research bring 
into question the trans-historic claims of the existing literature and allow us to formulate 
a more nuanced assessment of the power relations of public indebtedness as they have 
unfolded over time. For the sake of brevity, the empirical results of this study can be 
roughly divided into five historical phases: (1) Phase I, the ‘Roaring Twenties’ (1920-
1929); (2) Phase II, the Great Depression and World War II (ca. 1930–1945); (2) Phase 
III, the postwar ‘Golden Age’ (ca. 1946-1970); and Phase IV, the neoliberal period (ca. 
1971–2007); and Phase V, the current global financial crisis (ca. 2007–present).  
 
Phase I: The ‘Roaring Twenties’ (1920-1929) 
 
In Chapter Six we saw that, in the 1920s, the earliest period for which reliable data are 
available, the share of federal bonds held by the top 1% of US households was at its high 
point. In 1922 the top 1% owned 45 percent of the household share of the public debt, 
and this ‘top heavy’ distribution mirrored the top 1% concentration in the ownership of 
net wealth more generally, which reached its own high point of 44 percent in 1929. Thus 
in the 1920s, over three decades after Adams (1887) produced his pioneering analysis, it 
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appears that the bondholding class, at least its household component, was still a very 
powerful feature of the US political economy.  
Despite record levels of ownership concentration in the 1920s, the historical record 
does not show much in the way of an academic or a public debate over the distributive 
and redistributive dynamics of the public debt during this phase. There are at least two 
plausible, if speculative, reasons for this lack of debate.  
First, we do not have much in the way of consistent historical data on the pattern of 
public debt ownership before 1922. In the case of households, the concentration of the 
public debt in the hands of the top 1% may have been much higher, or at least may have 
been perceived to be much higher, in the years prior to 1922. A downward trajectory in 
the rate of ownership concentration would make the issue seem less immediate and 
explain the lack of debate about what appears to be an extremely ‘top heavy’ pattern of 
ownership concentration.  
Second, we know that the level of US public debt as a percentage of GDP declined 
significantly during this phase (see Figure 2.1). In 1921 the US public debt stood at 41 
percent of GDP and fell to 16 percent by 1929. The sharp decline in the level of US 
public debt may also help to explain the absence of debate over the distributive and 
redistributive dynamics of the public debt in the 1920s.  
 
Phase II: The Great Depression and World War II (1930-1945) 
 
In the context of the Great Depression and World War II the situation changed 
dramatically. From 18 percent of GDP in 1930 the US public debt escalated to 122 
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percent of GDP in 1945. And as we saw in Chapter Two, this explosive rise in public 
debt sparked a widespread debate about the distributive and redistributive dynamics of 
public debt.  
As part of their macro-economic strategy to boost effective aggregate demand through 
active government intervention, the Keynesians tried to show how a rapidly growing 
public debt could be used to achieve non-inflationary full employment. In supplanting the 
traditional doctrine of ‘sound’ finance, the early Keynesian theorists had to come up with 
new explanations of the functions and limits of government borrowing in capitalist 
societies. The one major objection Keynesians conceded might be raised against a rapidly 
growing public debt had to do with the negative effects it would have on the distribution 
of wealth and income.  
Perhaps with the extremes of inequality experienced in earlier US capitalism still fresh 
in their memories, Keynesians warned that in the event of large and rapid increases in the 
public debt, the rich would disproportionately purchase government bonds. This would 
eventually aggravate the deficiency of effective demand and undermine the government’s 
ability to engage in counter-cyclical deficit spending. During this period, concerns over 
the potentially negative effects of a growing public debt on the distribution of income and 
wealth were not confined to academic circles. As we saw in throughout this study, high-
ranking politicians such as former Treasury Secretary Henry Morgenthau Jr., and even 
powerful business figures, expressed concerns about the distributive and redistributive 
dynamics of the public debt.  
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In the end, however, early Keynesians were confident that the growing levels of public 
debt in the 1930s and 1940s would not have any serious negative effects on the 
distribution of wealth and income. Though they had no data to back up their claim, 
Hansen and Greer (1942: 497) confidently declared that government bonds were more 
widely distributed in the 1940s than they had been at any other point in US history. The 
limited disaggregate data for US households during this period corroborate this claim. As 
we saw in Chapter Six, the top 1% owned 33 percent of the household share of the public 
debt in 1945, a significant drop from its historically high share of 45 percent in 1922. 
Again the distribution of the public debt mirrored the general pattern of wealth 
inequality: in 1945 the top 1% owned 30 percent of net wealth, also a significant drop 
from its high of 44 percent in 1929.  
 
Phase III: The Postwar ‘Golden Age’ (1946-1970) 
 
If concerns about the distributive and redistributive dynamics of the public debt were 
alleviated somewhat by the circumstances of Phase II, they were altogether nullified by 
the circumstances of Phase III, the postwar ‘Golden Age’. During this phase, referred to 
by Bob Jessop (2002) as the era of the ‘Keynesian Welfare National State’, the US public 
debt plummeted from its WWII highs, falling steadily from 122 percent of GDP in 1945 
to 39 percent in 1970. This is also the period in which reliable and extensive disaggregate 
data first becomes available. The empirical research in Chapters Six and Seven helps us 
to explain at least in part why researchers abandoned concern for the disaggregate 
ownership of the public debt and its redistributive consequences.  
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As we saw in Chapter Six, the share of the public debt owned by the top 1% fell in the 
postwar period, reaching its nadir of 17 percent in 1969. Also during this period, we 
estimated that the impact of the federal income tax system on the distribution of federal 
interest income within the household sector was neutral (i.e. the ratio between the gross 
and net share of federal interest received by the top 1% was close to 1).  
 This is also the period in which we find the first reliable data on the disaggregate 
ownership of the public debt for the corporate sector. By both distributive and differential 
measures, the share of corporate holdings of the public debt owned by large corporations 
during the postwar period, represented by the historical snapshot data for 1957-61, was 
very low relative to subsequent periods. Much like the US household sector, the federal 
income tax system had no impact on the distribution of federal interest income within the 
corporate sector during this period.  
In the 1950s and 1960s the public debt had become more widely held than at any other 
point in history for which data is available. And this was also a period in which wealth 
and income were more equitably distributed than at any other point in history for which 
data is available. This period coincides with the disappearance of the class distributive 
and redistributive dynamics of the public debt from the political economic literature. The 
image of a powerful bondholding class seemed to be a relic confined to an earlier phase 
of capitalist development.  
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Phase IV: Neoliberalism (1971-2007) 
 
The shift from the postwar ‘Golden Age’ of the Keynesian Welfare National State to 
neoliberalism, which began in the early 1970s, was bound up with the transformation of 
the power relations of public indebtedness. Save for a brief period of decline associated 
with the Clinton-era budget surpluses, the public debt steadily climbed over this period 
from 38 percent of GDP in 1971 to 70 percent of GDP in 2007. And with these steady 
increases came a renewed debate about the distributive and redistributive dynamics of the 
public debt.  
 As we saw in Chapter Two, a small handful of political economists has rejected the 
mainstream fixation with ‘inter-generational redistribution’ and focused their attention on 
the disaggregate power relations that underpin the public debt. On the one hand, a group 
of heterodox political economists argue that during this period ownership of the public 
debt was highly concentrated and that interest payments on government bonds 
redistributed income regressively. On the other hand, orthodox Keynesians follow 
Hansen and Lerner and insist that, even with the onset of neoliberalism, the public debt 
was still widely held and had no regressive effects on the distribution of wealth and 
income.  
 The empirical evidence presented in Chapters Six and Seven helps us to assess these 
competing claims. For the US household sector, the 1970s, as we saw in Chapter Six, 
present an empirical blind spot. Since at least the early 1980s, however, the distribution 
of federal bonds and interest has, much like the distribution of wealth and income more 
generally, become increasingly unequal. The top 1% share of the public debt stood at 33 
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percent in 1983, nearly doubling the share that it held in 1969. And by 2007, the top 1% 
share increased further to 38 percent. As a result, the ownership of federal bonds and 
federal interest mirrors the U-shaped pattern of general wealth and income distribution 
since the early 1900s. Furthermore, over the neoliberal period, the federal income tax 
system and the transfer payments that flow from intra-government debt have done little to 
counteract this widening inequality.  
 Chapter Seven also indicated fundamental transformations during the neoliberal period 
in relation to the corporate ownership of the public debt. From the postwar (1957–61) to 
the early neoliberal period (1977–81) the conventional distributive measure of ownership 
concentration experienced very little change, as the corporate share of the public debt 
owned by large corporations fell from 66 percent to 65 percent. Yet according to the 
differential measure, the ratio between the public debt ownership of a large corporation 
and the average corporation more than doubled over this same period from 302 in 1957–
61 to 616 in 1977–81.  
However, the most profound changes in the corporate pattern of public debt ownership 
took place from the early neoliberal period (1977–81) to the late neoliberal period (2006–
2010). The latter years of this late neoliberal period (since 2008) will be discussed as part 
of Phase V below. Yet before the onset of the current crisis, there were still obvious 
changes that had taken place within the corporate sector. From 65 percent in the 1977–81 
period the distributive share of the public debt owned by large corporations increased to 
79 percent in 2007. Meanwhile the differential ratio between the public debt ownership of 
a large corporation and the average corporation increased from 616 in 1977–81 to 1619 in 
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2007. Much like for the US household sector, the federal income tax system had no effect 
on the distribution of federal interest income. According to our estimates in Chapter 
Seven, large corporations greatly increased their share of federal bonds and federal 
interest income over the course of the neoliberal period, while the federal income tax 
system remained neutral.  
As a result, the empirical research presented in this study supports the claims made by 
the small handful of heterodox political economists about the regressive dynamics of 
public indebtedness over the neoliberal period. On the flipside, the evidence flies in the 
face of claims made by orthodox Keynesians: there is simply no evidence to support their 
claim that the public debt serves the interests of ‘John Q. Public’. Over the neoliberal 
period, the public debt has come to serve as an institution of power working in the 
interests of the dominant owners: the top 1% of households and large corporations. 
Though much has changed since Adams’s time, the analysis in Chapters Six and Seven 
indicates that the power of the bondholding class has become resurgent during the 
neoliberal phase of US capitalism.  
 
Phase V: The Global Financial Crisis (2007-present) 
 
Perhaps the most striking thing revealed in the empirical analysis of this study is the 
dramatic changes that have unfolded with the onset of the current global financial crisis 
since 2008. In the wake of the current financial crisis the debt of the US federal 
government has increased from 64 percent of GDP in 2007 to 103 percent in 2012 (see 
Figure 2.1). This is the first time that the US public debt has breached the 100 percent of 
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GDP mark outside of World War II. And due to soaring costs associated with an ageing 
population, some expect the federal debt to balloon further without drastic changes to 
existing budget policies. 
 With this explosive rise in public indebtedness has come a rapid increase in public 
debt ownership concentration for both the household and corporation sectors. In Chapter 
Six, we saw that the top 1% increased its share of household holdings of the public debt 
from 38 percent in 2007 to 42 percent in 2010. In Chapter Seven, we saw that large 
corporations increased their share of corporate holdings of the public debt from 79 
percent in 2007 to 86 percent in 2010. And in differential terms, the ratio between the 
public debt ownership of a large corporation and the average corporation increased from 
1619 in 2007 to 2097 in 2010. Once again for both sectors the federal income tax system 
has done little to offset the increasingly ‘top heavy’ distribution of federal interest income 
during the crisis.   
What makes the crisis-era distributive and redistributive dynamics of the public debt 
all the more interesting is that they have been completely ignored in current academic and 
public debates. Of course the recent explosive rise in the US public debt has generated a 
lot of controversy and heated discussion. But the attention of academics, politicians and 
various other pundits has been focused on debating who should bear the burden of 
repaying the enormous sums of public debt that have been contracted in the wake of the 
current crisis.  
On the one side, there are those, including the corporate-led ‘Fix the Debt’ campaign, 
which argue that the US should reduce its public debt immediately, otherwise it will face 
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Greek-style bankruptcy and leave a crippling burden for ‘future generations’ (Cote 2012; 
Ferguson 2009, 2010). The preferred method for reducing the debt is austerity that will 
cut spending to America’s ‘bloated’ social programs (Kotlikoff 2010). On the other side, 
there are those, including the ‘Flip the Debt’ campaign associated with the Occupy 
movement, which urge caution and argue that the public debt has been a necessary 
component of the federal government’s crisis-management policies (Krugman 2012b; 
Wolf 2013; Summers 2013). With stubbornly high unemployment and increasing income 
and wealth inequality, the preferred method of gradually reducing the debt is tax hikes on 
the ‘super-rich’ that have gained the most from the political economic regime in place 
since the early 1980s (Buffett 2011, 2012; Sachs 2012).   
 
The Crisis and the ‘Debt Dilemma’ 
 
A recent series in the Financial Times has dubbed these debates over whether the public 
debt should be repaid primarily through tax hikes or through spending cuts as ‘America’s 
debt dilemma’ (Harding 2013). Thanks to the efforts of the ‘Flip the Debt’ and other 
progressive movements issues of power and inequality have been forced into the current 
debate over the ‘debt dilemma’. Their slogan – ‘Hey 1%! Pay your damn taxes!’ – places 
the responsibility for debt reduction should fall squarely on the shoulders of the large 
corporations and the top 1% that have ‘stolen’ an estimated $2.3 trillion using tax 
loopholes, offshore tax havens and tax cuts. ‘Flip the Debt’ sees the explosive increase in 
the public debt as an outcome of growing inequality and calls on those at the top of this 
increasingly unequal society to pay their ‘fair share’ to help reduce it. 
 
 
 
 210 
Yet what is most interesting about this often-vicious debate is not the questions that 
get answered, but the ones that are overlooked. One such question is why must the public 
debt be repaid? Whether mainstream or critical, all participants in this debate assume 
that, sooner or later, either through spending cuts or tax hikes, the public debt will have to 
be reduced from its current levels. The refusal even to contemplate alternatives to debt 
reduction points to the unquestioned sanctity of creditworthiness and ‘sound finance’ 
within contemporary capitalist society (Graeber 2011, p. 3).67  
Most importantly, the current debate also overlooks the question of whose interests are 
served by the public debt. As the research in this study suggests, the question of power is 
not only central to the issue of public debt repayment, but to the very existence of the 
public in the first place. Using power-centered accounting techniques and methods, the 
empirical analysis presented in this study suggests that the current debate is missing a big 
part of the overall picture.  
The public debt is not, as the current debate would have us believe, simply related to 
the issue of inequality through the issue of debt repayment. Rather the public debt, 
through the power dynamics of ownership distribution and redistribution, directly 
contributes to income and wealth inequality in America. The top 1% of households and 
the large corporations have greatly increased their share of federal bonds and federal 
interest over the past three decades or so. Over this period, and especially in the context 
                                                
67 By accepting the ‘sound finance’ doctrine, even progressive voices often fall into the trap of thinking 
about the government budget as if it were the budget of a household or a corporation. Yet as we saw in 
Chapter Five, and as proponents of Post Keynesian Modern Monetary Theory (MMT) explain, a monetarily 
sovereign (i.e. fiat currency-issuing) entity like the US federal government is never revenue constrained 
like a household or corporation and technically can never go bankrupt (see Wray 2012). This simple 
observation suggests that there are no inherent limits on government borrowing. These limits must 
necessarily be political.  
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of the current crisis, the public debt has served more and more to augment and reinforce 
the power of the ‘bondholding class’ at the very top of the social hierarchy.   
Of course talk of the power of the bond market and the almighty ‘bond market 
vigilantes’ has increased in the context of the current crisis. The ‘bond market’, however, 
is treated within these discussions as an impersonal, even mystical, force, rather than an 
identifiable class or social group. By remaining anonymous, talk of the almighty ‘bond 
market’, much like the debate over ‘inter-generational redistribution’ outlined in Chapter 
Two, only serves to strengthen the power of dominant owners of the public debt.  
 
The Real Debt Dilemma 
 
What if, as this study claims, questions of power are not only central to the issue of 
public debt repayment, but also to the very existence of the public debt in the first place? 
What if the public debt is not simply related to inequality but also part of its cause? How 
would our understanding of the ‘debt dilemma’ change if we started to ask these 
questions? Once these power relations underpinning public indebtedness are brought to 
the fore, we gain a totally different understanding of America’s ‘debt dilemma’.  
On the one hand, the results of this study suggest that the federal government faces a 
dilemma in trying to reduce the public debt. Attempts to reduce the privately held portion 
of the public debt are likely to encounter resistance from the ‘bondholding class’ of 
dominant household and corporate owners. During the current crisis, federal bonds have 
served as a ‘safe haven’ for investors, and as we saw in Chapters Six and Seven, the top 
1% and the large corporations have greatly increased their ownership share in the past 
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few years. Without any signs of recovery, dominant owners are unlikely to want to 
relinquish these ‘risk-free’ assets. Efforts to reduce the debt are therefore likely to target 
the intra-governmental debt, which, although increasingly regressive, still works broadly 
in the interests of the bottom 99%. Reducing intra-governmental debt held in government 
trust fund accounts is tantamount to gutting social programs. Given the state of wealth 
and income inequality in America, it is worth questioning whether an austerity drive of 
this type can occur without causing major social upheaval.  
On the other hand, the results of this study also suggest that the federal government 
faces a dilemma in trying to increase the public debt. Again taking into consideration the 
current state of wealth and income inequality, any further increases to the privately held 
portion of the public debt are likely to be purchased by dominant owners. Adding to the 
outstanding public debt is therefore likely to further skew the concentration of federal 
bonds and federal interest and contribute directly to growing income and wealth 
inequality. And this potential dynamic brings with it its own questions about whether any 
policy actions that further increase wealth and income inequality can be implemented 
without encountering further resistance from the bottom 99%.  
Without progressive redistributive spending and/or tax policies, actions to decrease 
and increase the public debt are both liable to aggravate an already explosive situation 
characterized by deepening social inequality. This is America’s real debt dilemma. And 
this dilemma only makes sense once we investigate the power dynamics of distribution 
and redistribution that underpin the public debt.  
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The Ruling Class and Debt Reduction 
 
For some, these conclusions may seem somewhat counter-intuitive if not completely 
contradictory: isn’t the ruling class adverse to big government and public debt? How can 
the public debt serve as an institution of power when the most powerful seem so opposed 
to it? Consider the high profile ‘Fix the Debt’ campaign that is led by billionaire fiscal 
conservative Pete Peterson and supported by CEOs from dominant corporations such as 
Bank of America, Boeing, Citigroup, General Electric, Goldman Sachs, Honeywell, 
Microsoft, Time Warner and Verizon (see Confessore 2013).68  
‘Fix the Debt’ does indeed advocate debt reduction. But the ‘fix’ that the campaign 
prescribes is focused almost solely on cuts to social security, Medicare and Medicaid 
programs, along with promoting a ‘pro-growth’ tax regime that would introduce 
unspecified measures to broaden the tax revenue base and at the same time reduce tax 
rates (Krugman 2012c). Fear mongering about the public debt and budget deficits is just a 
means for ‘Fix the Debt’ to push through an austerity agenda, one that, in the words of a 
recent editorial in The Nation (2013), is bent on ‘…making the 99% pay to make the 
wealthiest 1% a whole lot wealthier’.  
To understand how the ruling class really views debt reduction, we can look back at a 
rare but recent instance in US history when there was a serious prospect for public debt 
                                                
68 A recent study by Page, Bartels and Seawright (2013: 55–6) appears to lend credence to this view. In 
their survey, these researchers surveyed a sample of wealthy individuals within the top 1% and asked them 
to identify ‘very important problems’ currently faced by the US. 87 percent of the individuals sampled 
identified ‘budget deficits’ as one of these problems. In fact, the top 1% cited budget as a ‘very important 
problem’ more than any other issue, including unemployment (84 percent), education (79 percent) and 
international terrorism (74 percent). In contrast, a survey of general public opinion by CBS found that only 
7 percent of people identified budget deficits and public debt as the most important problem facing the 
country.  
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elimination. During the second administration of Bill Clinton the federal government ran 
budget surpluses and began to significantly reduce the public debt. And by the turn of the 
millennium, many were forecasting that the public debt would soon be eliminated 
altogether.  
Of course these forecasts now appear farcical with the public debt nearing 100 percent 
of GDP. But what is interesting is the lukewarm response to the prospect of debt 
elimination from powerful financial interests. Rather than celebrate the Clinton-era 
surpluses, financial groups started to worry about the implications of the rapid 
disappearance of federal bonds, which provide not only a massive and liquid financial 
market, but which are also the benchmark asset used to price all other types of assets 
(Reiner 2001). And in a telling 2001 speech to the Bond Market Association, Federal 
Reserve Chairman Alan Greenspan spent a great deal of effort trying to justify budget 
surpluses by placating fears about the negative effects of debt retirement on financial 
markets.69 If the ruling class response to debt reduction in periods of confidence is 
lukewarm, then how seriously should we take its calls for debt reduction in a period of 
global crisis? How can we treat the current calls for debt reduction as anything but fear 
mongering that serves some ulterior motive?  
 
 
 
                                                
69 Economist Bill Mitchell (2010) notes how in 2002 the Australian experience may have ‘given the game 
away’ in regards to ruling class sentiments about the public debt. That year the Australian government was 
running massive and growing budget surpluses yet continued to issue significant sums of government 
bonds. The reason? Powerful financial institutions started to protest against the ‘thinning’ of the bond 
market.  
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Conclusion: The Dilemmas of Power 
 
Of course there is nothing particularly novel in suggesting that the ‘Fix the Debt’ 
campaign is mostly a ploy to broaden support for an austerity agenda. This argument has 
been made not only by the Occupy-inspired ‘Flip the Debt’ movement but also by 
mainstream economists such as Paul Krugman (2012c, 2013).  
What is novel about the approach taken here is that it allows us to move beyond the 
narrow debate over the ‘debt dilemma’ and look at power underpinnings of the public 
debt. By mapping the distributive and redistributive dynamics of the public debt we come 
to a more nuanced understanding of the complex ways in which the ruling class wields 
power through the institution of public borrowing.  
Rather than debate the ruling class on its own terms, those who oppose the austerity 
agenda and growing socio-economic inequality might do well to think seriously about the 
power relations examined in this study and articulate an alternative view of America’s 
‘debt dilemma’. After all, the power of dominant owners of the public debt exists only to 
the extent that other elements of the population accept it. By mapping the dynamics of 
distribution and redistribution that underpin the public debt we gain a better 
understanding of the possibilities for, and also the barriers to, more progressive 
alternatives to a political economic regime that a growing number of people now believe 
works in the interest of the those at the very top of the social hierarchy. 
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